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4 FEBRUARY 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

IZVESTIYA ARTICLE DENIES SDI FEASIBILITY

Part I

PM050953 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Part one of article by L. Semeyko: "SDI and the White House Myths"]

[Text] I

When analyzing the meeting in Reykjavik and its consequences each of us inevitably comes into contact with that Washington "star" stone which sank the preliminary accords that had been reached on nuclear disarmament. The name of the stone is SDI. Let us look at it and at the actual idea of creating a space shield ("astrodome," as it is often called in the United States) from various angles.

From the scientific (purely theoretical, near ideal) viewpoint, the creation of an effective, extensive ABM system in space is, perhaps, possible. Technically, it is more than questionable. Militarily it is impossible. From the political viewpoint it is both invalid and extremely dangerous. As we can see, at least three conclusions out of four are opposed to it.

The scientific aspect. When we talk about the hypothetical scientific possibility of creating a reliable "space shield," we have in mind an ideal situation: the ultraperfect arrangement of the shield and absence of any resistance to it, that is, any countermeasures. A particular instance (incidentally, one that they assume in the United States) is the absence even of the very missiles whose job would be to penetrate the shield. Scientific calculations made in respect of a gigantic ABM system that has ideal accuracy, that reacts instantaneously, that is in theory faultless, and that encounters no obstacles perhaps can lead to the optimism that the Washington leaders would like to instill in the public. But the question immediately arises: Is this "hothouse" situation possible at all? Of course not. Technology cannot be perfect. And there would be resistance, considerable resistance to the ABM system. As for a scientifically superreliable shield existing in the total absence of missiles, here we encounter an utterly absurd situation. No one would need such a shield, because there would be no sword. The implementation of the accords reached in Reykjavik could create precisely such a situation.

The U.S. Administration set up three authoritative commissions to study the possibility of implementing SDI. The results of the investigations are secret, of course. But, as the magazine ATLANTIC writes, it is clear from what has seeped into the press that the "doubts about SDI have been distorted by the administration and presented in a favorable light." According to the compilers of the "Fletcher Commission" report, they were compelled by hook or by crook to moderate the report (here is a fine example of the quasicneitific vagueness: "It must not call a spade a spade. It had to talk about an instrument for excavating the soil."). The text was then moderated again at the Pentagon. The "Miller Commission" report was suppressed completely. One specialist familiar with it was pretty forthright: "The report does not have the courage to say that the plan (SDI--L. Semeyko) is idiotic. But after seeing a list of its shortcomings only a fool would reach the wrong conclusions....

As we have seen, even specialists in the United States admit that to make abstract scientific calculations in our era in the security sphere on the basis of military technical premises alone, and to adjust the results on a "what can I do for you" basis is essentially to lose touch with technical, military, and political reality and to entertain highly dangerous illusions. But this is breaking away from true science. "At least the President has not yet declared the earth flat"--one U.S. observer sarcastically remarked after Reagan's first "star" speech...

The technical aspect is the possibility that the very complex system of computers, lasers, space combat stations, and antimissile missiles, which would form the material basis of the extensive ABM system, will operate without a hitch. Is the U.S. Administration's forced optimism justified in this case?

In June 1,600 scientists and engineers from various government and private laboratories urged Congress to limit the SDI program, declaring that a genuinely reliable "astrodome" over America is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Some 57 Nobel Prize winners made a more categorical demand for a ban on the program. Subsequently, 6,500 scientists, including 15 Nobel Prize winners, decided not to accept funds for research in the space ABM sphere. Even those who are "accepting" them are displaying increasing skepticism. J. Miller, leader of the research program at the Livermore Laboratory, said that he is "alarmed at the scale of the exaggerations and promises and at the abandonment of the sober approach to the program." A.P. Helestein, considered to be the main inspiration behind the laser programs and, above all, the creation of the X-ray laser, left the laboratory, having found the courage to abandon military research.

America today is characterized by an exacerbation of the struggle over the realistic nature of the technical premises of SDI. On the one hand, Lieutenant General J. Abrahamson, leader of the organization to implement SDI, boasts of technical successes. The obvious purpose of this publicity campaign is to reassure the public and Congress in particular, which is regarding the optimistic promises with growing suspicion and is looking askance at funds for the "Star Wars" program.

On the other hand, the whole series of disasters with U.S. rockets launched into space this year speaks for itself. After all the launching of rockets is, one would think, a well-honed operation, it has been carried out hundreds of times. But there have been technical hiccups. So how can one talk of confidence about carrying out the far more complex "star wars" operations, whose objective is, to use U.S. scientist J. Pike's metaphor, to hit an "apple" tens of thousands of times in succession? And it is not just a matter of the space strike weapons--they are just a small part of the very complex and diverse ABM facilities. There are also the massive difficulties connected with coordinating the work of the thousands of computers in the ABM control system.

The military aspect. This implies the real combat potential of the "astro-dome" in conditions of active resistance. Let us say right away that it is not a matter of the specific percentages of missiles and warheads which will get "caught" in the several layers of the ABM system--this is a hypothetical as well as specialized topic. It is a matter of a fundamental answer: Is "absolute" antimissile defense, that is 100-percent effectiveness, possible or impossible? The SDI leaders' official response may surprise you. Here is Lt Gen J. Abrahamson: "Absolute defense is unrealistic." Let us give the general his due for being realistic: He is then aware... But that is the point: While apparently "aware," he is at the same time a fervent advocate of "Star Wars." A paradox for which there is an explanation, albeit not a simple one--the U.S. leadership and those behind it do not regard the creation of "absolute" defense as that important. It is more important, in the guise of safeguarding security by further building up military muscle, to develop, rather than reduce, let alone halt, the already loathsome arms race.

No one can ensure the reliable functioning of the ABM system for technical reasons and because of active and passive enemy countermeasures. And these will certainly be effective countermeasures. This has been repeatedly and most authoritatively stated by the Soviet leadership. And Washington ought to face up to the Soviet potential. In the end the "majority of U.S. military experts believes," an editorial in THE BOSTON GLOBE says, "that the Soviet Union is bound to be able to find effective means of countering U.S. technological achievements in the context of SDI."

But for today's U.S. leaders, who are voicing their disregard of both Soviet and U.S. warnings, something else is important: They do not want "absolute defense" at all, but dangerous games with the measures-countermeasures-countercountermeasures series, that is, an headlong arms race involving the latest weaponry which at some stage they will manage to "win"--gaining the leadership and superiority. The latter would, they say, be secured not only through the creation of an ABM system that is as perfect as possible, but also by turning its strike weapons in the future into overtly offensive weapons, training them on earth in the interests of a first strike.

Particularly important here is the military aspect, in terms of the correlation between nuclear and space strike weapons, which was fully covered in the Soviet package of proposals in Reykjavik: Reduction, not to mention elimination of nuclear weapons must be combined with the nontransfer of the arms race to space. The stability of the strategic situation must not be disrupted. But a disruption could occur. The wolf's teeth of an offensive strategy, geared to delivering a first (disabling) strike, are protruding from beneath the "defensive" sheep's clothing of SDI. The fewer nuclear weapons the USSR has, the easier it will be to destroy them for good through the combined efforts of the U.S. "sword" and "shield"--this is the overt intention. But this is banking on military adventurism concealed by the fig leaf of preoccupation with "defensive" methods of safeguarding security. This analysis is applicable to all military political versions of the "astrodome."

The political aspect. At the moment three versions are under discussion in the United States: SDI 1--covering the entire country with a "dense shield"; SDI 2--protecting missile bases only; finally, SDI 3--using a "thin shield" as protection against "nuclear madmen." The optimal method of space defense has to be chosen, they say. In the meantime all is confusion. Weinberger favors the "defense of cities," that is, the entire territory of the country. His assistant, R. Perle, the "prince of darkness" of the ultrarightists, favors the protection of U.S. retaliatory (that is, first!) strike weapons." Perle supports J. Kemp, who intends to fight his way to the presidency in a couple of years' time and is demanding immediate abandonment of the ABM Treaty and the deployment of a limited antimissile system before the end of the eighties.

But this is overt political trickery, because all the aforementioned versions of SDI are full of contradictions. In fact, if SDI is a giant with feet of clay, incapable of ensuring the reliable protection of all U.S. cities against nuclear destruction, then why put a fence around the garden, so to speak? Why rein in Reykjavik the possibility of destroying nuclear weapons, which would eliminate the very danger of nuclear destruction? It does not add up.

There is a contradiction in "SDI 2" as well: If you call for nuclear weapons to be made "impotent and obsolete" (Reagan's words), they why try to protect them at missiles bases?! This does not add up either. "SDI 3" is untenable too. Just as in the struggle against terrorism there is nothing to justify bombing raids against Tripoli, in the struggle against the threat of missile strikes by "nuclear madmen" the construction of an "astrodome" cannot be justified. You do not swat flies with a sledgehammer. It is necessary to eliminate the underlying causes of terrorism and of the spread of nuclear weapons--this is far more promising, although it requires immense effort, joint, coordinated, and above all political.

Of course, the political aspect of the campaign to misinform the public about SDI does not stop there. It is clear at the moment that Washington is exploiting the fact that as far as the general public is concerned the SDI

(program is an equation with many scientific-technical and military-political unknowns. But it is also clear that the continuation of the program will involve the world in an unprecedented arms race and destabilize the strategic situation. This is its main drawback. To try to find a positive feature is to deceive the public, and this is being done less and less out of ignorance and more and more with deliberate intent.

Part II

PHOTO Moscow IZVESTIYA In Russian 4 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 3

{part two of article by L. Semenov: "SDI and the White House Myths")

[text] 11

The main themes of the political disinformation being circulated by Washington in connection with the results of the Reykjavik meeting are emerging increasingly clearly with every passing day. SDI is at the focus of virtually all materials [as published]. Designed to "defend" America tomorrow, the "Star Wars" program itself has to be defended today. The aim is to paint it in all the colors of the rainbow and, at the same time, to shift onto Moscow the blame for the fact that there was no success in reaching an all-embracing accord in Reykjavik, and also to whitewash the Washington administration, which is literally clinging to this idea. Various myths have been launched for this purpose. The following three are perhaps the most typical.

Myth No. 1. The USSR is apparently terribly afraid of SDI. "One of the things the Russians fear is that we will have SDI. This is our trump card. We must not abandon it." This is a statement made by White House Chief of Staff D. Regan back in Reykjavik. Let us be objective: We do not sense a feeling of danger, indeed. But not because of SDI as such. This program does not worry us from the military aspect, because the space "umbrella" above the United States will prove to be full of holes even without our countermeasures, and even more so with our countermeasures.

Our worry is in the political sphere--in the face of the inevitable consequences which would be produced by the implementation of the "Star Wars" program. These consequences are really monstrous. SDI has already proved in Reykjavik its sinister political potential to thwart nuclear disarmament. This program is still, so to say, in diapers. Its total implementation will make it incalculably more difficult for the world to get rid of the creation [sozdatiye] of increasingly new nuclear and strike space means, the continuation of nuclear tests, and, finally, the grim threat of "universal assured destruction."

But how do the Washington leaders themselves answer the question of their own sense of danger? How would the situation be perceived in Washington if, for example, the USSR was intending to build a space shield identical to the one planned in the United States? Here is D. Weinberger's opinion: An effective

Soviet ABM system "would be one of the most dangerous prospects one could possibly imagine" and would demand an increase in the quantity and improvement of the quality of U.S. offensive weapons. As we can see, Washington's fears are of a different kind--they are purely military-technical: It would become necessary, they say, to do some more work on increasing the weight and improving the sharpness of their nuclear sword. Typical American approaches and equally typical concerns...

Might we also have military-technical problems? Of course. It is no easy matter to create a system to counter the "Star Wars" program although as it has been emphasized by the Soviet political and military leadership, it would be implemented both more quickly and more cheaply. We are, after all, talking about the fact that the Soviet response will not be symmetrical to the U.S. actions in SDI deployment--neither in the choice of means nor in the use of various methods of counteractions. Such a reaction to the creation of the Pentagon's "astrodome" would be forced upon us, but not only is it fully realizable from the technical viewpoint, it is also sufficiently effective from the purely military viewpoint.

To illustrate this thesis let us turn to the testimony of U.S. experts who have studied Volume Seven of the secret SDI analysis report prepared for the U.S. President by the "Fletcher Commission." This volume is devoted to an examination of likely countermeasures to the deployment of the SDI system. One U.S. expert declared: "If you read Volume Seven, you need not bother to read the remaining (six--L.S.) volumes of the report. This volume contains crushing proof of the inconsistency of hopes to find (in SDI) anything useful." No further comment is necessary. A similar conclusion has been reached not only by many Americans, but also by Soviet scientists and specialists.

The report by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat contains a brief but extremely convincing analysis of specific means and methods for counteracting strike space weapons. They include: Deployment of high-power ground-based lasers (their creation [dozdaniye] is an easier task than the creation [sozdaniye] of lasers designed to destroy missiles and warheads); creation [sozdaniye] of missiles with more powerful motors (which shortens the missile's boost phase before the warheads separate and thus reduces the likelihood of them being hit); increasing the number of missiles and warheads on them and using decoy warheads; protection of missiles and warheads from laser beams (covering their surface with special protective compounds, creating [sozdaniye] rapidly spinning warheads, and so on); scattering screening clouds of small and light objects (particles) in space; jamming the other side's electronic guidance systems; changing missile launch tactics; and so on. There is a multiplicity of means and methods to reduce the combat efficiency of an ABM system, and the Soviet Union, of course, has at its disposal an adequate economic, scientific, and technical potential to implement any necessary countermeasures.

The newspaper NEWSDAY cites the following statement by T. Hoopes, member of the American Committee for East-West Accord Board of Directors: "The Soviet Union is concerned about its (SDI's) consequences primarily not because it lacks confidence in its capacity to take countermeasures, but because this program will result in enormous difficulties of a technical and financial nature." It has to be assumed that difficulties would be inevitable, just as in any new defensive or peaceful undertaking, although it is hardly worth trying to define their specific nature or scale. But no matter what they may be, they will be successfully overcome for sure. Let us recall in this context M.S. Gorbachev's considered and firm statement that SDI does not frighten us: "I declare this with confidence, because bluffing in such matters is an act of irresponsibility. There will be a response to SDI. Not a symmetrical one, but there will be a response. We will not have to sacrifice much for that."

Myth No. 2. It is claimed that it was only thanks to SDI that there was success in "bringing Moscow back to the negotiating table" in Geneva and Reykjavik. The decisive role was apparently played by the "position of strength." Speaking on television following his return from Iceland, Reagan declared that his main impression from the meeting was that "in contrast with the past, we are now acting from a position of strength and for this reason it became possible to advance more swiftly with the Russians toward even more important positive developments. Here we have a clear attempt to justify not only the concept of "Star Wars" but also the entire program for America's strategic rearmament, which has been under implementation for five years now and is due for completion only in the nineties.

But practice proves something else. It was the USSR that invited the United States to sit down at the disarmament negotiating table on numerous occasions throughout the postwar period. By the way, the important successes in this work were achieved in the seventies when, according to the present U.S. Administration's claims, the United States apparently held no "position of strength." The USSR was forced to depart from the negotiating table in Geneva at the end of 1983, when the United States attempted to exploit the "position of strength" by deploying its nuclear "Euromissiles" and thus wrecked the talks. While on the subject of the SDI's "stimulating" role in talks, let us recall that the fiasco at the Geneva talks 3 years ago occurred 8 months after Reagan announced his "strategic defense initiative."

Of course, this does not mean that the USSR ignored the dangerous significance of this "initiative," including from the viewpoint of the future fate of the cause of nuclear disarmament. This is precisely why our country proposed to start the current complex talks on nuclear and space weapons. So, there was no need at all to "force" us to the negotiating table. On the contrary, it was the consistent Soviet efforts that made it more difficult for the United States itself to evade a serious dialogue.

It is here that, to put it mildly, the Americans are mistaken. The mistake lies in someone's calculations to make SDI a bargaining point at the talks--to sacrifice, if the worst came to the worst, some of its elements in exchange for extracting from the USSR a "genuine and fair" reduction of nuclear weapons which would be advantageous for the United States. The USSR has also taken a principled stance on the point that an accord must ensure equal security and

that it is necessary to pursue not just the reduction but also the elimination of nuclear arms while simultaneously precluding a space arms race. "If Reagan's so-called military strength buildup encouraged anyone to sit down at the negotiating table," Senator J. Biden declared in September, "it was only the Reagan Administration... While pretending that it follows the traditional logic of arms buildup in order to strengthen its position at the talks, the administration uses the talks to arm itself."

Myth No. 3. Play is being given to the already tiresome claim that SDI is apparently the only salvation from the "Soviet threat." Only "Star Wars" is supposedly capable of saving everyone from the threat of death in nuclear wars. But this myth's veracity clearly "does not hold water" if only because there is too much proof that the "space umbrella" will leak and that no ABM system will offer salvation from a nuclear catastrophe.

The conclusion is obvious: In order to get rid of this threat (and there, incidentally, there is no "Soviet threat" at all), it is necessary to escape from nuclear arms. But this is precisely where the rub is. People in Washington are unwilling to get rid of it. "Nuclear arsenals will be with us for as long as sovereign states with conflicting ideologies exist"--this was what former U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger wrote in the 27 October issue of TIME magazine. The same idea was voiced by the President himself in his 22 September speech at the United Nations. "The reality is such that we still have to rely on these (nuclear) weapons in the cause of deterring war."

So how is one to understand the Iceland accords on the elimination of nuclear weapons, to which Reagan nevertheless agreed? Maybe he did agree, but this does not at all mean that the steps were taken with the greatest of readiness. Nor does it mean that the preliminary accords would be ultimately implemented. "The deadlock arising from SDI saved us from the embarrassment of concluding an agreement which we would have subsequently had to repudiate"--this assessment by the very same Schlesinger of the "Reykjavik recklessness" (as he put it) is highly typical. So, from the viewpoint of right- and ultra-rightwingers, SDI is not so much a salvation from the "Soviet threat" as a salvation from possible accords on the elimination of nuclear weapons behind "Maginot lines" in space.

The manipulation of these and other myths around SDI in no way testifies to a serious approach by the Washington administration toward the most serious problems of our time. SDI has not only failed to save the U.S. leadership from embarrassment, but has actually predetermined it: Only a side which is in favor of wandering on for many more kilometers (and round in circles, at that) can find itself only 2-3 steps away from historic accords and fail to take these steps after the "strategic kilometers" have been traveled in talks. Such a side cannot but be considered the culprit to blame for the Icelandic failure. A culprit who avoided the realities of the nuclear age and is now trying to save face with the help of myths.

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CSO: 5200/1128

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW: CONSTRUCTION OF U.S. WARNING RADARS VIOLATES ABM TREATY

OW030609 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0400 GMT 30 Dec 86

[From the "Novosti" newscast; Vsevolod Solovyev commentary]

[Text] As THE NEW YORK TIMES reports, the United States is speeding up implementation of plans to construct two large radars in Greenland and Great Britain. Our commentary follows:

[Solovyev] Hello, comrades. Installation of the new, superpowerful early warning radars will be the most gross violation of the Soviet-American treaty on antimissile defense, the 1972 ABM Treaty. According to Article 6 of the treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States are obliged no to deploy radar warning stations anywhere in the future except along the peripheries of their national territories. Article 9 forbids their turnover to other states and deployment of ABM systems and their components outside one's own national territory.

Now, following the Reagan administration's trampling of the SALT II treaty, thereby clearing the path for what the West German magazine STERN figuratively called an unbridled revelry in madness, Washington is also ready to drop the sword on the ABM treaty, which is a cornerstone of the whole legal and contractual system of strategic arms limitation. For a long time now, Washington has even stopped recalling the Principles of Mutual Relations between the USSR and the United States signed in 1972 at the highest level, a document which says that in the nuclear age, there is no other basis for maintaining relations between our countries than peaceful coexistence. Forgotten also are the obligations to widen the legal and contractual basis of Soviet American mutual relations relations and to make the necessary efforts to steadily implement the concluded bilateral agreements. Today, Washington lays store in only one thing, the cult of strength. The White House strives to secure military advantages for itself. This is exactly what the construction of the new radars in Greenland and Great Britain is aimed at. In so doing, the White House does not want to understand that to shoot first in the nuclear age means nothing more than to die second.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA HITS CANADIAN ARCTIC RADARS, EARLY WARNING PLANS

PM291923 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Correspondent V. Shelkov report: "Canada: ...Now in Space"]

[Text] The Canadian Armed Forces are embarking on the implementation of yet another militarist venture. The country's Ministry of Defense has obtained the government's permission to conduct research and a series of tests under the program for the creation [sozdaniye] of a "radar palisade" in space. It is being developed [razrabatyvayetsya] for the purpose of "defending Canada's northern regions against cruise missiles." These plans are being presented to the Canadian public as a necessary element for deterring the notorious "Soviet military threat."

An upgrading of the "early warning system" is now proceeding at full speed under the same far-fetched pretext and within the framework of the Canadian-U.S. agreement on North America's joint aerospace defense (NORAD). A "northern warning system" consisting of 52 modern radar stations costing hundreds of millions of dollars is being created [sozdayetsya] in Canada's high latitudes. While installation workers at the northern warning system's electronic nests are frightening the Arctic fauna with the flash of welding torches and the screech of iron, Ottawa is already thinking of possibly replacing the ground stations with space-based ones.

The study of prospects for launching air defense radars into orbit will be conducted by the Canadian military in close contact with their U.S. colleagues.

/9738
CSO: 5200/1128

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

TASS: JAPAN TALKS ON SDI--Tokyo, 4 Jan (TASS)--The Japanese Government has decided to send another delegation to the United States on 20 January to continue talks on participation in the "Star Wars" program, the well-informed NIHON KEIZAI newspaper reported today. At the beginning of September Tokyo is known to have officially announced its joining the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Later on, however, difficulties arose at talks on direct participation in the "Star Wars" projects. According to the NIHON KEIZAI, during the forthcoming visit the Japanese delegation still expects to determine conditions for Japanese companies' participation in the U.S. SDI program.
[Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0841 GMT 4 Jan 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1128

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

GORBACHEV, REAGAN NEW YEAR MESSAGES ON DISARMAMENT

Reagan to Soviet People

LD010844 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0705 GMT 1 Jan 87

[Excerpt]

U.S. President Ronald Reagan addressed the Soviet people on radio on the occasion of the New Year. He said in particular:

On the occasion of the New Year I turn to you with a New Year message from the American people to the peoples of the Soviet Union. The time of New Year festivities is the time of love and hope as well as the time of meditation and expectation, the time when the American people, just like the people of all countries, gather in the circle of family and friends to think with hope about the future. It is precisely with this in mind that I would like to turn to you, the Soviet people, and share with you our hopes for the future - our hopes for peace on earth, our hopes for goodwill among all people, our hopes that we and our children will live in a happier world.

In 1986 the United States and the Soviet Union undertook considerable steps for the achievement of lasting peace. I consider that the biggest importance has to be assigned to successes. We achieved success in many respects. At the Geneva summit meeting the governments of our two countries agreed to speed up the progress of talks on all aspects of our relations, including in the sphere of reduction of nuclear arsenals and strengthening security of the two sides, assistance in respecting human rights, peaceful settlement of regional conflicts, and widening contacts between our two countries. Hence, during the months after the summit meeting, the delegations of our countries undertook protracted and considerable efforts. After that, this fall Mr Gorbachev and I met yet again in Reykjavik in Iceland in order to study the possibilities of speeding up the progress still further. The result of this is another step forward. According to some reactions, on some issues we achieved no more progress in those 2 days than did our diplomats in the last 2 years. Yes, much still remains to be done, but the position of the two sides is now closer than it has ever been before.

In Reykjavik we arrived at agreement concerning the desirability of genuine reduction of nuclear arsenals and also of the fact that the elimination of all nuclear weapons is the final goal. We arrived at an agreement that for a start we could eliminate all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles and keep only small number of missiles. We also arrived at an agreement on reducing by half the number of strategic weapons in a period of 5 years and on the necessity of possessing efficient verification procedures [proverka] for any kind of final agreement. Apart from this, we discussed other approaches to strategic defense.

As you know, the President continued, we did not achieve an accord on any of the topics which concern the second 5-year period. We in the United States are ready to discuss this, or any other proposal concerning the extension of these reductions, which are related to the first 5-year period.

After the Reykjavik meeting, both sides needed some time to evaluate what was achieved and how the movement ahead should be continued. Then the United States continued this process at the negotiations in Geneva, putting forward specific proposals for implementation of the understandings achieved in Reykjavik.

Looking into the new year, we in the United States are prepared, as before, to do everything necessary to turn this enormous work into verifiable [proverka] agreements [soglasheniye]. We hope the Soviet Union will approach negotiations in the same spirit.

Peace, Reagan noted, is founded not only on the basis of agreements on arms reduction, but on understanding between peoples, too. It is not always reported in the headlines of your and our papers but the United States and the USSR have achieved progress in that sphere, as well, having expanded exchanges and other contacts between our countries. Scientific, study, cultural and personal exchanges, particularly between our young people, have broadened. We in the United States would like the expansion of these exchanges in all spheres.

At the same time, the President said that respect for the freedom and dignity of the person is the foundation on which a genuine and reliable peace between our countries should be built. Events in other countries of the world, Reagan noted further, also influence relations between our countries. We cannot forget, he said, the many tragic and bloody conflicts which are raging on our planet. Conflicts which are the cause of enormous human sufferings and which are fraught with spreading. The United States is prepared to support any serious efforts aimed at the search for peaceful settlements of regional conflicts, and we are ready to cooperate with the Soviet Union and any other country for the sake of that aim.

The United States and the Soviet Union have many complicated issues to discuss. Their solving will not be easy, but rarely is anything worth doing that is easy. In 1986 our two countries achieved progress on several of the most difficult issues. I am sure that in 1987 we will achieve more. We must continue to walk together along the path to peace, and it is a long way to peace. Peace is also a dream. It is the dream of all peoples of all countries. There is a line in some old poem: Cheerful and sad, you are always nice, like our Russian song, like the Russian soul.

Gorbachev to Americans

PM011544 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jan 87 First Edition pp 1, 2

("M.S. Gorbachev Replies to Questions From U.S. Journalist J. Kingsbury-Smith" -- PRAVDA headline)

[Text] Question: What would you like to tell the American people on the occasion of the New Year 1987?

Answer: I would like, first of all, to say that Soviet people want to live in peace with the Americans and do not feel any hostility toward them. [paragraph continues]

On behalf of the leadership of the USSR I could add that when working out our policy in matters of war and peace we are as honest with the American people as with our own people.

Our age — that of nuclear weapons and high speeds, and of growing economic and political interdependence -- rules out the security of one to the detriment or at the expense of the security of another. I shall repeat once again: We can either perish together, or we can survive together. The only kind of security that is conceivable nowadays is mutual or, to be more precise, universal security.

So, whether we like one another or not, it is essential to learn to coexist, to live in peace on this tiny and very fragile planet.

Question: Are you in favor of continuing the Geneva talks between Soviet and U.S. representatives in 1987 with a view to achieving progress in matters pertaining to limiting and reducing arms?

Answer: Yes, we are. We are for talks which would cease to be fruitless and inert and would acquire real dynamism or, in a word, become real talks on reducing nuclear arms and on preventing an arms race in outer space.

We pressed for this in Reykjavik and we shall press for it still more vigorously in 1987. I am convinced that a radical turn in the talks would meet the vital interests of the American people as well.

At the same time the U.S. Administration's stand on this issue disappoints us deeply. Following the Reykjavik summit, the U.S. delegation in Geneva even moved backwards.

Although the USSR has not conducted nuclear explosions for a year and a half, the United States continued tests and declined to negotiate a full ban on them, and this despite the fact that the United States undertook to conduct such negotiations under two treaties, those dated 1963 and 1974. The defiant act of the abandonment of the important Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) by the White House was added to that in November. Deliberately and pointedly wrecking old treaties does not help the conduct of successful talks on new agreements. This is a serious problem which deserves the closest attention.

I reaffirm once again: We are for agreements on the most radical reductions in arms, both nuclear and conventional. Now the ball is on Washington's side of the court.

Question: Should the two sides show mutual flexibility, do you envision a possibility of reaching a compromise agreement during the next two years on anti-missile defense matters if there is an accord on non-deployment of space-based strategic defense system within a mutually agreed-upon period of time?

Answer: Under all conditions, nothing should be done which would erode or undermine the ABM Treaty. That would deprive us of any hopes for a reduction in nuclear arsenals and would upset strategic stability.

We are for the ABM Treaty of unlimited duration signed in 1972 being maintained, and maintained indefinitely. Article 15 of the treaty envisages only one cause for denouncing it: Extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing the supreme interests of a party to the treaty. It depends only on the two of us, the Soviet Union and the United States, for such circumstances never to occur.

We regret that the U.S. Administration adheres to a different line which allows for a possibility of the United States abandoning the ABM Treaty if it deems that advantageous to itself during the implementation of the SDI program.

The Soviet Union is not just for the preservation of the ABM Treaty but is for consolidating its regime. This is precisely what would be promoted by the accord with the United States on defining the limits on allowed laboratory research in the field of ABM, as is being suggested by the Soviet side.

This treaty is important in itself but it is doubly important because without this treaty it is impossible to come to terms on cuts in strategic nuclear arms.

So, in this issue, too, things depend not on us but on Washington. People in Washington should finally decide in utter clarity what they want: A runaway arms race or reduction and elimination of weapons? No one will do that for the U.S. Government or instead of it. A good deal depends on this choice, including for the peace and well-being of the American people. We wish peace and well-being to them, just as, of course, to all the other peoples.

TASS Terms Reagan Message 'Hypocritical'

LD052021 Moscow TASS in English 1945 GMT 5 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS -- Melor Sturua, in his comment in IZVESTIYA, describes as "hypocritical" the New Year message of U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the Soviet people. In that message which was broadcast by the "Voice of America" the President repeatedly mentions "the magnificent Russian soul" and says "let us hear the voice of this soul".

"Where and when did Mr. Reagan in all six years of his Presidency hear the voice of the Russian soul? I don't think I remember that", Melor Sturua says.

"Mr. Reagan does not hear even the voice of the American soul. Most Americans demand that an end be put to nuclear tests -- but Reagan is continuing these tests. Most Americans demand that the SALT-2 treaty be observed -- but Reagan tears it to pieces. Most Americans demand that an end be put to the arms race -- Reagan is escalating it".

"Last year in Reykjavik there was a time when mankind sort of looked beyond the horizon and sighted the outlines of a non-nuclear world. But the historic chance was missed, and not through the fault of the Soviet side".

"The Washington leaders are acting against their conscience before both peoples, since they do not want to hear their soul which demands peace and security of one people to the detriment or at the expense of security of the other people. [sentence as received] It is only together that we may die or survive", stressed Melor Sturua.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1121

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV DOCUMENTARY ON REYKJAVIK MEETING BROADCAST

TV Broadcast

LIM52224 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1610 GMT on 5 January broadcasts a 30-minute documentary film entitled "Difficult Dialogue in Reykjavik" which begins with footage of nighttime Reykjavik on 12 October 1986, showing street traffic and an aerial view. The announcer says that although Reykjavik has become part of history, its outcome is still felt in the international life.

The video changes to scenes of Icelandic countryside, and then back to the city streets, this time in daylight. The announcer continues, saying that those were memorable days for Icelandic citizens. The video shows representatives of various antiwar groups collecting signatures on the streets of Reykjavik and displaying placards to the camera. The camera also shows passages from letters sent to Gorbachev and Reagan by children of different countries demanding peace. The announcer says the summit attracted the best newsmen in the world. Then follows a recording of short interviews with some of the journalists, including an American, a Swede, and a Dane, all of whom say they await tangible results from the summit and hope that the European nuclear missiles will go.

Over footage from 9 October showing Reagan's plane landing at an air base in Iceland and the President with his advisers descending from the plane, the announcer says, "Following the memorable Geneva summit, the United States clearly was backing away from the Geneva accords. The updating of the triad of the U.S. strategic armaments was proceeding at full speed, and work on the 'Star Wars' program was being carried out persistently. On the eve of his departure for Reykjavik, President Reagan called on the Congress to remove limitations on military spending to enable him to act from a position of strength in Iceland. The political baggage of the President had nothing -- absolutely nothing -- new concealed in it."

Over footage of Gorbachev and his wife being seen off at the airport by the entire Politburo, the announcer says, "In the post-Geneva time, the Soviet Union strictly adhered to the accords. New thinking and new approaches were embodied in bold initiatives and acts, from an integral concept of eliminating nuclear weapons to the extension for the fourth time of the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev did not come to Reykjavik empty-handed." Additional footage shows Gorbachev's arrival in Reykjavik, his statement at the airport, and his ride to his hotel. The announcer describes Gorbachev's talks with the Icelandic president.

The announcer says 11 October was the first day of summit talks. Footage shows a crowd of newsmen and camera crews and Reagan and Gorbachev arriving and walking toward the

mansion. Small talk between Reagan and Gorbachev on their way to the mansion, which was deleted from Moscow television reports on the summit at the time it was held, is audible. The camera shows both leaders posing for photographs at the top of the stairs and inside the mansion as the announcer says: "What was the objective of the Soviet Union when it suggested a get-together at the summit level in Reykjavik? In two words, to achieve major accords on the key issues of consolidating international security, and to create solid premises for holding a full-scale Soviet-U.S. summit meeting on American soil. The United States had a different objective in mind: to have a relaxed chat, and to choose a date for the meeting, changing nothing in the course of events. This was precisely what determined the dramatic nature of the Reykjavik conversations. We managed to film only the very first moments of the meeting, for the talks were held behind closed doors. But now we know that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, within the first hours and minutes of the meeting, tabled a package of Soviet proposals which transferred the talks on the issues of disarmament onto a qualitatively new plane.

"What was involved was not limits and sublimits, not curbing the nuclear arms race, but radically cutting nuclear arms and eliminating them altogether subsequently. These were truly stunning proposals in terms of their novelty and significance. Such important issues as ways of overcoming regional conflicts and the provision of human rights also were not left aside. The discussion, therefore, concentrated on the most burning and topical problems of our time. But all this became known later on. At the time, representatives of the world press enthusiastically voiced their guesses."

Then follows a recording of brief interviews with PRAVDA correspondent Tomas Kolesnichenko and an Italian and a French correspondent on their hopes for the outcome of the summit in the middle of its first day. Then follows footage of Reagan and Gorbachev posing for pictures again as they emerge from the first round of talks, and additional Reykjavik street scenes, peace race runners, etc.

The announcer says on 12 October, the second day of the summit, foreign journalists "literally besieged the Soviet press center. They were interested in assessments of a possible outcome of the talks." Footage shows Georgiy Arbatov answering questions. The announcer says, "But the main thing, after all, was the talks themselves. The reluctance of the U.S. side to come to terms with consolidating the ABM Treaty prevented a historical compromise on the entire range of most important issues of curbing the nuclear arms race from being reached. The fourth, unscheduled meeting lasted for 4 long hours. Journalists were waiting for the press conference of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev." Footage shows the conference hall with waiting newsmen and then Gorbachev with members of his negotiations team taking their seats on the platform. Then follows a 12-minute recording of Gorbachev reading his statement and then answering a question concerning SDI

Over more aerial views of Reykjavik and its harbor, the announcer says, "What has become of Reykjavik? Was it a step forward, toward a nonnuclear world, or was it a return to the past? First, it was a step forward. Reykjavik brought a new quality to world politics; it threw light on the fact that accords are possible, it showed that the time to act has come. It has demonstrated in the most convincing way possible that the Soviet Union is unshakable in its aspiration to reach the great goal -- to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. A long and difficult road lies ahead, but it can and must be traversed. Reykjavik is a major step forward along that road."

A caption credits the documentary's authors as N. Shishlin and V. Konvaliov.

TASS Report

LD052227 Moscow TASS in English 2006 GMT 5 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS -- The documentary film "A Difficult Dialogue in Reykjavik" which was premiered on the central television of the USSR today, underscores the lasting significance of the Soviet-American summit meeting.

The film features the two-day long negotiations between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan which became a major political event in the struggle against the danger of war, for elimination of nuclear weapons.

"Our aim was not only to narrate about the meeting itself but also to convey its inner tensity, mankind's keen attention to it", a TASS correspondent has been told by scriptwriter Nikolay Shishlin.

"What will Reykjavik be: a step upward to a non-nuclear world or a step backward? The TASS correspondent and his colleagues queried when talking to Soviet and foreign journalists, representatives of competent international organizations. Really great was the disappointment of all who waited for the United States to give a positive reply to the Soviet compromise proposals on a whole package of major problems of curtailing nuclear armaments, but all in vain". [punctuation as received]

The film makes it possible for one to feel once again the dramaticism of Reykjavik conversations, clearly to understand that the American side's desire to go away from practical decisions, the attempts to have the discussion of agreements instead of agreements, the pursuit of military superiority in place of consent with the principle of equal security are now the main threat to peace.

And nevertheless Reykjavik has been a step forward. It made it very clear that accords are possible and that the time has come for concrete actions. Film sequences show Mikhail Gorbachev speaking upon completion of the meeting. In his speech one hears the call for an end to the arms race, development of fruitful cooperation which meets the interests of the USSR and the USA, all peoples of the world.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR PAPER SEES U.S. UNDERMINING STRATEGIC STABILITY

PMI2153c Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Dec 86 p 3

[Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel V. Chernyshev article: "Foundations of Strategic Stability: How Washington Undermines Them"]

[Text] At the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, the accords which were practically reached on radical reductions followed by the elimination of nuclear arms were not finalized because of the U.S. Administration's reluctance to strengthen the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty) and because of its desire in any event to continue the development of SDI, or the "Star Wars" program. And now the United States, by ostentatiously violating the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the SALT II Treaty), has effectively rejected it. These alarming facts shook the world. They reveal quite clearly the nature of the present American foreign policy course, which is aimed at an all-around arms race, the militarization of outer space, and the whipping up of international tension. After all, these two treaties constitute the foundation of strategic stability, a base for the process of reducing and then eliminating strategic offensive arms, that is, the starting point for the path which ultimately, and in a historically short space of time, can and should lead mankind to a nuclear-free world. What is the nature of these treaties, and what dangers are inherent in their rejection?

The ABM Treaty

The main crux of this treaty lies in the sides' effective renunciation of the creation of a defense of the country against a nuclear strike. Article I enshrines each side's pledge "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense," and Article V the pledge "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

Each side was granted permission (Article III) to deploy only limited ABM systems in two regions: (a) within one area having a radius of 150 km and centered on the party's capital; (b) within one area having a radius of 150 km and containing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers.

In each area a limited number of components of ABM systems are stipulated (ABM interceptors, launchers, and radar stations). Each side is permitted to have no more than 100 ABM interceptors in one area. In 1974 the USSR and the United States signed a protocol to the treaty, whereby the number of areas of deployment of an ABM system for each side is reduced to one, and the USSR chose the Moscow region, while the United States chose the region of the Grand Forks missile base.

Why did the sides renounce something which appears to be of the utmost importance, namely the defense of the entire country against a nuclear missile strike? First, it is impossible to create a defense which is "impenetrable" to missiles, and this fact has been acknowledged by the world's major scientists, including American scientists. The recognition and open acknowledgment of this fact was the embodiment of state wisdom and political courage on the part of the USSR leadership and the U.S. Administration when they signed the ABM Treaty. The renunciation of the creation of ABM systems for the defense of the country's territory -- until the elimination of nuclear weapons as such -- is the only reasonable means and the best means of defending a country against nuclear missile attack. Each side is clearly aware that if it carried out a nuclear strike against the other, even a weakened retaliatory strike would do it unacceptable damage, and there could be no winner in a nuclear war. Western specialists express this aptly: "Shoot first, die second."

Second, the creation by one side of a large-scale ABM defense would lead to a sharp fall in confidence, the disruption of strategic stability, the stepping up of the arms race, and an increase in the probability of the outbreak of war. Indeed, in these circumstances the other side would have fears that the large-scale ABM defense was being created so as to be able to inflict a first nuclear strike and then, by means of the defense, able to bring the retaliatory strike down to an "acceptable" level, that is, with the aim of making nuclear war possible and winning it. This in turn would force the other side either to create an ABM defense system of its own or substantially to improve and build up its offensive strategic forces, or most likely a combination of the two. The result would be an endless arms race following the cycle "action — counteraction — countercounteraction." And as the mountain of nuclear arms grew, the threat of nuclear catastrophe would multiply.

The present U.S. Administration is trying to prove that the ABM Treaty is "obsolete," since it is now possible to create an effective ABM system. But nothing could be further from the truth. The laws of logic engendered by this treaty are of unlimited duration, and progress in science and technology only confirms the need for such a regime. After all, if in our time it is possible to create a more effective ABM system, as Washington dreams of doing, for instance, and through the use of space strike arms, then this would lead even more to an arms race with unpredictable consequences, strategic chaos instead of strategic stability, and an increase in the probability of a nuclear war starting — either intentionally or unintentionally, by accident.

The SALT II Treaty

The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972 (SALT I) and the SALT II Treaty (1979), which the USSR and the United States complied with on a basis of reciprocity, were designed directly to limit the strategic offensive arms race. The first document contains pledges not to construct additional fixed land-based ICBM's, and to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of the agreement.

The predominant significance of the SALT II Treaty is that on the basis of the mutually acknowledged principle of equality and equal security, it requires the sides to observe both quantitative and substantial qualitative limitations on the sides' strategic nuclear systems. It established not only the initial aggregate level of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but also the reduction of that number to 2,250, if the treaty were ratified (the United States, as is well-known, refused to ratify the treaty, but subsequently pledged to comply with its provision). The treaty also stipulated corresponding "ceilings" for the basic groups of strategic systems: 1,320 for ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and heavy bombers with their armaments, in particular cruise missiles; 1,200 for ballistic missiles (not including bombers) with MIRV's; and no more than 820 for ICBM's with MIRV's. Limitations are also stipulated on the number of warheads on each type of ICBM and SLBM and on the number of cruise missiles on heavy bombers.

Thus the main significance of the SALT II Treaty is that it limits the deployment of the sides' strategic offensive forces. Under the treaty both sides removed from the armory a proportion of their strategic delivery vehicles. At a press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 23 May this year the following figures were cited, for instance: Since the time of signing the treaty the USSR has dismantled 72 ICBM launchers and 71 heavy bombers, and in all, under the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty, it has dismantled 540 strategic delivery vehicles, while the United States has dismantled 168.

The SALT II Treaty undoubtedly meets the security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

However, the upper hand has now been taken in the United States by circles which are opposed to detente and call for the buildup of military might and for military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Washington's fulfillment of the "comprehensive strategic program" announced on 2 October 1971 has now reached the stage where the administration must choose: either the further buildup of arms, or the SALT II Treaty, which "hampers" that buildup. And it has chosen the arms race. Representatives of the U.S. leadership have declared that the treaty is "dead," and the other day the United States ostentatiously exceeded the "ceiling" of 1,320 units laid down by the treaty for MIRVED ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by delivering to the armory the 131st bomber carrying cruise missiles.

The renunciation of the SALT II Treaty by R. Reagan's administration is evidence that Washington seeks entirely to remove the barriers which still exist on the path of the nuclear arms race and that the American military is ready to continue to sacrifice its own people's security interests to the weapons traders' profits.

People throughout the world, including people in the United States itself and in the allied countries, condemn Washington's renunciation of the SALT II Treaty. This step is quite rightly described as an undermining of the arms limitation and reduction process, as a serious blow against Soviet-American talks on Nuclear and Space arms in Geneva, and as an attack by the present White House incumbent on the foundations of the limitation of strategic weapons. And one can hardly regard as an exaggeration the remark by America's ABC television that although the talks continue, the two powers have "entered a world without SALT, where there are no longer any limitations on offensive nuclear arms."

Some people in Washington are most reluctant to learn the lessons of history, open their eyes to the realities of the nuclear and space age, and see where blind adherence to the cult of strength could lead their country and the whole world. The triumph of anti-Soviet ideology over common sense -- that is how sensible politicians in the United States itself define the administration's attack on the existing agreements.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

IZVESTIYA HITS U.S. 'BETRAYAL' OF REYKJAVIK

PM171909 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA political observer Stanislav Kondrashov, "Intolerance and Hypocrisy"]

[Excerpts]

In his television address to the American people immediately after Reykjavik President Reagan said that he attaches "much less significance to the words said at meetings than the deeds which follow." An old axiom, but the President immediately confirmed it in an unexpected way. He departed from his own words, from the assurance given at the summit meeting -- that he agreed to destroy all strategic nuclear armaments over a 10-year period.

The betrayal of the word was followed after a while by the deed, which was also at odds with the logic of Reykjavik. At the end of November of the United States brought into service the 131st heavy bomber equipped to carry long-range cruise missiles. What the Reagan administration had threatened throughout its 6 years in office had taken place: The United States had broken completely with the SALT II treaty, opening the sluice gate for an unlimited nuclear arms race -- and the prospect of strategic chaos. It was, perhaps, Washington's most important strategic action since Reykjavik.

The most important document in that period, on the other hand, was the Delhi declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, which M.S. Gorbachev signed with Rajiv Gandhi on 27 November. It proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the universal norm of international relations and nonviolence as the foundation of the life of the human community. Philosophy and politics founded on violence and deterrence are immoral and impermissible, the declaration says. They instill a spirit of intolerance, they destroy man's lofty aspirations, and they deny all human values.

The 10 Delhi principles together form a kind of code for the new political thinking the need for which has been proclaimed by the Soviet Union. All Washington is saying and all Washington can say is words. But, in the first place, these words are confirmed by, for example, the 30-year practice of peaceful coexistence between two states with different systems and a combined population of more than one billion. Second, a word is also a deed if, by authoritatively influencing the world community, it helps to unite peoples and states and generate a more tranquil and favorable international climate.

The Soviet Union is engaged in a fundamental restructuring of its domestic life, tackling big and difficult tasks connected with the democratization of society and

acceleration of economic development. Any unbiased observer will see and note that through a number of major initiatives, displaying great dynamism and flexibility, tolerance and willingness to compromise, the Soviet leadership would like — in conjunction with other states — to achieve a long overdue restructuring of international life as well, on the basis of trust and mutual understanding. Priority, to common human values — the emphasis of the Delhi declaration is logical for a country which, at its leading party's congress, proclaimed as the main task mankind's survival in a nuclear age. Without this conscious and, moreover, hard-won priority, movement toward a nuclear-free world and age is impossible. In order to survive together we have to get on with one another.

Will the other side take on this task? How will it tackle it?

Perhaps there is no state leader in the world today who has used religious values and the biblical, "Judeo-Christian" ethic to justify his practical policy as often as President Reagan. But, contrary to long tradition, he uses this ethic to justify intolerance, bellicosity, and the cult of force. In Reykjavik, as has been mentioned before, he went along with the idea of nuclear disarmament, but barely more than a month later in Washington he has exceeded the treaty limiting the strategic arms race. For what purpose? To further build up the positions of strength and to implement superarmament, which, if you believe his administration's strange logic, can lead to disarmament. And the notorious SDI? Another quest -- now in space -- for U.S. superiority, another example of force and violence against other participants in international life, above all another nuclear power.

These warnings are directed primarily at the antiwar movement among whom there has been a response to the Soviet Union's peace initiatives, in particular such persuasive and concrete ones as the unilateral moratorium in nuclear explosions. Polls have shown that most Americans supported the idea of their country's endorsing the moratorium. But their opinion went unheeded by the very people who are fond of claiming that in America, in contrast to the Soviet Union, public opinion is a weighty factor, one that is binding on the government. The opinion of the majority went unnoticed four years ago when it advocated a nuclear arms freeze. There is no escaping the conclusions that Washington listens to Americans' opinions only when they join the government in demonstrating chauvinist feelings (the April bombing of Libya or, again, Grenada), but goes blind and deaf if the people display more common sense than their political leaders.

For the sake of the overriding interests of humanity the Soviet Union does not turn the very real and highly significant ideological incompatibility into a barrier to the solution of international problems. Washington, on the other hand, exacerbates and exaggerates this incompatibility, making its elimination, on its own terms, of course, a kind of essential prerequisite for the achievement of accords. It is in this context that the U.S. leaders are more and more obstinately raising the question of human rights.

Here is what the U.S. President says: "In the course of our task with the Soviet Union we have discarded the hackneyed old doctrine that relations between our countries do not depend on the conduct of the Russians worldwide or on the way the Soviet authorities treat their own peoples at home. We have said that more respect for human rights in the Soviet Union is the fundamental condition of genuine peace between us and that talks on arms questions which lead to the reduction of our arsenals but have no effect at all on the reasons why these arsenals were built up in the first place have little chance of lasting success."

How is one supposed to take this declaration, which has been repeated again and again in U.S. officials' utterances? Apparently it means that Soviet society has to change not in accordance with Soviet people's wishes and needs, but at the prompting and bidding of people on the other side of the Atlantic. Not in accordance with our ideas, ideas accepted in the world community, and documents on human rights, but according to the ideas of the Reagan administration. Apparently it is easier for Washington to see where we should be going and how we should proceed. Otherwise there is little chance of "lasting peace" and a "reduction in arsenals." Otherwise mankind will forfeit the right to peace.

What is this -- a whole program of U.S. interference in Soviet internal affairs or another "linkage," of which there have been so many in the history of Soviet-American arms control talks? Or, rather, another excuse for wrecking the talks and blaming Russia because it is refusing to change in the way America wants?

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ARMY PAPER, REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS FORM 'PACKAGE'

PM221157 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Dec 86 Second Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Vasin article: "Basis of Accords"]

[Text] The Soviet Union demonstrates in practice its awareness of its very high responsibility for preventing nuclear catastrophe and for the destiny of all mankind. A vivid example of this is provided by the large-scale and far-reaching initiatives advanced by our country at the meeting in the Icelandic capital between M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan. They are aimed at ending the arms race on the earth and preventing it in space. The reduction and subsequent total elimination of strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime, the preservation of space without weapons, the ending of nuclear tests--these are constituent parts of nuclear disarmament. They should be viewed comprehensively, as a package.

The Soviet package is a balance of interests, concessions, and compromises, a balance of the removal of anxieties, and regard for the interdependence of the sides' legitimate interests. Our country has made major concessions on strategic offensive arms by lifting the question of forward-based nuclear facilities and agreeing to a separate solution to the question of sea-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet Union has agreed to the total destruction of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, leaving aside the question of British and French nuclear weapons. Here the USSR would reduce its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country to a level of 100 warheads, while the United States could have the same number of medium-range missiles (in terms of warheads) on its territory.

These Soviet actions have been dictated by the need to achieve the chief aim of creating a world without nuclear weapons. They observe not in words but in practice the principle of equality and identical security. But the United States lays claim to a special position and seeks unilateral advantages for itself: It would like to use any means to "factor out" SDI from equalization in terms of nuclear arms.

The American administration and U.S. military-industrial circles, which dislike strategic parity and equal security, want to overtake the Soviet Union and achieve military superiority via space. The realization of the SDI program

means a new stage of the arms race, but now in space, and progression to [vykhod na] new kinds of weapons--space weapons--with which some people on the other side of the ocean would like to supplement nuclear weapons. It is clear that the deployment of SDI will result in the destabilization of the strategic situation and increased international tension.

All the former White House assurances that SDI will make nuclear weapons useless and so the United States will abandon them are refuted by the actions of the Reagan administration itself. By trampling on the SALT II Treaty it has confirmed its desire to implement at all costs the very extensive programs for building up strategic offensive arms.

The SDI program does not frighten the Soviet Union militarily. If America finally decides on it, an appropriate Soviet response will be made, only it will not be symmetrical. However, this is not our choice. The peoples of the planet must know that it is precisely the United States that is pushing the world toward the brink of unpredictable consequences.

Washington is currently undertaking refined maneuvers to dismember the package of Soviet proposals and break up the logically substantiated, fair version of a summary accord without doing anything to ensure a balance of compromises. The Western mass media confirm that Washington would like to remove from the negotiating table what is more advantageous and ignore what, for various reasons, is not to the administration's liking. In particular, the NATO Military Planning Committee recently pointed out that "progress on intermediate-range nuclear forces must not be made dependent on any other agreement." And calls were heard at the December NATO Council session in Brussels to reject discussion of the integral package of measures proposed by the Soviet Union in Reykjavik.

But, as M. S. Gorbachev said, "Our concessions are also part of the package. If there is no package, there will be no concessions either." The package solution is the basis of accords on a nuclear-free world.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR, U.S. POLICIES OF 'HEGEMONY,' 'DETERRENCE' HIT

AU240926 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 22 Dec 86 p 2

[Commentary by NOVOSTI correspondent Valentin Falin, Moscow: "The New Year, What Choice Will Be Made?"]

[Text] The following statement must be regarded as both an axiom and a constant: Security can only be universal and, as far as the relations between the USSR and the United States are concerned, only bilateral. Genuine equal security will be guaranteed not by as high a level of strategic equilibrium as possible but by the lowest possible level, one in which all systems and kinds of means of mass destruction become unnecessary. Hence strengthening peace and security is no longer a military task.

In the Soviet position in Reykjavik the "philosophy of shaping a secure peace in the nuclear and space age" prevailed. During this meeting the USSR tried to convince the United States of the need to combine word and deed. All went well until President Reagan tried to introduce hedges into the agreements, thinking hard how Washington's policy of strength could be combined with a peace without violence and how an official antinuclear space umbrella, known as SDI, could be stretched over a world free of nuclear weapons. He did this so long until he aroused distrust about his actual intentions because he avoided halting the nuclear weapons tests, even though he spoke out in favor of destroying all nuclear weapons in the coming 10 years.

It is in fact impossible to let the world be just a little bit nuclear. Nor can space be militarized just a little bit, as an experiment and so forth, without hoodwinking the other side at the same time. Such ploys spell nothing good.

As early as after Reykjavik the American leadership revealed why it had allowed the historic chance in the development of civilization to come to nothing: At heart the United States is not willing to place justice above strength, consent to being an equal among equal states, dissociate itself from the concept of neoglobalism and from directing the best interests of the world, or hegemony, or to accept the world community for what it is. Ronald Reagan proclaimed bluntly that his administration would continue the policy of strength and that it would not abandon the concept of "deterrence," which, as transpires from American Government documents, is nothing but a policy of "deliberate and gradual pressure" with the main emphasis resting on the "concentration of military superiority."

Guided by this theory the United States rejects peaceful coexistence and cooperation for the mutual benefit. From the U.S. angle a world without weapons and violence only harbors danger or the specter of danger. One can rest easy with an axe and a thick

cudgel under the table. Everything else -- the references to the "insidiousness of the Russians," to alleged violations of treaties by the Soviet Union, all over the globe -- only constitutes a verbal supplement, an expression of annoyance about the fact that whereas U.S. imperialism is stronger than ever the scope for the application of this strength is becoming smaller every year.

How will things go on now? Never before has mankind had such opportunities to improve its life and never before has it been threatened by such dangers as today. There is a choice but how it will turn out depends first and foremost on whether the West can bring its ideas into harmony. This is the key to solving most of the problems that are making the life of the world community difficult today. This is where the answer to the central question of whether or not the chance for genuine disarmament in the interests of all becomes an accomplished fact lies.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS ANALYST CONTENDS NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD ATTAINABLE

LD311719 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT 31 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 31 TASS -- Military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

The outgoing year 1986 will go down in history as a year of change in mankind's mentality. A sharp turn has taken place in the concepts of the possible and the impossible, the attainable and the unattainable: The world has learned that it is possible to avert the threat of nuclear annihilation. Can anything be more encouraging and inspiring than the prospect of approaching the year 2000 without nuclear arms, without any weapons of mass destruction altogether? The Soviet program of attaining a nuclear-free world, set forth in the January 15, 1986 statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, offers a concrete and realistic road following which mankind can reach this great aim within a historically short period of time.

Let us recall for how long some people in the West tried to portray the Soviet program as "totally unrealistic" and as "propaganda", contended that the world has now split into those who believe in it and those who do not. But now it is absolutely clear to all that these times are gone and it can be firmly said that the world has split, clearly and precisely into exponents and opponents of nuclear disarmament. The overwhelming majority of the population in the world has realised that there exists a real possibility of destroying the nuclear sword threatening the very existence of civilisation. And it is only those who dream of military superiority, who make a profit on the arms race, who have grown accustomed to nuclear arms and dream of using them in their egoistic aims oppose the Soviet program.

A considerable contribution to awareness of the attainability of a nuclear-free world was made by the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. First of all because at that meeting the Soviet Union presented a package of cardinal proposals based on its program of nuclear disarmament and actually being a balance of interests and concessions, an interdependence of the security interests of the sides. The Soviet side was flexible in tactics because it had a strategic plan. Secondly, the Soviet proposals proved to be so persuasive that they seriously influenced the President of the United States: In fact he was captivated by the possible closeness of a nuclear-free world. But he lacked courage, sense of responsibility and political resolve. The American side remained on its old positions eroded as they are by time and which no longer accord with present-day realities.

The "Star Wars" program stood in the way of the accords that had been all but reached and made it impossible to formalise them. And yet the world has changed. Faith has appeared and if there is faith there will emerge the forces that will eventually erect a barrier in the way of "Star Wars" and pave the road to a nuclear-free world. For the issue now is either "stellar peace" or "Star Wars", peaceful coexistence of the threat of extinction.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ANALYST ON DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR AGE

PM221621 Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA In Russian 19 Dec 86 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor, Lieutenant General of Aviation V. Serebryannikov under the rubric "New Thinking: A View of the Problem": "The Defense of Socialism in the Nuclear Age"]

[Text] The realities of the nuclear age insistently demand a new understanding of the present level of development of civilization, international relations, and the modern world. They, these realities, dictate the need for new political thinking oriented toward preventing nuclear war and making peaceful use of mankind's means and creative strength to preserve and develop civilization on earth. The modern world, the 27th CPSU Congress pointed out, has become too small and fragile for wars and power politics. It cannot be saved and preserved unless the ways of thinking and acting which have been built for centuries on the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts are broken with resolutely and irrevocably.

Our party and the Soviet state proceed from precisely this in their activity in the world arena. The new political thinking finds concrete expression in the Soviet Union's radical foreign policy actions and initiatives such as the program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and the proposals for a total ban on tests of them and also for a ban on chemical weapons and for cooperation in the peaceful use of space. The new political thinking found vivid expression in the Soviet side's position at the meeting between N.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan in Reykjavik, when an entire package of major, principled proposals was placed on the negotiating table before the American representatives. Had those proposals been accepted, they would have ushered in a new epoch in the life of mankind -- the nuclear-free epoch.

The Reykjavik meeting confirmed that the chief obstacle in the way of nuclear disarmament was the American "Star Wars" plans and the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative," to which the administration and the U.S. military-industrial complex are devoted. The SDI program is an attempt to give a new twist to the arms race spiral, achieve positions of military superiority, and find a means of waging nuclear war in the hope of winning it.

Our party poses and resolves modern questions of the defense of socialism in strict accordance with a scientific analysis of the international situation and with the realities of the nuclear age, in the context of the global problem of war and peace. The CPSU Program, the Party Central Committee's Political Report to the 27th CPSU Congress, and other congress materials contain very important points on the nature and thrust of Soviet military policy, military doctrine, and military building in the USSR and on the fact that our defense efforts are forced on us and conditioned by the existence of the war danger stemming from imperialism.

The congress documents also confirmed the further creative development of the basic ideas of Lenin's teaching on the defense of socialism. The CPSU elaborated principled guidelines for the contemporary and long-term development of the Soviet Armed Forces and defined criteria for the level they must attain. This must be a level that rules out imperialism's strategic superiority and ensures our Armed Forces' ability and readiness to rout any aggressor.

The Soviet Union intends to continue acting in the military sphere in such a way that no one has any grounds for fears, even imagined fears, for his security. But the USSR and its allies equally want to be rid of the sensation of a threat hanging over them. The Soviet state has adopted a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and will abide by it in the strictest manner.

It is precisely with regard for the nature of modern weapons, the present level of development of international relations, and the increased interdependence of states and from positions of the common struggle to prevent a nuclear catastrophe that our party approaches problems of the defense of socialist gains.

Socialism, the 27th CPSU Congress pointed out, unconditionally rejects wars as a means of resolving interstate political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes. Our ideal is a world without weapons or violence, a world in which every people freely chooses its path of development and its way of life.

It is on this principled basis that the Soviet Union builds its relations with all states, including states of the opposite social system -- relations of constructive cooperation and collaboration. There is no alternative to this political course in the nuclear age. Objective conditions have taken shape at the modern stage under which the struggle between capitalism and socialism must be waged in forms of peaceful coexistence.

The nature of modern weapons, as the 27th CPSU Congress emphasized, leaves no state with any hope of defending itself by military-technical means alone, even by creating the mightiest defense. The significance of a sensible policy and of new political thinking in ensuring universal security and each state's security is increasing sharply. Ensuring security is increasingly a political task, which can be resolved only by political means.

it is important to bear in mind that new weapons systems and the tremendous might, speed, range, and accuracy of nuclear missile means are steadily reducing the time and complicating the conditions for adopting political decisions on questions of war and peace in the event of crises. The continuation of the arms race, its transfer into space, the computerization of control of military technical systems, the discovery of new kinds of weapons -- all this can lead to unpredictable consequences, to the result that the situation in the world will no longer depend on the reason or will of politicians but will be in the thrall of technology and military technocratic logic.

This dictates the need for a fundamental break with traditional views on questions of war and peace, the security of individual states, and international security as a whole. The new thinking leads to the only sensible conclusion that nuclear war must not be an instrument of policy. Not only such war itself but also the preparations for it, that is, the arms race and the desire for military superiority, are objectively incapable of giving anyone a political advantage.

The Soviet Union adheres firmly to such positions. But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that reactionary imperialist circles continue to regard war as a permissible instrument of their policy. The policy of the U.S. ruling circles is a policy of social revenge on a global scale, of the strong-arm resolution of the dispute between the two systems, of confrontation and hegemonism. Unable to cope with the deepening general crisis of capitalism and steadily losing their positions, reactionary imperialist circles would like to resolve their own worsening problems at socialism's expense and to secure a possible chance, by their way of thinking, to restore the old orders. All the U.S. military doctrines adopted since World War II have recognized the "permissibility," "acceptability," and "expediency" of nuclear war under certain conditions and contained guidelines for winning it. It is no secret that the United States still has officially adopted scenarios for a nuclear attack on the USSR. "The new nuclear strategy," the now-published "Defense Directives for 1984-1988" state, "is that the American armed forces should be able to eliminate the entire Soviet military and political system (and that linked with the Soviet Union)."

Transatlantic politicians and strategists are distinguished not just by a deficit of the new thinking and the lack of a realistic view of problems of war and peace in the modern epoch but also by a further militarization of consciousness -- which leads to increasing aggressiveness and adventurism in policy. The "philosophy of war" which substantiates the thesis that "the new, improved technology of war can reliably ensure security" and the waging of a victorious armed struggle on any level and involving the use of all means of destruction is flourishing in the United States.

All this attests that U.S. imperialism is the source of the danger of a new world war, which for imperialism's part would be the continuation of its reactionary, unjust, and criminal policy with regard to the entire international community.

The Soviet Union counters that philosophy and policy of imperialism with the philosophy and policy of shaping a secure world in the nuclear and space age. This philosophy pervades all the USSR's aforementioned peace initiatives and proposals.

The defensive Soviet military doctrine is constructed in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the initiatives advanced by the USSR. It was stated most definitely from the 27th CPSU Congress platform that the Soviet Union does not aspire to greater security and will not agree to less.

The activation and efficient utilization of political means undoubtedly make it possible in the long term to achieve reductions in and then the total elimination of mass destruction weapons. But this can only proceed as a mutual, bilateral process, that is, when the imperialist states embark on this path and travel their half of it.

But today it has to be said that the danger of war stemming from imperialism that really does exist embodies the danger that it could break out, although we are struggling by all means to prevent this. But in the event that it is launched, as V.I. Lenin emphasized, a military attack can be repulsed and broken only by military means. Socialism's readiness for this variant of the development of events is one of the strongest factors deterring aggressors. Therefore, as long as aggressive forces do not reduce but build up material means and improve methods of warfare, socialism cannot permit a lag in this sphere.

Strictly following the principle of equal security, the Soviet Union resolutely advocates confining the opposing sides' military potential within the limits of reasonable sufficiency. But the positions and actions of the United States and its NATO partners continue to keep the nature and scale of this limit at its present inordinately high level. If anything is being done in the West in the sense of altering the existing balance of strategic forces, it is being done for the purpose of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the socialist Warsaw Pact countries. Such plans and actions are extremely dangerous.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned that aggressors' attempts to achieve military superiority over it and its allies will be nullified. This applies also to the so-called U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative." M.S. Gorbachev said in his interview with Indian journalists: "SDI does not frighten us. We have thought over what we must do if the Americans continue with SDI. But that will not be our choice."

Everything our country is doing in the defense sphere is subordinate to the interests of reliably defending the motherland and socialism's gains. These interests also demand profound understanding of the essence, nature, and peculiarities of modern wars, particularly the nuclear missile warfare being prepared by imperialism.

The Marxist-Leninist definition of war as the continuation of a policy by violent means is well-known. This formula also makes it possible to understand the new quality of modern war connected with profound changes both in policy and in the means of armed struggle. Modern war -- large or small, nuclear or conventional -- canot be anything but the continuation of policy and is, consequently, subject to social class evaluation as to whether it is just or unjust.

This question must also be addressed because there are people in the West who deny the justice of counteractions by countries subjected to aggression. Theories which have appeared there recently (some of them are dressed in pacifist garb) have attempted to prove that in the nuclear age struggle (meaning, above all, armed struggle) in defense of revolutionary gains and for national liberation cannot be acceptable because it is fraught with consequences dangerous to the cause of peace.

These "theories," if such they may be called, have nothing in common either with the objective laws of social development or with the humanism to which they lay claim. They do not serve the cause of peace and social progress but willy-nilly encourage the escalation of social revenge and military brigandage by imperialist reaction. The modern world consists of many dozens of states, each of which has its own perfectly legitimate interests and the equally legitimate right to defend them.

Of course, the realities of the nuclear age set all states the fundamental task of behaving with restraint and circumspection in the international arena and living in a civilized manner, that is, under conditions of correct contacts and cooperation, while not closing their eyes to the contradictions that exist. But if, contrary to common sense, imperialism unleashes war against the USSR and its allies, our state will make a very decisive response to that challenge. And it will be a supremely just and sacred action.

It is possible to state without exaggeration that never before have questions of war and peace and associated questions of the defense of socialism in the nuclear age been examined so thoroughly as at the 27th CPSU Congress. The congress theoretical propositions, conclusions, and guidelines are a model of the new political thinking and a reliable methodological base for further, more profound understanding of the essence, nature, and peculiarities of modern war.

Only on such a scientific basis is it possible to increase the efficiency of the struggle to prevent nuclear war and successfully carry out defense building in the interests of defending socialism's gains. Modern knowledge of war makes it possible to foster in the Soviet people and their armed defenders the only correct attitude to it -- which is of tremendous moral and political significance and makes it possible to activate the human actor in the very difficult matter of strengthening the motherland's defense capability and ensuring socialism's reliable defense.

Great and complex tasks are facing military scientists in connection with the need for more profound knowledge of modern war and its laws. Only on the basis of truly scientific research, generalizations, and conclusions is it possible to formulate the comprehensively substantiated demands which our times make on enhancing the vigilance and combat readiness of troops and naval forces. Only on this basis can Soviet military art successfully develop further and the system of training and educating Army and Navy personnel improve.

Our military cadres are called upon to master new approaches and think and act in a new way. The program guidelines of the 27th CPSU Congress channel them toward lively practical work and concrete deeds: strengthening combat potential, enhancing combat readiness, accelerating the qualitative improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces, restructuring organizational, party political, and ideological work, ensuring high efficiency in the training and education of servicemen, and strengthening discipline, organization, and order.

The Soviet Armed Forces' high vigilance and combat readiness deter imperialist aggressors and are a mighty obstacle in the way of their unleashing a new war. The dialectics here are as follows: Everything that serves the interests of socialism's reliable defense simultaneously helps to strengthen peace and accords with the interests of social progress on our planet.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: WEST EUROPEAN POST-REYKJAVIK STANCE SCORED

PM241115 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 20 Dec 86 p 3

[International observer G. Dadyants article: "The 'Yeses' and 'Buts' Surrounding Reykjavik"]

[Text] So what is happening in this West Europe situated so near to us? Why has it adopted a vague stance since Reykjavik, as M. S. Gorbachev stressed in his conversation with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. And as soon as a move toward nuclear disarmament began to take shape, why did some of its leaders take fright and begin to undermine the fundamental accords reached in the Iceland capital?

It will be recalled that FRG Chancellor H. Kohl and British Prime Minister M. Thatcher, have already been in Washington since Reykjavik, but not by any means in order to welcome prospects of creating a nuclear-free world. H. Kohl stated that, in the event of a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear missiles, war would once again become "possible and probable." And M. Thatcher announced that Britain in its own defense policy could continue to take nuclear weapons as a reference point. Paris is also stirring the storm in a teacup raised by Bonn and London. After M. Thatcher's meeting with F. Mitterrand a kind of "triumvirate" stood out distinctly, opposing Reykjavik and trying to drag all of West Europe with it.

That same West Europe which not so long ago was so afraid of the Soviet SS-20 missiles and then noisily applauded Reagan's "zero option." And so a "zero option" was proposed in Reykjavik, envisaging the elimination of both Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. Why doesn't it suit West Europe now?

Evidently, those who took refuge in arguments about the "Soviet threat" in order to accumulate nuclear weapons felt uncomfortable. The magazine DER STERN states directly that the demand by Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats for arms control was popular only so long as it was apparent that there was still a long way to go before its implementation.

We shall not tire the reader with numerous citations from West European leaders' speeches saturated with hypocritical assurances that they "in spite of Reykjavik," as before adhere to ideas of disarmament. We shall limit

ourselves to citing the statement made by French Foreign Minister J.-B. Raimond, "Any talks leading to the complete eradication of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe without a parallel reduction in the existing imbalance of conventional and chemical weapons would be a threat to our continent's security."

A threat because, as West European politicians explain their thoughts, in the event of eliminating nuclear weapons, Europe would be left face to face with the Soviet Union, which supposedly has "superior" conventional weapons.

This, it turns out, is what the Russians' crafty schemes are about! That is why they decided to sacrifice their SS-20 missiles—in order to crush West Europe with tanks! The old tale about the Cossacks invading Paris, it seems, takes on new life.

NATO's generals, who, allowing themselves to be led along by Bonn, Paris and London, have now rebelled against Reykjavik, have forgotten that they once calculated exactly—the Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional armed forces are about equal and no kind of "Soviet military supremacy" in this field exists. In addition J.-B. Raimond's thesis on the "threat" to the European continent in the event of nuclear disarmament is flawed because no one is proposing to stop at nuclear disarmament. The Warsaw Pact countries' proposal put forward in Budapest foresees great reductions in Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional armed forces and arms in the next 1 or 2 years by 100-150 thousand men, and after that toward the nineties—by 25 percent. If adopted by the West, these reductions would involve tactical aircraft and as a whole would reduce the armed forces of the opposing military-political groupings in Europe by more than a million men.

Why force an open door, Mr Raimond?

Each successive "argument" invented in West Europe against the Reykjavik accords is more absurd than the previous one. They say, for example, that it is impossible to reduce medium-range missiles unless operational-tactical nuclear missiles are also reduced. But these questions are also closely linked. The Soviet proposals put forward in Reykjavik provide for urgent talks on missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km, the level of which would be immediately frozen with the "zero" option for medium-range missiles.

No, the stir raised in the West concerning conventional weapons and operational-tactical missiles obviously misses the target.

If the Reykjavik accords had been implemented they would have presented a unique chance for Europe to become a continent of peace and genuine international cooperation. They would have removed the ominous shadow of nuclear war from Europe and excluded the possibility of using it as the theater for military action. Is it possible that they do not understand this in Bonn, Paris and London? Why do they defend the political ideas of yesteryear there so stubbornly?

However clever the efforts at concealment, any explanation is quite simple. All objections to Reykjavik have a particular aim: Chancellor Helmut Kohl

wants to maintain the possibility of West German "access" to the U.S. launch trigger, to supplant the problem of disarmament with the problem of NATO's "arms upgrading," while Britain and France do not wish to part with their nuclear forces.

But if the Reykjavik ideas of nuclear disarmament were implemented, if Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear forces and also medium-range missiles were at first cut by 50 percent and subsequently eliminated altogether and operational-tactical missiles were reduced, then it would be necessary, like it or not, to sit down at the negotiating table and discuss the question of French and British nuclear weapons. But apparently they do not want this or they only say they want this but do not in fact.

It turns out that Europe's fate is being sacrificed to the nuclear ambitions of London, Paris and Bonn. The other peoples of West Europe are today compelled to pay for precisely these ambitions at the expense of their security.

West Europe's anti-Reykjavik syndrome is the typical reversion to the old political thinking, a reversion which is all the more dangerous because it is accompanied by the chronic illness from which West European political circles are suffering--anti-Sovietism. This illness, we recall, has already led West Europe to catastrophe once before.

You involuntarily ask yet another question, when analyzing the cunning "yes, but" that can be heard from West Europe in relation to Reykjavik: Did the West Europeans themselves think up these "yes, buts" or are they merely performing as the puppets of those forces in the United States which are today being evasive and are telling lies, trying to misinterpret the essence of the historic accords reached in the Iceland capital, and to disown the idea of a nuclear-free world which would have a direct and immediate impact on the coffers of the U.S. military-industrial complex? In other words, are West European politicians playing their own game? Or has Washington dealt them marked cards in order to help Reagan justify his repudiation of the fundamental accords reached in Reykjavik?

In this case West Europe is playing not so much against us as against itself.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA DECRIMES WEST EUROPEAN REACTION TO REYKJAVIK

PM311319 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[V. Mikhaylov article, "These Strange Memory Gaps"]

[Text] When he discovered America, Christopher Columbus could hardly have supposed that centuries later his native Europe would be asking him with reproach: "Why did you do it?" On the other hand, he could not possibly have imagined at that time that at the end of the 20th century placards with his portrait and precisely this question on them would be carried by columns of demonstrators in front of U.S. missile bases between the Rhine and the Moselle and by pickets at U.S. military bases in the British Isles and on the Italian island of Sicily. Nor could he have imagined that the bitterness of this question would be addressed to the rulers of modern-day America, which has shown its gratitude to the discoverer's continent with nuclear "gifts" threatening its very existence. Yes, in Columbus' time man was only just beginning to understand the world, and the future possibility of its destruction was beyond the realms of thought. But if he were to appear in Europe today Columbus would definitely join the ranks of opposition to those who identify progress with increasingly sophisticated arms and are unable to imagine life without the threat of universal annihilation. The prospect of a nuclear-free world would most certainly appeal to him no less than a strip of salvational dry land on the horizon after interminable wanderings at sea filled with danger.

Europe is certainly fascinated by the vision of a future without lethal weapons. This distant dream appeared to take concrete form at the beginning of this year in the Soviet program to free the world of nuclear weapons. In Reykjavik the dream drew even closer and appeared within reach of our generation. Hence, in the space of just 1 year, a powerful leap forward has been achieved in the thinking and in the ideas of East and West on the bounds of what is essential, realistic, and possible.

Why is Europe so sensitive? The continent of one of the most brilliant civilizations is closest of all to catastrophe: It is crammed with more weapons than the other continents. What is this — the dialectics of development? No. Europe discovered the secret of the split atom and, it seemed, it had at last obtained the eternal Promethean fire capable of warming and providing inexhaustible energy for the eternal motor of progress. But it was stolen. America, "free" of the European experience of devastating wars in its own country, turned the Promethean fire into a Gehenna and threatens to cast its original mother -- Europe -- into it.

Judge for yourselves. More than 7,000 nuclear charges are concentrated in Europe, and more than half of them are in the FRG. Even the present chancellor's predecessor, H. Schmidt, was concerned that the concentration of U.S. nuclear weapons on West German

territory was higher than in the United States itself. But more and more new medium-range missiles have been transferred here since then. The Pentagon named them "Pershings" in honor of the general who distinguished himself by his ferocity in a punitive expedition against the Mexican people when they rose to fight for their freedom. Pershing missiles have gained ominous notoriety in Europe -- and not only by virtue of their name. Their deployment was preceded by frank statements by U.S. leaders on the possibility of a limited nuclear war. Three years have passed since these weapons made their appearance, but the Europeans are not reconciled to their presence.

Reykjavik highlighted both the feasibility of disarmament and the absurdity of continuing the arms race. The USSR and U.S. leaders recognized the fact that a world without strategic offensive weapons and a Europe without medium-range missiles would be far safer. What is the point of creating new mountains of weapons? The simple thought -- "What is the point of this extravagant insanity?" -- has crossed the minds of millions of people.

The "external nature" of weapons was dealt a heavy blow in the Icelandic capital. It became clear that the ogre of war, like the fabled Koshchey the Immortal, is actually mortal. Institutes which study public opinion have registered in various Western countries a drop in belief in the myth of a "Soviet threat" and reduced support for the policy of stockpiling arms. In the FRG, for example, where this myth has been cultivated for more than one generation, 6 out of 10 inhabitants "do not feel alarmed" about the USSR's foreign policy intentions. "No one believes any longer that Soviet disarmament proposals are a part of Soviet propaganda," the newspaper KIELER NACHRICHTEN notes. "M.S. Gorbachev's foreign policy actions, such as the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions and his decision not to violate the SALT II treaty, have contributed considerably to strengthening belief in the seriousness of Soviet proposals."

One would think this growth in trust would be welcome: It facilitates the achievement of disarmament accords. But this is only the case of these accords are actually desired. Many figures in West European capitals, and particularly in NATO Headquarters, are not standing up to the test of Reykjavik, however. They have been literally seized with fear when faced with peoples' insight. "The main problem facing NATO is to convince people of the existence of the Soviet threat" -- this is a directive from the American General B. Rogers, supreme commander NATO Allied Forces Europe. NATO's supreme organ, its Military Committee, has been instructed to resolve this "main problem." A special session of the committee discussed the situation which has taken shape since Reykjavik and formulated the question as follows: "how to secure broader public support for NATO strategy and compel people to understand that our own weapons do not pose any threat."

Now would seem to be the right time to restrain members of the NATO General Staff. What is the point of whipping up a new fear of the USSR if you are aiming for accords with it? But the very opposite is happening. Statemen in this military bloc's leading countries, and primarily in Britain and the FRG, have set about implementing a new program to dupe the population of Western Europe. After visits to Washington by Prime Minister M. Thatcher and Federal Chancellor H. Kohl, three basic aspects of the struggle against the accords outlined in Reykjavik have come to light.

First, with regard to strategic offensive weapons only the initial stage -- a 50 percent reduction in the course of 5 years -- has been taken up. The concluding stage, however -- the total elimination of these weapons in the following 5-year period -- has simply been dropped. There is no mention of it either in the Anglo-American communique

published after M. Thatcher's trip across the ocean or in the statement made by the FRG chancellor in Washington. This truncated strategic arms program has now been announced at the NATO winter session as the aim of the entire Western military bloc.

Second, the Reykjavik accords are being surrounded by a palisade of far-fetched prior conditions, particularly the "zero option" -- that is, the plan to totally eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, as if they want to incarcerate it forever in a medieval fortress.

Third, if given a free rein NATO would quarter and dismember the package of interconnected proposals placed on the table in the Icelandic capital, which scrupulously take into account the interests of those who participated in the talks, as well as the interests of the entire world community. First of all, attempts are being made to set apart the U.S. "Star Wars" program and place it beyond the bounds of the talks, as if there is any sense in agreeing to eliminate weapons on earth and then opening up the far reaches of space to these very same weapons! The question of scrapping medium-range nuclear missiles is also being pronounced "autonomous" and "independent of agreements in other spheres." But it was on the insistence of the leaders of Western countries, primarily the FRG, that the question of these weapons was considered in Reykjavik not only within the framework of Europe but also in connection with these weapons in Asia and on the American continent, that is, on a global level. And finally, the fourth organic part of the package -- ending all nuclear tests -- has been pushed into the dim and distant future.

Some British and FRG leaders have done a complete turnabout in a matter of several months in their approach to the "zero option" for medium-range missiles. When it was an American proposal it was applauded. But when it became a Soviet-American proposal stones were thrown. Here are just a few examples. G. Howe, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, said in March this year: "An agreement (on medium-range missiles -- V.M.) must envisage a real 'zero for zero' solution. The U.S. proposal meets these criteria." After the Soviet-American meeting in the Icelandic capital, basically the same "zero for zero" was pronounced by the head of the government in London to be "a cause for serious concern."

Bonn is also not against forgetting things it has said in the past, when the chancellor stood up for the unconditional removal of USSR and U.S. missiles as the "only solution possible from a moral standpoint." F.-J. Strauss, head of the Christian Social Union, was even prepared to make a pilgrimage "with a candle in his hands" to Altoetting (a place of worship of the Holy Virgin Mary -- V.M.) if the Soviet Union were to agree to the "zero option." But now this "zero" has become possible, Straus has said at his party congress that it is "not worth the effort."

What is this -- sclerotic failures of memory? But it is happening to too many people, and at the same time -- so this cannot be the answer. What is more likely is that the original applause was not intended for the "zero option" but for the inventiveness of the U.S. Administration in putting forward such an effective proposal. No one seriously believed in its feasibility at that time. Henry Kissinger, who, as U.S. secretary of state, had himself been involved in the NATO decision to deploy American missiles in Europe, now explains in the pages of THE WASHINGTON POST the real reasons for the appearance of the "zero option." "In the first term of the Reagan Presidency we witnessed heated debates between those who wanted an agreement on limiting the deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe -- mainly in the State Department and among the NATO allies -- and those who believed that this plan could not be the subject of negotiation -- mainly in the Defense Department. In order to suppress these disputes the administration put forward the 'zero option.' By a twist of fate, it was first

proposed by the Defense Department, which believed the Russians would reject it. In the end this tactical ploy began to take on a life of its own."

If one traces the impediments now being placed in the way of realizing the "zero option," which was given a real start in life in Reykjavik, one discovers trends alarming to Europe -- not only the intention to block the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, but, paradoxically, to develop the arms race in Europe -- yes, that is right -- on the pretext of "preparing" for the moment when the removal of the Pershings and cruise missiles will begin.

The well worn but still living myth of the Warsaw Pact countries' "gigantic superiority" in conventional weapons has been hurriedly revived and a new myth has been introduced -- the "Soviets' multiple superiority" in short-range nuclear systems. The following construction is being put on these two myths: Since the East is vastly "superior" in conventional and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of U.S. medium-range missiles will make this superiority even more of a threat and will "increase the danger of war." From this premise, based on falsified data, the following conclusion is being drawn: Either the USSR will unilaterally reduce its forces, or...the West "will be forced" to begin "upgrading its arms."

The strategy of whipping up fear of the East's imaginary vast superiority has already been used more than once to psychologically prepare the Western population for a new quantum leap in arms. With the aid of this strategy Britain and France can justify their current programs to build up their own nuclear arms. The newspaper WELT AM SONNTAG reports that in the FRG the Bundeswehr's plans for 1987 envisage a sharp increase in the number of short-range missiles -- a new generation. Under the heading "Nuclear Participation," the Defense Ministry plan documents its wish for the future as follows: The development of an "economical nuclear option" for the Bundeswehr is essential.

These plans are encountering opposition not only among opposition parties in the FRG, Britain, and France. There is not even unity among the ruling circles. Even the military-industrial complex is not omnipotent in these countries. The shaping of policy is influenced by the reasonable fear that as a result of departing from the Reykjavik accords Western Europe will become even more involved in the United States' military preparations. This will undermine the economic and scientific and technical foundations of its independence.

The Europeans will not reconcile themselves to the role of waiting upon the American Pershings threatening their continent with devastation. It was also the unhappy lot of earlier European generations to suffer the role of Columbuses charting the course of our ship "Earth" away from the shores of the past with its endless military catastrophes toward new shores, toward a life free of the fear of universal destruction.

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CSO: 5200/1121

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: 'DELHI SIX' URGED RESUMPTION OF ARMS TALKS

LD292152 Moscow TASS in English 2017 GMT 29 Dec 86

[Text] New Delhi December 29 TASS -- The leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Greece, Tanzania and Sweden made an appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States to take practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear arms and non-emplacement of armaments in outer space. Their joint statement circulated simultaneously in the six countries today says, specifically, that in the last days of the outgoing year 1986 they urge the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States for an early resumption next year of all-embracing talks with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on earth and, in the long run, eliminating nuclear weapons everywhere. This is what the entire international community expects.

The leaders of the Delhi Six urged the United States to review its decision to abandon the SALT-2 treaty. They noted that in the present complex situation it is necessary to follow the spirit and letter of agreements, above all those that have a direct bearing on questions of disarmament and arms limitation.

The leaders of the six countries emphasised that there is not justification for the holding of nuclear weapons tests by any country. The leaders of the six countries urged the United States again to revise its policy in the sphere of nuclear explosions, so as to establish a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. The year 1987 offers an opportunity to both countries to reach agreement measures, including substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals. The Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik showed that this can be achieved, the statement says.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

BRIEFS

TASS: FILM ON REYKJAVIK SCREENED--Moscow, 18 Dec (TASS)--"What Reykjavik has been; A stage upward towards non-nuclear peace or a return to yesterday?" is the question being asked by Soviet publicist Nikolay Shishlin and documentary film director Vladimir Konovalov in the new film "A Difficult Dialogue at Reykjavik." It was first screened in Moscow today. The film is a story of the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the tense atmosphere around that meeting. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1728 GMT 18 Dec 86 LD] /9274

TASS: CZECH UN ENVOY'S LETTER--New York, 5 Jan (TASS)--Reykjavik was made optimistic all people who desire to have a turn for the better. The negotiations held here helped mankind for the first time in the past few decades to make a headway on the road towards nuclear disarmament, towards the ultimate triumph of reasons, runs a letter from Czechoslovakia's permanent representative at the United Nations which was issued today as an official document of the UN General Assembly of the "International Year of Peace" item. Reykjavik brought to light difficulties on the way to a non-nuclear world, and the main obstacle--the U.S.-advocated SDI, the document says. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1702 GMT 5 Jan 87 LD] /9274

CSO. 5200/1121

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR ARMY PAPER: U.S. DERAILING SALT PROCESS

PM231605 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Dec 86 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel, Retired, V. Chernyshev:
"The Politics of Wreckers. Washington Is Derailing the SALT II Treaty"]

[Text] The Reagan Administration's decision to finally abandon the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty has been universally condemned, notably by sober-minded politicians and public figures in the United States itself. "We lawyers call on you, Mr President, to safeguard the foundations of our country's security in the nuclear age by continuing to observe the SALT II Treaty's provisions," some 1,200 U.S. lawyers wrote in an open letter to the White House chief.

The SALT I and SALT II accords are of enormous political and military importance. They underlie the first treaty-legal system regulating states' activity in the strategic arms sphere, and they constituted specific steps along the path of ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. And this is not just the Soviet Union's viewpoint. Let us recall how U.S. official spokesmen described the SALT II Treaty prior to its signing in 1979. "A fair and verifiable treaty," "the most specific and most detailed of all treaties ever concluded in this sphere"--U.S. President J. Carter declared. "An important step toward making America and the whole world feel safer," Secretary of State C. Vance pointed out. "The treaty will consolidate the security of the United States and our allies, will curb the arms race, and will diminish the probability of a nuclear war."

The SALT II Treaty was assessed in equally positive terms in other world countries, including states which are U.S. allies in NATO. These assessments still remain valid today. Describing the results of the treaty's operation during the past period, the West German magazine STERN, for example, wrote last June that both sides had to display restraint as regards the firm limits and rules of the treaty. "President Reagan has now torn this document into shreds, and has thus opened the way for unrestrained raging insanity," STERN concluded.

The R. Reagan Administration has been undermining this treaty for several years. Right in the very first days after taking over at the White House, it buried the ratification of this document. At the same time, it embarked on actions in blatant violation of the SALT II Treaty. For example, disregarding the special limitations in the protocol to the treaty, the United States started a massive deployment of long-range cruise missiles. Washington embarked on an obvious circumvention of the treaty by effecting the stationing of medium-range missiles in West Europe, which was a substantial addition to the U.S. strategic potential. In parallel with all this, the implementation of an unprecedented program for the modernization and buildup of strategic offensive weapons proceeded at full steam along all avenues.

Until quite recently, the implementation of this program was still somehow "squeezed" within the framework of limitations imposed by the treaty. Now, however, Washington has not only approached, but has actually crossed over the red line of treaty limits which have become too narrow for the military-industrial complex which is cultivating the arms race.

The White House decision to derail the SALT II Treaty will have the most negative and most dangerous consequences.

First, it means rejection of the principle of equality and equal security underlying the SALT II Treaty. The present administration has been unhappy with this principle for a long time. Now it has been simply rejected and cast overboard.

Second, the treaty system curbing the nuclear arms race is being destroyed in fact. Without the SALT Treaty, former U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara emphasized, the entire structure of arms control, created over 15-20 years, will be destroyed. And it is hardly possible to describe as hyperbole the U.S. ABC-TV's statement that, although the talks continue, both powers have "entered a world without SALT, where there are no longer any limitations on offensive nuclear weapons."

Third, the liquidation of the treaty structure for curbing the arms race is fraught with unpredictability as regards the sides' implementation of strategic programs. The SALT II Treaty and SALT I Interim Agreement provisions make it possible to reliably monitor the development of the strategic situation. Each side had an opportunity to forecast what the other could do in the strategic sphere and to know that the other side could not go beyond the set limits. This is what ensured strategic stability, by making it more difficult to breach parity by sharply ratcheting up strategic offensive weapons.

Fourth, the entire world questions Washington's ability to be a reliable partner in the conclusion of any treaties and agreements whatsoever if, guided by its selfish interests, it finds it so easy to sweep aside documents which have been signed at top level. Many European leaders, the French newspaper LE MONDE writes, are alarmed by the evolution of the situation in the United States and its possible consequences for East-West relations. The question of how much

confidence can be placed in the U.S. Administration during its remaining 2 years in power is being asked at the highest level in European capitals, the newspaper stresses.

Fifth, the U.S. Administration's new and dangerous step is a "logical" link in the campaign of attacks against Reykjavik's historic opportunities, which pave the way to a nuclear-free world and which, as it has been shown, are so frightening to U.S. militarist circles. The White House's action, the U.S. newspaper BALTIMORE SUN writes, contradicts Reagan's statements in Reykjavik on his administration's objectives in the arms control sphere. The U.S. Administration, Senator J. Chafee pointed out, "complicates relations with the Soviet Union" at a time when hopes of progress in the arms control sphere emerged in the wake of Reykjavik.

Sixth, the prospects of the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva are placed in jeopardy, and the likelihood of concluding new agreements is considerably diminished. "Using the SALT II limitations as a basis, we could agree on deep cuts in nuclear arsenals," R. McNamara declared. "The unrestrained arms race which we would perhaps launch instead does not offer any such basis." One could add to this that it is difficult to build new accords on the shaky ground of uncertainty, which would be one of the results of the course being offered to the world by the United States.

The U.S. President's decision to wreck the treaty system and plant a landmine beneath the structure of detente has delighted the American ultras, the adversaries of all arms limitation, those who sleep and dream of a world transformed in the image of a "great America." "There is no doubt," Paul Warnke, one of the leading U.S. experts on disarmament problems, declared, "that the government employees who came to the Pentagon under the Reagan Administration have never been champions of arms control. I believe that this is an insane policy, and that the insane have won at this stage."

"Making excuses" to U.S. right-wing circles for his "2-day flirtation" with the vision of a nuclear-free world in Reykjavik, the White House chief is now rushing to demonstrate his unwillingness to achieve any progress along the path of reducing and destroying nuclear weapons, and his intention to totally destroy the existing system for curbing the arms race in his remaining years in power. Furthermore, he is in a hurry to commit future administrations to an unrestrained arms race.

Some people in Washington are totally unwilling to learn the lessons of history, to open their eyes to the realities of the nuclear and space age, or to understand what could be the outcome for their own country and for the entire world of their blind commitment to the cult of strength and the desire to gain strategic superiority at all costs. A triumph of anti-Soviet ideology over common sense--this is how the U.S. Administration's offensive against existing agreements must be assessed.

Under such conditions, the Soviet Union would have been fully justified if it were to automatically cancel its corresponding pledges under the treaty and agreement that are being wrecked by the Americans. Maybe that is what it should have done, were it to be guided by emotions alone. Nevertheless, when examining this question, the Soviet leadership proceeded on the basis of sober reckoning and the logic of our policy. It thoroughly weighed up the political, military, and moral-ethical aspects of the prevailing situation and drew the conclusion that additional efforts must be made to avert from mankind the threat of sliding toward strategic chaos.

Declaring that the USSR will, for the time being, honor the limitations imposed by the SALT II Treaty, the Soviet side proceeds from the vast importance of this question for all of mankind, from the very same noble and humane motives which stand behind our program for the liquidation of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the 18-month moratorium on nuclear explosions, and our large-scale proposals in Reykjavik.

The USSR will very carefully observe U.S. actions to ensure that parity is not excessively overburdened by U.S. military programs, and will not allow any military superiority over it. At the same time, our country believes that an opportunity still exists to halt the dangerous development of events and is offering the U.S. leadership another chance to weigh up all the possible consequences of its actions and to heed the world community's opinion and the sober voices in political and public circles, including in the United States itself. The Soviet Government's decision is also a call to the U.S. Administration to halt, to display genuine restraint, and not to take any steps which would finally derail the agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The USSR would not like to take the path along which official Washington is pushing the world. It hopes that ultimately the "insane" will fail to win the upper hand.

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CSO: 5200/1130

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

TASS: RADARS BREACH ABM TREATY--New York, 28 Dec (TASS)--The Reagan Administration is moving towards violating the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. THE NEW YORK TIMES quoted officials today as saying the United States was going to implement plans to build two new, large radars in Greenland and Britain. It also cited arms control experts as saying that would be a breach of the ABM treaty because it did not allow the United States to build new radars. ["U.S. Moving Towards Violating ABM Treaty"--TASS headline] [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1103 GMT 28 Dec 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1130

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRAVDA REBUFFS U.S. 'SLANDER' ON SOVIET BW

PM231030 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[S. Nikitin article: "Bacilli of Slander"]

[Text] The U.S. administration has evidently decided to declare an "open season" on arms limitation and disarmament agreements. It is twisting the Reykjavik accords on the move to a nuclear-free world, has violated the SALT II Treaty, and is conducting an offensive against the ABM Treaty.

The latest target for attacks is the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and on their destruction which to this day remains the only international treaty on real disarmament. Concluded in 1975, it led to the elimination of these weapons and excluded from the arsenals a whole class of arms which are highly dangerous for mankind. This was a substantial step along the path to a world free from weapons of mass destruction. Now the Pentagon apparently believes that this step should not have been taken, and that the barrier which was erected must be broken down. As for the means chosen, they are old ones--slander of the Soviet Union and of the accords themselves.

The other day the latest collection of what is regarded, in the American capital, as "evidence" of violations by the Soviet Union of the convention banning bacteriological weapons was put into circulation. This time they decided to publish the lie in the form of a military intelligence report, evidently in the hope that some people would believe it. After all, it is "intelligence," and there is no need to cite facts--the information is "secret."

This "report" could, of course, be ignored, especially since it reiterates the accusations which the United States has already tried--unsuccessfully, it is true--to use at the international conference held in Geneva in September to examine the operation of the convention banning bacteriological weapons.

At that time the USSR delegation gave the necessary explanations about biological work being done in our country, the achievements which exist, and the plans for the future, showing convincingly that all our activity in these spheres accords strictly with the convention's provisions. Soviet specialists answered the questions put to them, including those put by their American colleagues, in connection with the USSR's fulfillment of its commitments under

the convention and concerning outbreaks of epidemic diseases which have taken place on the Soviet Union's territory. This kind of frank dialogue is natural and necessary; it is needed if there are to be normal, honest relations between the participants in the convention and if disarmament agreements are to bring about rapprochement among states, rather than being a source of misunderstandings or disunity. To this end there was a businesslike, committed discussion at the conference of ways of strengthening the convention and stepping up its effectiveness.

But militarist circles think and act in the opposite direction. The U.S. delegation at the conference, either feeling out of place in these efforts on the part of the convention participants, or seeking to thwart the success of the conference, came to Geneva to put a "fly in the ointment," and started spreading accusations of its own manufacture--certain states, it said, including the Soviet Union, do not comply with the convention. The majority of the conference participants, however, showed no interest in this slander and focused attention on examining serious proposals on strengthening the ban on bacteriological weapons. Here too the American delegation did not pass the test. The United States singlehandedly blocked the Geneva forum's decisions on strengthening the convention's verification machinery, elaborating a corresponding protocol, and convening a special conference to this end (these proposals were initiated by the Soviet Union, Sweden, Pakistan, and Ireland). The American "no" in effect demonstrated the hypocrisy of the U.S. stance on questions of international verification. On closer inspection this stance proved to be merely a bluff.

Proposals on the development of equal international cooperation among states, on the basis of the convention's provisions, in the sphere of the peaceful utilization of biology and bioengineering, as well as on extending the exchange of information on new scientific and technical achievements in these spheres, which would strengthen confidence that these achievements are not being used for military purposes, were also not to Washington's liking.

The Soviet Union does not consider the discussion of these questions, which began at the conference, to be completed. It is a question of an important task--reinforcing the effectiveness of the convention, promoting the growth of its authority in every way, and effectively implementing all its provisions. The Soviet Union will continue to seek these goals, aware of its responsibility as depository of the convention and as a state which complies with it strictly and has an interest in the strict fulfillment of the convention by others.

One would wish to express the hope that people in the United States will display the utmost seriousness in approaching such an important matter as the strengthening of the international legal base for disarmament and compliance with arms limitation treaties. The renunciation of cheap propaganda tricks and involvement in the efforts of stages to strengthen the convention banning bacteriological weapons--that is what is needed from Washington in order to demonstrate in practice its adherence to this important document.

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CSO: 5200/1123

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS ON U.S. 'OBSTRUCTIONIST' STANCE TOWARD CW CONTROL

LD242007 Moscow TASS in English 1941 GMT 24 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 24 Dec (TASS)--By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev.

It is only 50 years since the beginning of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Poisonous Agents that the United States ratified the protocol. Over that period of time the United States used chemical weapons on a large scale of more than once, specifically in Vietnam. To this day, Washington has not made any serious attempts to alter its odious reputation for declaring most resolutely against the complete ban on the production of chemical warfare agents and against the destruction of their stockpiles.

It is with great satisfaction that the world public received the new Soviet initiatives for chemical disarmament which envisage the complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their production. The Soviet proposals have a compromise nature and help overcome the differences that existed earlier. For instance, the Soviet Union's proposals envisage also permanent international on-site inspection at most important facilities, if necessary.

At the consultations on chemical disarmament that ended recently in Geneva the Soviet delegation expressed the readiness to assume as a basis at the discussion Britain's proposal which envisages the possibility of verification of the observance of the agreement in exceptional circumstances by alternative methods, without infringing lawful interests of security of all parties. Under that British proposal it would be possible in some cases to verify the nature of the output of an industrial enterprise without entry to its shops, by analysing effluent, by means of chemical sensors, etc, but the U.S. side has not supported Britain's proposal.

The United States' openly obstructionist stand with regard to the ban on chemical weapons causes concern even among the leaders of the United States' allies. Greece and Turkey take part, alongside Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, in a meeting in Bucharest devoted to the creation of a chemical weapons free zone in the Balkans. The proposals of the GDR and Czechoslovakia for a chemical weapons free zone in Europe received broad support in the FRG, in other NATO countries.

In order to resolve the problem of chemical threat in the interests of entire humanity, Washington should confirm by practical deeds its obligation recorded in the joint Soviet-U.S. statement after the Geneva summit, should intensify its efforts toward concluding an effective and verifiable convention on general and complete ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1123

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR: BW CONFERENCE MEETS IN GENEVA, BW-CW DIFFERENCES ERODING

AU221521 Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 12, Dec 86 (Signed to Press 10 Nov 86) pp 92-98

[Article by V. Baburov: "Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons (On the Results of the Second Conference To Review Its Operation)"]

[Text] The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which came into force in 1975, occupies an important place among the package of international agreements limiting the arms race. It is essentially the first disarmament measure in the history of international relations to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union's attitude toward the convention is prescribed by its endeavor for peace and a desire to achieve a total and universal prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Striking testimony to this is the program to eliminate these weapons by the end of the current millennium, which was set forth in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and confirmed at the 27th CPSU Congress.

The experience of history confirms that achievements in various spheres of science can be used not only for peaceful purposes. This is also true of microbiology. On the one hand, its progressive development and successes are being widely used in the economy and contribute to the productive struggle against epidemic diseases. There is also, however, another side to the problem: All these achievements could also have helped to create lethal microorganisms, the future components of new weapons.

According to specialists, in a certain sense bacteriological weapons are no less dangerous than such means of mass destruction as chemical or nuclear means. Bacteriological agents, being live organisms, are able to reproduce rapidly and in view of this, the epidemics they produce can encompass enormous areas. According to the calculations of experts, in the event of an attack by one strategic bomber on an undefended population, the region of contamination from onboard nuclear weapons would amount to 30 square kilometers, chemical -- 60 square kilometers, and bacteriological -- 100,000 kilometers. It should also be taken into account that the production of bacteriological weapons would be significantly cheaper than the creation of chemical, and especially nuclear weapons. Virtually any country having microbiological establishments is capable of stockpiling them.

However, a serious barrier stands in the way of this today in the form of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. Its conclusion made it possible to avoid tragic events, of which there have been quite a few examples in recent history, in which the best achievements of the human intellect have been turned against the peoples of the world. [paragraph continues]

The vitality and effectiveness of the convention were confirmed during the second conference to review its operation, which was held in Geneva in September this year. Delegations from the 63 state parties to this agreement took part in it, as well as observers from countries that have signed but not ratified it, such as Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Sri Lanka.

The work of this many-sided forum took place under complicated conditions, in an atmosphere of the policy by the United States and certain NATO countries of continuing the arms race and of delaying the drafting of accords on disarmament issues. This was reflected during the general discussion, in which 45 delegation took part, as well as in the activity of the meeting's working organs.

U.S. representatives, having resorted to slanderous attacks accusing the USSR of violating certain provisions of this agreement, tried to aggravate the situation at the conference and to sow doubts about the efficacy of the convention and its effective fulfillment. This approach reflected a line planned before the meeting, when a report appeared on the interest of certain U.S. circles in resuming the development of bacteriological weapons. They launched an attack on the convention by putting forward a package of accusations, saying other states were supposedly not observing the agreement. A speech in Washington in August -- that is, before the meeting -- by D. Feith, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense, which essentially contained an appeal to create these weapons on the basis of the latest achievements of biotechnology and genetic engineering, can serve as an example.

At the Geneva conference, the delegation of the USSR and other socialist countries and Afghanistan subjected such invalid attacks to persuasive criticism by stressing that they were aimed at undermining the convention and designed to justify a return to the development and production of bacteriological weapons. The Soviet delegation outlined our country's constructive approach to the fulfillment of the commitments it has made in accordance with the convention, which confirmed an interest in strengthening this important agreement to the utmost. The clarifications it made produced great interest among and a positive response from the participants in the conference. As a result, the attempts of the U.S. side to entice it into a confrontational course were neutralized.

Practically all those present stressed the unchanging significance of the convention as an important measure of real disarmament and the need to strengthen it to the utmost and strictly fulfill all its provisions. The overwhelming majority of delegates adhered to the view that the main task of the meeting was to examine ways to enhance the effectiveness of this important agreement. In its final declaration, the conference urged that the convention become a genuinely universal international document. The speakers noted with satisfaction that since China and France had joined it, all the permanent members of the Security Council, which in accordance with the UN Charter were particularly responsible for maintaining international peace, were participating in it. It was stressed in speeches by representatives of the socialist countries, India, Nigeria, and Latin American states that the convention was a very important international-political and legal tool that made it possible to close off one of the channels of the race of the most lethal arms, and that in recent years the significance of this obstacle had not only not decreased, but had grown. The conference advocated further expanding the range of conference members (there are now more than 100 of them), particularly through the states that have signed but not yet ratified the stated agreement.

The delegates from socialist and developing countries noted that the very fact of the conclusion of this agreement was a positive example of a successful solution to the complicated problems of security and arms limitation. [paragraph continues]

It serves a convincing testimony that real disarmament, which leads to the removal of entire categories of arms from states' arsenals, is quite a feasible task and that given the goodwill of all states, progress along the difficult path toward universal and total disarmament is not only necessary, but possible.

An indicator of the effectiveness and vitality of the convention is that, as a rule, its members are observing it in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill, to which the consolidated document presented at the conference testifies. (Footnote 1) (See Doc. BWC/Conf. 11/3 Add. 2) As a result, up to now the need has not arisen for consultations on questions of the observance of the convention that is stipulated in Article V.

As regards the Soviet Union, as pointed out in the addresses by the Soviet delegation, observance of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, which was ratified by a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on 11 February 1975, is guaranteed by the appropriate USSR state institutions. Our country does not possess any bacteriological agents and toxins, stockpiles of these weapons on its or the territory of other states, and equipment or means of delivery, and also does not conduct research and development aimed at creating and refining these weapons on its territory or on the land of other states. It has never transferred biological agents, toxins, weapons, or the means of their delivery to anyone, has not provided assistance to and has not encouraged or induced other states to manufacture or otherwise acquire them.

The active position of the USSR and other socialist countries largely promoted the successful conclusion of the conference's work. The Soviet delegation opposed attempts aimed at undermining the convention with the help of various farfetched pretexts and urged a focus of efforts primarily on the tasks of further strengthening and enhancing the prestige of this agreement.

As early as the first conference to review the operation of the convention, which was held in 1980, the Soviet Union, together with other depositary countries (the United States and Great Britain), presented an information document on the scientific-technological discoveries, which affected issues considered by the convention, that were made over the first 5 years of its operation. This document contained a valid conclusion that the achievements in the sphere of biological science have not led to vagueness or fundamentally new opportunities that could be used to secretly violate or circumvent the convention's provisions.

The updated information material presented by the Soviet side at the current -- second -- conference reaches the conclusion that all new natural or artificially created pathogenic microorganisms fall unconditionally under the operation of the convention and there are no legal or other bases to place them in any special category of weapons of mass destruction. It also contains the conclusion that toxins synthesized by methods of bioorganic chemistry and having a dual affiliation -- both to toxins and chemical weapons -- fall completely under the ban on the development, production, and accumulation of stockpiles, and especially on their combat use in accordance with the convention in force.

Thus, it is pointed out in this document, the convention's provisions are comprehensive and concise, and are extended to all microorganisms and toxins both of natural and artificial origin that could be viewed as agents for military purposes. (Footnote 2) (See Doc. BWC/Conf. 11/4 Add. 1)

At the conference such a constructive approach to the convention was displayed by the delegations of other socialist countries, as well as by a number of developing states.

At the same time the rapid development of biological science, particularly major new achievements in genetic engineering, engenders quite justified alarm: But what if this entire scientific-technological leap is fraught with a potential military threat? The representatives of some delegations pointed out that in such a situation certain circles would take action to circumvent the convention. Stemming from this, a proposal was voiced at the Geneva meeting to take measures to strengthen confidence and the verification [kontrolnyy] mechanism of this agreement.

The fears voiced at the conference have some basis if one takes into account reports that work is being done in certain Western countries, primarily the United States, aimed at using biological science for military purposes.

Concerning such research, the prestigious U.S. journal BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS has pointed out the "disturbing signs that biological science could gradually be integrated into the military system." According to the journal's calculations, appropriations for research for the purposes of chemical and biological warfare increased by 365 percent in the United States from 1980 to 1985. Given this, the nature of work being done on the basis of the biological research program could significantly change toward work on potential weapons. (Footnote 3) (See BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May 1985, pp 10-16) Revealing in this regard is the view of (M. Shekter), president of the American Society of Microbiology: "The difficulty that military people encounter lies in the following: While asserting that they are working on defense problems, they are simultaneously doing the same work for offensive purposes." (Footnote 4) (Ibid.)

Also attracting attention are the projects being developed by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, which spent \$40 million on long-term basic research in the 1986 fiscal year. The office intends to approximate its development projects even more to the tasks of the U.S. Navy, which is testified to by the orientation of the activity of its subordinate biological laboratories in Oakland and Berkeley (California). In Berkeley, for instance, work is being done in the sphere of slow contagions, of the genetic analysis of the pathogenicity of plague pathogens, of pathogenic carriers of dangerous viral infections, and of the diagnostics of bacterial meningitides. In this regard U.S. scientific circles, particular the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are voicing serious fears about the fact that the Pentagon will seek to expand research for military applications. (Footnote 5) (See NATURE, 1986, No 6060, p 298)

Taking into account the mood of world public opinion in favor of confidence-building measures, the USSR delegation, together with the representatives of other socialist countries, put forward a proposal in Geneva on holding a special conference, in a form that is acceptable to the participants in the forum, aimed at adopting a joint protocol containing measures to strengthen the verification mechanism. This proposal produced great interest among the forum's participants. The delegations of Sweden, Ireland, and Pakistan, for instance, voiced support for it; the others did not object to it in principle. However, the representatives of the United States and of states allied to it stated that this proposal was unacceptable and prevented it from being reflected in the conference's final document, thereby essentially showing a negative attitude toward strengthening verification measures in the disarmament sphere.

Accommodating the desires of a number of countries, the delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist states did not object to the adoption of recommendations by the conference on an exchange between the conference's participants of data on centers where biological research is being done. This information would include the location of these centers, the extent and basic areas of work, as well as information on all instances of outbreaks of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the socialist countries displayed a readiness to create a group of scientific experts to discuss new achievements in the sphere of biology related to the observance of the convention.

This created a good basis for developing and coordinating the text of the final declaration, which was the foundation of a mutually acceptable compromise. An example of the interest of conference participants in achieving positive results was the decision to convene a special meeting at the level of experts in Geneva on 31 March-15 April to coordinate the procedures of an exchange of information concerning the convention.

At present the differences between chemical and biological warfare are becoming increasingly eroded. Therefore, also an important result of the conference was the fact that a recommendation on very rapidly concluding talks aimed at banning yet another type of mass destruction weapons -- chemical -- was reflected in the final declaration, which was adopted unanimously.

The Soviet Union is consistently guided by the provisions of Article IX of the convention, which note the importance of talks aimed at reaching agreement on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Proceeding on this basis, the Soviet delegation at the second conference advocated the utmost intensification of talks to conclude a convention, which would be effective and would lend itself to verification, on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. As you know, in seeking to accelerate the resolution of this important task, as early as the second UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 the Soviet Union introduced for discussion a document "Basic Provisions of a Convention for the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons," which took into account the positions of other states which were parties to the talks, including on the issue of verification. Together with the subsequent Soviet proposals on various aspects of the problem of prohibiting and destroying chemical weapons, this document is a good basis for an appropriate convention.

At the end of April the USSR introduced new proposals at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. They concerned the timely announcement of the locations of enterprises for the production of chemical weapons, the immediate termination of their operation, and the provision of conditions for very rapidly beginning the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, as well as destruction or dismantling of facilities for its production. At the same time important proposals were also introduced on the strictly controlled verification of the elimination of facilities for the production of chemical weapons and the termination of their operation, including holding systematic international on-site inspections [inspeksii na mestakh].

At present prerequisites exist for completing the coordination of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction. As stressed by the delegations of socialist countries at the Geneva conference, so as to ensure favorable conditions for this, it is important that all states refrain from all actions that could hamper talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and in particular refrain from the production and development of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from the deployment of these weapons on the territories of other states.

The conference advocated the adoption of energetic measures aimed at fulfilling the commitment made by convention members to continue talks on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and on a very rapid coordination and conclusion of an appropriate agreement. The Soviet delegation at the Geneva conference also confirmed that the USSR fully takes into account the convention's provisions aimed at the peaceful use of biological science. It was pointed out in speeches by the Soviet delegation that in the Soviet Union, research and development using microorganisms and toxins is carried out in the interests of health and of the development of the microbiological industry and agricultural production.

The microbiological industry in the USSR specializes in producing agents for the intensification of agriculture and medical compounds. The sector's enterprises manufacture and supply to agriculture vaccines, feed yeast, vitamins, enzymes, antibiotics, plant protection agents, and bacteriological fertilizers. The development and supply of various medical compounds for health needs, as well as of biological agents for scientific research that are obtained by microbiological synthesis, are being expanded. Each year the manufacture of products and preparations for the needs of the textile, food, chemical, and other sectors of industry is increasing.

Genetic engineering has made a substantial contribution to the development of domestic biotechnology. Strains producing special-purpose products, including insulin, interferon, autotropic [samotropnyy] hormones, and indispensable amino acids have been obtained with its help. Moreover, immunoregulatory peptides, antigens for the viruses of influenza, foot-and-mouth disease, and hepatitis, and other physiologically active substances have been obtained.

The Soviet delegation showed that our country is implementing broad international ties in the area of biotechnology both in the economic and scientific-technological sphere by exporting products and importing technological equipment and scientific apparatus and through joint study of the scientific-technological problems of the CEMA member-states, as well as by selling licenses and providing technological assistance to foreign countries in creating new plants or modernizing existing ones.

Carried out within the framework of multifaceted cooperation is the coordination of the plans for the development of the microbiological industry of CEMA countries, international specialization and cooperation in the production of food additives and the development of standards, as well as participation in the work of Inforchem -- the international system of scientific and technological information on chemistry and the chemical industry.

On the basis of agreements with the GDR, the Polish People's Republic, the CSSR, and Cuba, the Soviet Union is building the Mozyr plant for the production of feed protein. Technical assistance has been provided by Bulgaria in the construction of an entobacterin plant, by Cuba in the production of furfural and lysine, and by Romania in the construction of a feed yeast plant.

The Soviet Union is implementing bilateral scientific-technological cooperation in biotechnology with Western countries, including Italy and Switzerland. Talks have been held with a number of these firms, such as "ICI" and "John Brown," (Great Britain); "Hoechst-Ude" and "Linde," (FRG); "Rhone-Poulenc" and ("Fin-Teknip"), (France); ("Farmatsiya"), (Switzerland); and others. Seminars with foreign firms, in which specialists from scientific-research institutions and enterprises take part, are held regularly.

Items of Soviet export are solvents (acetone, butanol), furfural, (kormogrizin), (pektfoetidin), and Vitamin B12. Laboratory equipment and apparatus make up a significant proportion of imports into the USSR. In recent years the sale of Soviet licenses has expanded.

The Soviet Union's use of achievements in the sphere of biological science is aimed at further developing the national economy, particularly the successful fulfillment of the Food Program. Moreover, it advocates broad cooperation between states in the sphere of the peaceful development of biology, viewing the joint study of problems as an effective way of strengthening the operation of the convention. This position of the Soviet side has encountered widespread support from the participants in the Geneva forum, primarily from socialist and nonaligned states.

The importance of the results of the second conference was confirmed during the work of the current, 41st session of the UN General Assembly. A large group of countries, including socialist, nonaligned, Western, and neutral ones, have introduced in the UN General Assembly's First Committee a draft resolution supporting the decisions of this conference.

It has given impetus to the further expanding international cooperation in the interests of developing biological science for the good of peace and progress. Promising areas in this regard are the spheres of biotechnology and genetic engineering, the development of effective agents for preventing and treating infectious diseases, as well as the fight against plant pests.

Common sense triumphed at the meeting of the convention members in Geneva, and it was crowned with definite success. Among its positive results one should consider the fact the importance and vitality of the agreement were stressed, specific measures to strengthen it were outlined, and the U.S. course toward undermining confidence in this document was resolutely rejected. The forum of the state parties to the convention consolidated a number of useful recommendations for the development of international cooperation in the sphere of biotechnology and genetic engineering and resolutely opposed the use of the latest achievements of biological science for military purposes.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET CHEMICAL SERVICES COLONEL DETAILS CONCERNS

Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 86 pp 85-87

[Article by Colonel B. Shubin: "The Concerns of the Chief of Chemical Service"]

[Text] As is known, excellent field training and strong military discipline in personnel is reached through the joint and purposeful work of commanders and political workers, staff officers and specialists in the various services. The content and nature of the tasks that they resolve on a daily basis are different, but they all serve the general goals, like links in a single chain. The successes and shortcomings of every one of them has an unavoidable impact on the end results of the subunit and unit as a whole.

Chemical service officers are called upon to make an important contribution to the business of training personnel to operate clearly and in a well-organized manner in modern battle. Their role is especially great when the enemy is using weapons of mass destruction. For example, the functional duties of the regimental chief of chemical service as contained in the regulations are especially multi-faceted. First and foremost, in peacetime he strives to develop qualitative measures to reliably support subunit operations and to protect them from toxic and radioactive agents and also enemy biological weapons; and he works to effectively employ these measures in battle.

The majority of chemical officers have a good understanding of the importance associated with this mission and have a conscientious attitude toward their service and party duty. The selfless actions that many of them displayed while eliminating the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant testify to their high political, business and moral qualities. Officers N. Vygodovskiy, S. Golovko, V. Reznichenko, Ye. Starostin, A. Toporkov, N. Shevchenko, S. Shishko and many others did an exceptional job and distinguished themselves. They boldly entered the struggle against the enraged elements at this hour of need, quickly discerned the radiation problem in the area around the station and conduct radioactive decontamination operations, thus providing a bridgehead for the work in eliminating the ruinous consequences of terrain contamination in the danger zone. Military chemical personnel also did an excellent job in resolving the other difficult tasks involved in dosimetric monitoring of the radioactive contamination in people, livestock and various types of equipment.

At the same time, reality is showing that some, and especially recently assigned chiefs of chemical service, are allowing important omissions in planning military and political training and are not providing skillful assistance to subunit commanders in setting up exercises and training. And they also often do a poor job in monitoring the course of the training process and the monitoring the condition and use of protective gear. The reasons for this are more than just their poor professional skills. It is also the low sense of responsibility that the officers have for their assigned tasks and in some it is their adherence to outdated methods for managing their service.

In order to generalize the foremost experience I would like to go into some detail in relating the work of Major G. Logvinov (from the North Caucasus Military District) who is the best regimental chief of chemical service in one of the formations. This industrious, energetic, well-trained officer enjoys well-deserved authority in the collective. In a relatively short time he has been able to significantly correct the situation in the sector of work that has been entrusted to him.

The subunit that is directly subordinate to the chief of chemical service achieved good and excellent marks in the socialist competition that was dedicated to the 27th CPSU Congress. And training in defense against weapons of mass destruction in many of the regiment's subunits was marked by definite successes this year. The best of them was the tank battalion commanded by officer G. Kozhekhanov. It is generally recognized that a lot of this is due to the new chief of chemical service.

One cannot say that Logvinov's predecessor was not a conscientious officer. During his time of service he received a lot of incentives and did not receive a single punishment, but earlier there was no one in the regiment who was interested in the problems of chemical defense. The command and the party organization did not get very involved in the work of the chemical service, considering this the prerogative of specialists. Apparently the final satisfactory results in ZOMP [defense against weapons of mass destruction] that were attained at inspections satisfied them.

Major Logvinov took over the service on the eve of the training year. The officer began by carefully studying documentation from the previous final inspections and the appropriate notes in the military training journal. He made a comprehensive analysis of the positive aspects and the deficiencies in ZOMP training for regimental subunits and in all areas of the chemical defense platoon's training. This allowed him to note specific and real measures in generalizing and introducing progressive experience and in eliminating omissions and deficiencies in training personnel.

The chief of chemical service took an active part in the work involved in planning military and political training. The primary goal that he worked for was an expedient consistency in developing ZOMP subjects with commissioned and warrant officers and sergeants and with subunits and the efficient use of the material and technical training base.

During the planning process the chief of chemical service determined the volume and length of time for developing chemical support missions in concert with the primary issues in tactical training exercises and in other training. He further planned the sequence for getting subunits involved in chemical defense in joint exercises and training with tankers and artillery men.

Subjects and times were also set up to have company and platoon commanders involved with displays and methodological instructor training in ZOMP. Training in the most difficult subjects was established for warrant officers and sergeants. Major Logvinov developed documentation for the chemical defense platoon in accordance with the established requirements for planning military and political training and also developed documentation for special exercises with battalion chemical instructors, as well as with the crews (squads, teams) that were designated to conduct radiation and chemical reconnaissance.

The chief of chemical service simultaneously provided battalion commanders and chiefs of staff with specific assistance in planning and setting up ZOMP exercises. They were specifically given recommendations on the decontamination sequence which considered the efficient use of equipment in training classrooms, the tactical fields of the chemical training ground and the areas near the barracks that were set up for training. When required, special equipment, instruments for radiation and chemical reconnaissance, radiation and chemical decontamination sets, simulators, and incendiary and smoke equipment, placards, stands and other mobile training equipment were set up there at the assigned time.

Major Logvinov helped subunit commanders write exercise schedules, correctly organize the development of ZOMP norms and conduct training for personal in the prolonged use of gas masks and protective garments. By the way, the regiment began to more fully utilize time from field exercises for such training and it also displaced to training locations to train and then returned to the barracks. As a result, they succeeded in improving the psychological and physical tempering of the personnel.

The chief of chemical service sees one of his primary missions as increasing the effectiveness of exercises in defense against weapons of mass destruction and teaching subunit commanders to conduct such exercises in a manner that is methodologically correct. Displays and instructor-methodological exercises are routinely set up, especially on such subjects and issues as using the protective characteristics of terrain and organic equipment, the means of individual and collective protection, the conduct of radiation and chemical reconnaissance, methods and means for operating in contaminated terrain and others.

Future exercise instructors receive a clear representation of which defensive issues should be developed in a squad, platoon or company, which should be dealt with in the classroom, on equipped training areas or tactical training fields, and which trainers, simulators and technical equipment are best used to avoid artificiality in operations by personnel and so forth.

Instructor-methodological exercises usually have a practical side. Company, platoon or squad commanders execute methods or means as determined by the subject to protect against weapons of mass destruction. But at the same time instructors explain how to set up competition for the best accomplishment of norms in ZOMP exercises at their own subunits and how to get their personnel to develop psychological and physical stability, self-sufficiency, courage and solid skills in rendering self- and first-aid to wounded, as well as in the use of protective means and anti-radiation preparation.

For example, during one of the methodological exercises Major Logvinov recommended to officers that when teaching their subordinates how to operate in case of an enemy chemical attack they should give the established signals, primarily through subunit observers so that the students who are carrying out tactical or fire missions do not expect these signals. Based on the specific situation, crew commanders must refine the sequence for applying protective means. At the same time, soldiers who have been prepared beforehand can open envelopes that have been passed out to them and imitate the first symptoms of a disease as described in their envelop. Their comrades must detect these symptoms in a timely fashion and correctly provide first aid.

The chief of chemical service further explained how the activities of the students should be monitored and evaluated. The best crew in this case is determined by three factors: the decision's expedience and the sergeant's commands; the timeliness and correctness of donning protective and the effectiveness of the antidote that is selected and other self-help methods.

If the exercise then requires that weapons and military equipment be designated as contaminated by enemy toxic agents, then it is useful to do this, observing (and demonstrating) certain precautionary measures. It is advisable to mark the drops of the imitation toxic agent mixture that are on the material parts while wearing a gas mask and protective clothing and remaining some distance from the students. It would seem that even this simple methodological method has a certain psychological effect on soldiers. As a result they are usually more careful in decontaminating equipment and are more watchful of their own safety.

Major Logvinov usually shows special care that chemical support issues are constantly developed in tactical exercises and subunit training. He takes an active part in devising exercise plans and assists instructors in setting up an integrated mixture of measures to protect against toxic agents and radioactive substances and to demonstrate the use of smoke and incendiary devices to successfully accomplish missions.

One company training exercises included an attack from the march against a prepared "enemy" defense. At the initiative of the chief of chemical service the plan for the attack included: personnel operating in a form-up area with dangerous radioactive contamination, a smoke screen to protect personnel from well-aimed fire on the advance, a chemical air attack on the company march column deep in its defensive position and full decontamination using the technical means from the chemical defense platoon. Thus one or two chemical support issues were developed at every stage of the exercise.

Before the subunit went out to the field the chief of chemical service personally inspected the presence and condition of their individual protective gear, radiation and chemical reconnaissance instruments and tank decontamination instruments and conducted training with the crew that the company had trained to conduct that reconnaissance. The officer analyzed any deficiencies that were detected during his address to the company Komsomol meeting. He also refined the tasks of qualitatively developing chemical support issues at the up-coming training and then in the exercise. A battalion chemical instructor was assigned to successfully resolve them.

The chief of chemical service assisted the training instructor create a difficult radiation and chemical situation, prepare and carry out the necessary simulation of terrain and equipment contamination and develop the planned issues in an instructive manner under conditions that approached combat. As a result personnel improved the skills that they have to have to operate successfully in battle.

The feeling of responsibility for his assigned area that communist Logvinov has developed is not only reflected in his conscientious accomplishment of certain functional regulatory duties. He is constantly looking for creative ways to further improve regimental officer and personnel training within his specialty. Any problem involved in improving chemical service that the officer cannot resolve through his own efforts he bravely elevates to the command and party organization. And since his recommendations are always clear, completely thought-out and well-founded, as a rule they are totally supported.

For example, at the chief of chemical service's initiative the plan for the independent work that officers do with service literature now includes many new problems involved in protecting subunits from contemporary means of armed conflicts. Logvinov always carefully follows newly published regulations, manuals, training material and periodicals in his own service and often comes out with examples of these. He found the time to talk with officers who were doing individual work and he assisted them in including various chemical support problems in their work.

During the course of tactical and command-and-staff exercises the chief of chemical service does not wait for instructions from above, but rather independently tries to assist the regimental commander and chief of staff and other officers in guaranteeing the survivability of subunits when the enemy is employing weapons of mass destruction. His recommendations are usually specific, business-like, tactically sound and closely related to the specific work of the officials.

The chief of chemical service focuses special attention on officers, warrant officers and also regimental subunits which, according to reviews of the past year and graded exercises conducted during the winter period, have insufficient ZOMP training. He tries to meet with them more often, systematically monitor them and give them more assistance in mastering the necessary knowledge and skills. His exactingness and persistence are always combined with kindness and sensitivity in his relationship with colleagues and

with the ability to convince them of the necessity of continuously improving themselves.

The chief of chemical service's prestige is to a great degree based on his active participation in party and political work and the social life of the regiment. He regularly speaks at party and Komsomol meetings and holds conversations with personnel not only in his own specialty, but also on issues of military education, socialist competition and supporting strict regulatory order in subunits.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS INTERVIEWS ACADEMICIAN ON BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

LD271120 Moscow TASS in English 1105 GMT 27 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 27 Dec (TASS)--"A bacteriological war, if it breaks out, would be no less horrible and unpredictable by its consequences than a thermonuclear war. It also threatens the existence of humanity. This is why scientists of the whole world should stop the dangerous research leading to the creation of bacteriological weapons," Academician Nikolay Dubinin, director of the Institute of General Genetics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has said in a TASS interview.

Speaking about the danger of a bacteriological war, Academician Dubinin pointed out that the achievements of gene engineering permitted to 'improve' agents of diseases in such a way that a human organism would be helpless against them. "It will be enough to implant a pathogenic gene into a virus of ordinary gripppe for it to cause a lethal disease when it gets into a human organism. Even ordinary gripppe can turn whole continents into a desert in several days, while medics will be unable to develop in time the faccine needed to save people."

In the opinion of Academician Dubinin, further progress of mankind is connected with the achievement of genetics. He believes that in the coming 10 to 20 years gene engineering can help resolve the problems facing the world today, such as the combatting of cancer, the getting of unbelievably high yield of agricultural crops and the preservation of the purity of environment.

"It often occurs to me that scientists could achieve much more in peaceful research if enormous resources were not diverted for military purposes. Genetics, the same as other sciences, is ready to be used for the benefit of mankind and not against it," Academician Dubinin said in conclusion.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR PAPER: 'NO SIGNS' OF U.S. ENDING NUCLEAR TESTS

PM281915 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Vladimir Katin "International Review": "The Moratorium: Who's Against It?"]

[Text] In the international arena some events, like a searchlight, brightly illuminate both a particular country's true essence and states' covert intentions. Such an event has been the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. In almost 18 months our country has extended it several times. We hoped that Washington would eventually assess this correctly, as it deserves. But, alas, this has not happened. The response in the United States has been, to date, 24 underground nuclear explosions, which they have tried to muffle with a propaganda cacophony. At first they declared that all this [the moratorium] was being done merely for effect, since the USSR has, or so they claimed, carried out more explosions than the United States and needs a break. However, after doing their calculations, specialists saw for themselves that the reverse was true -- the United States has long been the champion when it comes to nuclear explosions, and its record shows 33 percent more than the Soviet Union.

The Washington began to crank up a vocal campaign about verification [kontrol] -- the Russians, it said, cannot be trusted since there is no reliable monitoring [kontrol] of tests. However, on this occasion too the story proved untenable. Scientists, including Americans, specifically proved that modern hardware makes it possible to record even a very small nuclear explosion and to distinguish it from anything else. Moreover, our country is prepared to reach agreement on any forms of international verification [kontrol], including on-site inspections.

Ultimately all the attempts to prove the unprovable were futile. It was then that the U.S. Administration's true intentions were highlighted. The Soviet Government statement issued at the end of last week says that the real reason for Washington's refusal to join the moratorium is that the United States is openly gambling on obtaining military superiority by creating fundamentally new forms and types of armaments. People across the ocean do not even conceal the fact that space-based strike weapons -- nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers' -- are being developed [sozdayutsya] under the "strategic defense initiative" program during nuclear tests in Nevada, in other words that work is under way to prepare totally new weapons capable

of hitting targets in space and on earth. So that is the reason why the United States is turning its back on our proposal to begin real talks that might outlaw nuclear tests forever! Our logic on this issue is simple: If there are no nuclear tests, the corresponding weapons will not be improved and so will become obsolete and naturally wither away.

That is why the Soviet Union is again proposing that full-scale talks on the total prohibition of nuclear tests be started without delay. It is ready for such talks with any participants and at any forum, as long as the United States takes part, of course. The Soviet Government also stated its readiness to continue to adhere to the moratorium if the United States joins it. But in the new year the USSR will be forced to resume tests after the first nuclear explosion in the United States. Our position has been greeted with understanding abroad. However, a number of governments have expressed regret that the Soviet Union did not deem it possible to extend its unilateral moratorium in the prevailing situation. That formulation of the issue is fundamentally wrong. In effect /WE ARE EXTENDING THE MORATORIUM FOR THE FIFTH TIME/ [capitalized words between slantlines published in boldface]. As soon as nuclear explosions cease to thunder in Nevada, our country will be prepared on any day or in any month to stop implementing its test program on a basis of reciprocity.

This decision is primarily prompted by security considerations. We cannot display unilateral restraint indefinitely. Therefore the Soviet nuclear tests, if it does prove necessary to resume them, will be directed primarily toward improving our strategic potential. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has no intention of competing with the United States in terms of the rate of nuclear explosions. As the prominent Soviet scientist Ye.p. Velikhov figuratively said, the button triggering tests at Soviet sites is on the U.S. President's desk. By pressing it he will improve the Soviet warheads pointing at the United States.

The long Soviet moratorium on all types of nuclear explosions has not left the peoples of the world indifferent to this event. It has been approved by the UN General Assembly in its resolutions, by the countries of the "Delhi Six," in which 1 billion people live, and by the heads of states and government of 101 nonaligned countries representing two-thirds of the world's states. At their eighth conference in Harare they called on the United States to join the Soviet moratorium. And over 80 percent of the population in the United States is demanding the same thing.

However, before the eyes of the whole world the United States is continuing with maniacal stubbornness to hone its nuclear sword. And refusing point-blank to follow the USSR's example in pledging not to be the first to use it.

In such an alarming situation everyone should sound the alarm, so to speak: "Washington is preparing terrible nuclear carnage for mankind!" But no, there are no protests from many Western capitals.

Clearly, the NATO countries have alliance obligations and must display bloc solidarity. But it is not a question of tearing West Europe away from the United States -- in itself such a formulation of the question is senseless and naive. It is now necessary for the West Europeans to use all their considerable political authority and to influence the United States, to attempt to bring it to its senses. It is within the competence and the capacity of the Old World countries to call on Washington to join the Soviet moratorium on any nuclear tests. This is a sphere of military activity in which neither additional expenditure, nor protracted talks are required; all that is needed is firm political will.

Let us look realities straight in the eye -- we are disappointed by the West European states' unconstructive, or even ostrich-like, position on this issue. There is a sense of a clearly one-sided attitude toward the essence of the problem. Thus the Soviet leadership receives many messages from the Western public, and also at official level, asking it to continue the moratorium. However, the paradox is that there are not equally persistent demands to the United States to stop its explosions. In general, it is a rather strange picture: Everyone is in favor of universal security, but let the Soviet Union alone struggle for it with the United States!

The question which arises in this connection is: Why are the Nevada explosions not audible in NATO capitals? The main reason lies in the NATO countries' negative position toward the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe. Verbally they seem to be in favor of there being no such weapons here. But only in the unforeseeable future. The recent NATO Council session confirmed a strategy based on the use of nuclear weapons. The British prime minister absolutely cannot contemplate a Europe without nuclear weapons, and the latest British inventions in this field are being tested at American test sites. This is evidently why London is not joining in the struggle for the general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests.

For their part the French leaders are maintaining an extremely eloquent silence on this score. It is obviously not easy to cast stones at others and accuse the United States when in the last 10 years France has carried out 80 nuclear explosions at Mururoa atoll.

Taking account of the strong antinuclear movement in the country, the FRG authorities occasionally -- for domestic consumption -- express themselves in passing in favor of the ending of nuclear tests. But increasingly seldom. The FRG's involvement in SDI -- a program which requires the development of nuclear facilities -- is a factor here.

There are countries in Western Europe which are unfortunately prepared to justify any adventure by the U.S. Administration. You cannot call this "a manifestation of Atlantic solidarity" but rather blind worship of force to their own detriment.

All this naturally encourages the U.S. Administration and adds wind to the sails of its militarist programs. Objectively assessing the situation, it has to be stated: At present there are still no signs that the United States is prepared to follow the USSR's example and abandon the holding of nuclear tests. Even despite the fact that over 130 members of the House of Representatives have demanded that the president immediately subscribe to a ban on nuclear tests.

In this connection a reasonable question arises: What benefits has the unilateral Soviet moratorium provided?

Despite the serious costs [sereznyye izderzhki] incurred by our country in the field of its own security it has played an exceptionally important role in international life. First, the moratorium has demonstrated our determination to shift the question of ending nuclear tests to the practical plane, and we have proved this in practice. Second, the active support given to our unilateral action by the broad public of the world's countries, the United Nations, and other international forums has confirmed that the new political thinking in the age of the split atom is making headway. Third, those who, it transpires, only profess to want nuclear disarmament have completely exposed themselves. Fourth and finally, the moratorium has demonstrated a real possibility that effective barriers can be erected in the path of the nuclear arms race without cost if there is no procrastination and given the existence of the political will.

This is a substantial contribution by us to the struggle for a nuclear-free world and for mankind's survival. The experience, lessons, and conclusions which the Soviet moratorium provides are indubitably enriching the path toward a safe future.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR REPORTS COMMENTARY ON NEW U.S. DEFENSE BUDGET

Weinberger on SDI Budget

LD060937 Moscow TASS in English 0829 GMT 6 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 6 TASS -- U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has held a news conference here on the Pentagon's proposed budget for fiscal 1988 and 1989, which was submitted Monday for congressional consideration.

He said the Strategic Defense Initiative and the deployment of an SDI system as soon as it was developed were the administration's top priorities.

The federal budget estimates for fiscal 1988, signed by President Reagan and sent to Congress, provide for 312 billion dollars to be spent on the arms race, which will be 23 billion more than in the current financial year.

"Star Wars" spending is to grow by as many as 62 percent to 5.2 billion dollars.

Weinberger: Military Increase Substantial

PM051551 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jan 87 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Cranking It Up..."]

[Text] Washington, 31 Dec -- The U.S. Administration is continuing to crank up the arms race. At a special briefing U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger announced the Pentagon's request for a substantial increase in military appropriations in the current -- 1987 -- fiscal year.

According to the head of the military department, the Pentagon is demanding from Congress another \$2.8 billion for this fiscal year, in addition to the \$289.4 billion already allocated to it.

It is indicative that the largest increase is intended for the "Star Wars" program. The Pentagon is demanding that the sum of almost \$3.6 billion already allocated by Congress for the implementation of this program this year be increased by a further \$0.5 billion. From this sum it is planned to release \$250 million for research and experimental design work within the SDI framework -- and, in particular, for the development [razrabotka] of a new type of vehicle to place in orbit military cargoes weighing up to 75 metric tons. Expansion of the nuclear test program to create [sozdaniye] nuclear-powered laser weapons is estimated at \$70 million. A total of \$60 million is being earmarked for the development [razrabotka] of kinetic weapons.

U.S. special forces are to receive an extra \$330 million, while \$240 million will be spent on new munitions. What is more, according to Weinberger, the United States intends to spend an additional \$0.5 billion during this fiscal year on modernizing the U.S. chemical arsenal and replacing some of its obsolete chemical munitions with new, even more lethal ones.

'Neoglobalism' Evident

LD061101 Moscow TASS in English 1048 GMT 6 Jan 87

[*"U.S. Foreign Aid Budget and 'Doctrine of Neoglobalism'" -- TASS headline]*

[Excerpt] Washington January 6 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

The federal budget bill for the fiscal year 1988 shows the U.S. Administration's commitment to the Reagan doctrine known as "the doctrine of neoglobalism". Apart from allocating an enormous sum of 312 billion dollars for the arms race, the President demands that Congress bring appropriations under the item "International Affairs" to 19.1 billion dollars or one billion dollars more than the 1987 fiscal year appropriations.

Ronald Reagan explains such a sharp increase in appropriations under this item by the need for guaranteeing U.S. commitments embracing the entire world. This is, above all, handouts to governments of countries where there are U.S. military bases propping "the doctrine of neoglobalism". It is from these bases that the USA directly interferes in the affairs of nations in many regions.

Record Arms Budget

LD051725 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 5 Jan 87

[Excerpts] Washington January 6 TASS -- TASS correspondents Oleg Polyakovskiy and Nikolay Turkatenko report:

A draft federal budget for fiscal 1988 was published here.

It sets the total spending level at one trillion 24 billion dollars, which is the record one ever in the U.S. history. The first thing that strikes the eye when one familiarizes oneself with this document is the administration's demand for further increases in military spending by slashing allocations for social needs.

Three hundred and twelve billion dollars are requested for the arms race. This sum exceeds by 23 billion dollars the size of military spending in the current fiscal year. The draft budget gives particular attention to completing the Congress-approved construction and deployment of 50 MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missiles, of which ten have become operational at a U.S. Air Force base in Wyoming state recently, and also to speeding up the "Star Wars" programme. Expenditure on the latter is projected to be increased by 62 per cent at once to total up to 5.2 billion dollars.

'Militarist' Course Reflected

LD051507 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0350 GMT 5 Jan 87

[Commentary by Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] The U.S. draft budget for 1988 is today being submitted to Congress by the White House. Over to our political observer Aleksandr Zholkver.

[Zholkver] They v that a budget is a concentrated expression of the policy of the state concerned. we approach the new American draft budget with that yardstick, it should be said at it reflects above all the militarist course of the present Washington administration. In the new financial year, which in the United States traditionally begins on 1 October, almost a third of the total budget is to be spent on military purposes: \$312 billion out of about a trillion. This truly astronomical military expenditure, which is once again being increased by 3 percent, is to be devoted to the buildup both of nuclear and conventional arms.

That includes 50 more MX intercontinental ballistic missiles and two new aircraft carriers; and the modernization of another battleship; and the development of a so-called present guidance bomb. On Star Wars preparations, over \$5 billion are to be spent: 50 percent more than this year.

On the other hand, when it comes to social programs, the tendency of the new budget is just the opposite. Grants to farmers, who are going through hard times, are almost halved; spending on social security is to be cut, too, including aid to the homeless, though their number in this Year of the Homeless will, according to all forecasts, rise still further in the United States.

In its 1988 budget, the White House once again plans for a huge deficit of over \$100 billion. I must say that U.S. Congressmen themselves are worried that the budget fails to make ends meet. The chairman of the Armed Forces Committee has already announced his intention to ask the Pentagon boss several "tough questions," as he put it, regarding rational policy in the sphere of national security and a budget that would not be built on sand. But judging by the new draft budget, the White House is still being guided not by considerations of reason and responsibility in our dangerous nuclear missile age, but above all by the interests of the military-industrial complex, for which vast military expenditure is a veritable gold mine.

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CSO: 5200/1127

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW HITS REAGAN'S VIEW OF 1986 PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL

LD292031 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 29 Dec 86

[Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver commentary]

[Text] President Reagan has made a New Year's address on the radio. Here is a commentary by our Political Observer Aleksandr Zholkver:

[Zholkver] In the part of the speech devoted to the international situation, the President's emphatic optimism attracts attention. He declares that the past year was good for the cause of peace throughout the world and even for the progress of Soviet-U.S. relations. The White House boss finished his speech with the chorus from the popular U.S. song "That Was a Very Good Year". Well, what of it? Both a musical ear and optimism are praiseworthy human qualities. However, as is known, neither the words nor even the song but the real facts are by far the most important things. For the Washington administration in the past year these were by no means so good.

Indeed, what has Washington been doing in the past year, which, as you recall, was declared International Year of Peace by the United Nations? Twenty-four nuclear blasts on the test range in Nevada; 50 new MX intercontinental missiles; 9 new nuclear submarines; 131 long-range bombers equipped with cruise missiles; tests of antisatellite weapons in space and the buildup of conventional arms on earth; the raids by U.S. bombers on Libyan towns; flights by U.S. military transport planes with weapons for the contras in Nicaragua; and deliveries of U.S. weapons to Iran and the Afghan bandits and to the terrorist bands in Angola and Mozambique. Does the White House consider all this to be a contribution to the cause of peace?

As far as Soviet-U.S. relations are concerned, can the way Washington has behaved since Reykjavik really be regarded as helping progress, when the White House has started to disown not only the USSR's new proposals on nuclear disarmament, but also the previous Soviet-U.S. agreements on limiting the arms race on earth, and preventing one in space?

So, as far as the Washington administration's activities are concerned, it is difficult to recall the past year good for the cause of peace and for Soviet-U.S. relations. Nevertheless, on the threshold of the new year there really are grounds for optimism. For example, I have in mind the thoughts in the magazine MONTHLY REVIEW by 25 leading U.S. observers, scientists and experts on international affairs. Recognizing the consistency and constructive nature of the USSR's peace initiatives, from the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear blasts to the Soviet proposals on reducing both nuclear and conventional arms, they come to the conclusion that all is still not lost. Perhaps I can agree with this version of optimism.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: NO OPTIMISM IN U.S. ARMS, TESTING, SALT STANCE

LD301137 Moscow TASS in English 1125 GMT 30 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS — This year there will be no exchange of television addresses by the leaders of the USSR and of the USA, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's information Department, told a briefing here.

The United States has turned to us with the proposal on an exchange of new year television addresses by the leaders of our countries as was the case last year, he said. An exchange of television addresses is the content of the moment, which these addresses mirror. [sentence as received] To our regret, the departure of the U.S. Administration from the accords reached at Reykjavik, its abandonment of the quantitative limitations under the SALT-2 treaty and the refusal of the USA to join in the Soviet moratorium on nuclear blasts -- all that gives no ground for an optimistic note.

We believe that an exchange of television addresses is a good thing. But why instill in people illusions that everything is in order. Despite the good statements by the U.S. side, including the statement of the kind that in 1986 we have allegedly drawn closer on many issues, we, nevertheless, see no reason for an optimistic tone which will, naturally, come about if such an exchange of television addresses takes place.

We say: Let us again make efforts to remedy the situation so that we should have ground for optimism, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said.

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CSO: 5200/1127

RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA: U.S. PHYSICIANS URGE END TO ARMS RACE, TESTS, SDI

PM021259 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jan 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Good Deeds Are Better Than Words"]

[Text] A high assessment of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions has been made by the prominent U.S. scientist and public figure Bernard Lown, who is cochairman of the movement International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. "The International Physicians movement has always believed that good deeds are better than fine words," he stated in a conversation with a TASS correspondent. "Therefore we welcomed the introduction of the moratorium on nuclear explosions as a historic initiative by the Soviet Union. The fact that the United States is continuing its nuclear tests does not nullify the significance of the USSR's policy. It has given a powerful boost to the peace movement and has increased trust in your country still further. It has helped honest people to become aware of just what is happening in reality."

It is essential in the coming year 1987 to galvanize the struggle for an end to the nuclear arms race and the diminution of the threat of nuclear war. Such an appeal has been made by the influential U.S. organization "Physicians for Social Responsibility". The Organization's appeal circulated here emphasizes the need to intensify actions with a view to "halting tests of nuclear weapons and putting an end to the 'Star Wars' program," which -- despite White House claims -- "will not stop the nuclear arms race." The Reagan administration, the document says, must be made to realize that the American people demand from it more than artful playing to the gallery.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR MEDIA REVIEW 41ST UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S ARMS STANCE

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Report

PM181431 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Gennadiy Shishkin "International Review": "The Hard Road To Security"]

[Text] We are coming to the end of 1986, declared International Peace Year by the United Nations. As far as our country is concerned the tense struggle against the nuclear danger and the arms race is the centerpiece of the foreign policy strategy of the party and the entire Soviet people. Throughout the year the Soviet Union has repeatedly made vigorous efforts to promote the cause of disarmament. Pride of place among these efforts rightly goes to the specific plan put forward in the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's 15 January 1986 Statement for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century and also to the peace initiatives submitted to the United Nations in conjunction with the other socialist countries.

The 41st UN General Assembly, whose results are currently being evaluated throughout the world, was an important event in international life. Foremost among the multitude of complex and multifaceted problems in the 143 items on the General Assembly agenda was the most acute and urgent task of preventing a nuclear catastrophe and preserving world civilization.

The entire work of the 41st session demonstrated the general growth of awareness that the current tense and dangerous situation demands new political thinking and a realistic and responsible approach to international problems. The session's attention was centered on problems of peace, disarmament, and security. Its most important decisions included support for the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions and a call to the U.S. Government to subscribe to the moratorium and accelerate the conclusion of a corresponding treaty.

The UN General Assembly approved a major new initiative by the 10 socialist states, including the Soviet Union, one that is permeated with concern for the future of mankind. They submitted a resolution "On setting up an all-embracing system of international peace and security."

The resolution expresses concern at the constant escalation of the arms race on a global scale, particularly the nuclear arms race, and the threat to security

arising out of this. It talks of countries' growing interdependence, saying that in the modern world there is no reasonable alternative to a policy of cooperation and collaboration between states conducted on the basis of equality, with absolute respect for the right of every people to sovereign choice of the ways and forms of their development. The General Assembly decreed that consideration of the question of an all-embracing system of international peace and security should continue at the 42d General Assembly session.

Some 102 delegations voted for the socialist countries' resolution, with only the United States and France voting against it. The remaining NATO countries and some states dependent on them abstained.

The results of the voting were a convincing demonstration of growing appreciation of the idea of an all-embracing system of international security put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress. It is indicative that they were considerably better at the plenary session than at the time of the preliminary approval of the draft at the First (Political) Committee, when there were 82 votes for it. This was aided by the backing the idea of a general system of international security received in the Delhi Declaration, which made a great impression at the United Nations.

Despite the obvious successes achieved during the 41st UN General Assembly session, the acute and complex struggle over the socialist countries' initiative showed that much remains to be done to finally establish the new political thinking throughout the world. The policy of the United States remains the main obstacle in its way. All the indications are that the U.S. ruling circles merely saw the Soviet initiatives as an obstacle to their imperial designs. What exactly are these designs? To achieve military superiority and on that basis implement strongarm diktat. Only Washington failed to back the resolution on preventing an arms race in space, which received 130 votes. It also failed to respond to the UN call for a nuclear test ban. The United States, in company with Britain and France, voted against the draft put forward by Mexico and other nonaligned countries containing a demand for the immediate cessation of all nuclear explosions by introducing a moratorium. Nor did the U.S. delegation support the resolution calling upon the USSR and the United States to persist with talks in order to elaborate specific and effective measures to bring about nuclear disarmament and prevent an arms race in space.

In full view of an angry world the Washington administration is seeking to reverse the process of nuclear disarmament talks away from the qualitatively new point they were brought to by the Reykjavik meeting. It was there that the Soviet Union put forward bold, original initiatives aimed at getting some movement again on questions of nuclear disarmament! Their chief feature is that they are based not on the principle of limiting nuclear armaments, as was the case with earlier treaties, including, for instance, SALT I and SALT II, but on the principle of their elimination, and in a comparatively short time at that.

We resolutely rebuff attempts to cause the resumed talks to revert to idle debates. To that end M.S. Gorbachev has put forward new initiatives since Reykjavik, at the Indian parliament. They are geared to aiding the building of a universal security system. Together with its Warsaw Pact allies, the USSR

proposed a meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact working groups, a meeting between Marshal V. G. Kulikov and General B. Rogers, and a meeting between the NATO secretary general and authorized representatives of the Warsaw Pact Organization. But neither the first, nor the second, nor the third met with a positive response. It is 6 months now and there has been no reply to the socialist countries' Budapest initiative on reducing conventional armaments and armed forces.

"All this, like the destructive stance of our Reykjavik partners," M.S. Gorbachev stated, "makes one seriously wonder how willing the present generation of political leaders, who determine the West's stance are to disarm. It is a fact, after all, that some of them are completely in the power of the military business bosses who are totally indifferent toward the worries, hopes, opinions, and very lives of hundreds of millions of people."

The results of the NATO sessions in Brussels also confirm that this is a fair assessment. The final communique of the NATO Military Planning Committee session stresses resolve to continue building up conventional armaments and "maintain an impressive nuclear potential."

As we can see, there are many difficulties on the road to a nuclear-free world. Toward the end of the year a relatively complex situation has taken shape, and clearly a hard struggle to halt the arms race and effect disarmament lies ahead. Militarist circles are obviously intimidated by the prospects that took shape in Reykjavik. Now they are coordinating their efforts to erect insuperable barriers to the process that commenced in Iceland.

The attempts by Washington and NATO to dislodge the world from the road to the elimination of the nuclear threat strengthen the resolve of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to achieve movement toward a nuclear-free world.

IZVESTIYA Report

PM221121 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent V. Soldatov dispatch: "What the Debate Showed. On the Results of the 41st UN General Assembly Session"]

[Text] New York--The 41st UN General Assembly session, which is now ending, has reflected the contradictions of our time and peoples' hopes and fears. The session opened in the atmosphere of great expectations aroused by preparations for the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik. And it is ending when it has become quite clear that Washington has no intention of taking practical steps to reduce nuclear weapons and lessen international tension. Evidence of the present administration's reluctance to follow a course of ending the nuclear race is its decision to break with the Salt-2 Treaty--a decision announced by President R. Reagan on the eve of the conclusion of the 41st session.

All these events have affected the mood and activity of the session participants. Urging the Soviet Union and the United States to resume their dialogue on

nuclear disarmament problems, most delegations have actively discussed measures which could prevent a slide toward nuclear catastrophe and would promote the development of normal relations between all countries. Of the more than 140 issues on the present session's agenda, almost half have been dedicated to the problems of ending the nuclear and conventional arms race and strengthening international security.

The resolution submitted by the socialist countries on creating a comprehensive international peace and security system was aimed at achieving this goal. This initiative was broadly and comprehensively discussed. During the discussion in the First Committee, representatives of 60 states expressed their viewpoint on the essence of the proposal. The initiative was approved at a General Assembly plenary session. The resolution on the creation of a comprehensive international peace and security system states that in the world of today, when there is growing interdependence between states, there is no reasonable alternative to a policy of cooperation and collaboration between countries. Discussion of this issue will be continued at the 42d UN General Assembly session.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries made an appreciable contribution to the discussion of all the important issues on which the future of mankind depends. They proposed practical ways of resolving these issues. It is typical that Soviet initiatives submitted at sessions in the past have been firmly incorporated in the program of action of many nonaligned and neutral countries and have been given a second life in the resolutions they have proposed. This is the case with the initiatives on urgently ending and banning nuclear weapon tests, on the importance of all states pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, on preventing an arms race in space, and on banning chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as a number of other proposals.

The United States' behaviour at the General Assembly session was quite different. In his speech to the delegates President R. Reagan talked a great deal about the "peaceful intentions" of Washington, which, according to him, is prepared to go to virtually any lengths to preserve peace on earth. These declarations, however, were not borne out by practical actions. U.S. actions revealed quite different intentions. Long before the session began, the United States announced that it was substantially reducing its contribution to funding the United Nations.

The U.S. Congress and the White House thereby hoped to make this world organization "more compliant." These hopes were not vindicated. The United States' aggressive actions in the international arena were sharply criticized and the majority of the delegations supported proposals aimed at removing the nuclear threat and developing mutually advantageous cooperation between all states. Having failed to achieve its aim by means of blackmail, the U.S. delegation resorted to an old tactic: it began to oppose all proposals not to the liking of the United States and, by various methods, to persuade other countries to do likewise.

Washington's hopes of counting on the solidarity of its closest allies were not vindicated. The allies showed their independence on many occasions. Delegates drew attention to the following fact. Last year, only two countries--

the United States and U.S.-occupied Grenada--abstained from voting on the resolution concerning the peaceful use of space. This year, only one country--the United States--abstained from voting on the space resolution. Even Grenada had dared to resist U.S. pressure.

The "tough" policy toward developing and neutral countries on which V. Walters, zealous advocate of this policy and U.S. representative in the United Nations, placed great hopes did not justify itself. During voting on resolutions concerning disarmament and security problems the American delegate had to press the red "No" button totally on his own 11 times. In all, the U.S. delegation voted against 43 resolutions.

The General Assembly devoted serious attention to regional conflicts. Some of them are a threat to international peace and security. The conflict in southern Africa is sharpening. The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this issue condemn the policy of apartheid conducted by the South African Government as it dooms the country's indigenous population to inhuman living conditions. They also condemn the policy of "constructive engagement" with the Pretoria regime pursued by a number of Western countries, primarily the United States. It was noted that this policy allows Pretoria to ignore the demands of the world community. Delegates demanded that Namibia be granted independence and that the plundering of its natural resources, in which American and West European companies play an active part, be stopped. The Western companies, and also Israel, which supply South Africa with equipment to produce nuclear weapons were condemned.

The conflict in Central America, where, with the help of hired cutthroats, the United States is trying to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, is extremely dangerous in its possible consequences. The General Assembly urged all interested countries to support the Contadora process and take every measure to ensure a peaceful solution to disputes. A special resolution speaks of the need to respect the decision of the International Court, which, as is well known, condemned the United States' aggressive actions. The General Assembly urged an end to the trade blockade on Nicaragua.

Delegates were virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the aggressive policy pursued by Israel, which continues to unlawfully occupy the Arab territories it has seized. Israel is only able to conduct such a policy because all its actions are supported by the United States. The General Assembly condemned the so-called strategic alliance between the United States and Israel. The overwhelming majority of the delegations spoke in favor of convening a peace conference on the problems of the Near East. Israel's continuing occupation of the West Bank of the Jordan, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip was condemned. A special resolution was dedicated to Jerusalem, whose Arab quarter has been seized by Israel. Delegations voiced their concern in connection with Israel's growing nuclear weapon production.

A large proportion of the work done by the General Assembly session was taken up by economic issues. A number of Western countries, primarily the United States, were sharply criticized for their policy of plundering developing countries. It was pointed out in particular that the industrially developed

capitalist countries set high prices for the finished products they export and low prices for raw materials exported by developing states. This "discrepancy in prices" has contributed to a considerable extent to the growth in the debts of a number of states--debts which now pose a threat to their political stability. A resolution was passed on international economic security. It points out the need to develop mutually profitable economic cooperation between all states, irrespective of their social orientation.

There were sharp polemics over human rights. A number of Western countries tried to speculate on this problem. It was convincingly shown during the debate, however, that capitalist countries violate elementary human rights: the right to work, to a roof over one's head, and to security in old age. The neoglobalist policy of Washington, which supplies the Afghan dushmans with the most up-to-date weapons and is helping to keep reactionary regimes in power in El Salvador and Chile, was exposed.

The 41st UN General Assembly session made a constructive contribution to the struggle against the nuclear threat and for the lessening of international tension and the development of peaceful, good-neighborly relations between all states.

TASS Report

LD060747 Moscow TASS in English 0735 GMT 6 Jan 87

[Text] New York January 6 TASS -- The 41st session of the U.N. General Assembly has shown the growing understanding by the international community of the need for urgent specific actions by states to guarantee a survival of mankind in the nuclear-space age, says a statement published on Monday by the USSR permanent mission to the U.N. on the results of the session. Its character qualitatively changed after the Reykjavik summit which highlighted both a chance to create a nuclear-free world and obstacles in its way.

The Reykjavik summit, the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-aligned countries in Harare and the Soviet-Indian talks in New Delhi imparted a powerful impetus to the hopes of the overwhelming majority of U.N. member states for establishing a new mode of political thinking in international relations, oriented on tackling security problems through political means.

These hopes found their expression in a concentrated form during the discussion of the joint proposal by the socialist states, including the USSR, on establishing the all-embracing system of international peace and security, the statement points out. A resolution adopted at the initiative of the socialist states and with the active participation of many other countries sets out the framework for a direct and multilateral dialogue on the most effective ways of guaranteeing security for all and in all spheres.

Over 100 countries voted for a search for a new and fresh approach to guaranteeing security.

Despite the opposition of the USA and some other delegations, the session concentrated on problems of peace, disarmament and security. Its most important decisions include the General Assembly's support for the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, a call on the USA and all other countries to join the moratorium and to stop immediately nuclear tests. The U.N. firmly spoke out against shifting the arms race to space, above all against placing nuclear weapons into space. The Soviet Union virtually voted for all resolutions on disarmament and security. The USA voted against most of them.

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USSR MEDIA REVIEW, ASSESS 1986 DISARMAMENT EVENTS, PROGRESS

'Top Priority' Program

LD2/1429 Moscow in English to North America 0000 GMT 27 Dec 86

[From the "Top Priority" program]

[Excerpts] Hello, I am Pavel Kuznetsov and welcome to Top Priority, a regular panel discussion from the studios of Radio Moscow. Today we have our usual panel, Professors Radomir Bogdanov -- welcome back to our program -- and Sergey Plekhanov of the Moscow-based Institute for United States and Canada Studies. Today is our final discussion on Top Priority and therefore I'd like you...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] Final, you mean, I'm sorry, final for this year.

[Kuznetsov] Yes, that's what I said. Final program for this year and I'd like you to share your feelings about the past year. In my view a major lesson of 1986 is that it has demonstrated the ever-growing concern with the continued accumulation of nuclear weapons. Also this year, in my view again, will go down in the history books because we've tried to shape up our vision of a nonnuclear world and have made certain practical steps in this direction. [Passage omitted in which Kuznetsov recalls Gorbachev's announcement in January of a Soviet plan for a nonnuclear world by 2000 and in Reykjavik the two sides were close to reaching accord on doing away with strategic offensive arms in the next decade; Bogdanov says its not nuclear weapons but a peaceful policy that safeguards peace; Plekhanov says plan for a nonnuclear world by 2000 embraces other modern destructive weaponry.]

There is need to build a political structure with your potential adversary to make war unacceptable, says Plekhanov]

[Kuznetsov] I want to stop you right there because I'm going to play to you a segment of an ABC's News Nightline, anchored by Ted Koppel, and one of the guest speakers is Richard Perle, who is the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, and Mr Perle is talking about conventional arms and also U.S. strategy, which is indeed NATO strategy, for initiating the use of nuclear arms in Europe. Let's listen to that tape now, and then I'd like you to comment on it.

[Begin recording] [Perle] In the event that we have no other way to repulse a massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe to consider the resort to nuclear weapons [sentence as received]. This doesn't mean that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable, it doesn't mean that the use of nuclear weapons would be extensive and indeed we believe that the prospect that nuclear weapons might be used is sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from launching even a conventional attack in first (?instance).

[Koppel] Let me comment on it this way. Do you believe that the Soviet Union has superior conventional forces in Europe?

[Perle] I don't think there is any question about that. Soviet conventional forces vastly outnumber those of the NATO alliance in virtually every category.

[Koppeij] Therefore, therefore, if the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact were to begin an assault against Western Europe coming in from East Germany into West Germany it's really only a matter of time, isn't it? If NATO forces did not use some kind of tactical nuclear weapons it would be only a matter of time if their conventional forces are superior before someone would call up the White House or the, or the Pentagon and say fellows we need help, we got to use it.

[Perle] (?But) we certainly can't rule out the possibility that Soviet conventional superiority could lead to a situation in which we would have to face a very difficult choice, either withdrawing from the continent of Europe or using one or more nuclear weapons in order to halt the Soviet advance. [end recording]

[Plekhanov] Now I think what Mr Perle said was very typical arguments and I'd like one of you two to comment on...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] It's very typical argument and first of all let me state, you know, that I hate even to discuss that idiotic scenario of Soviet Union invading the Western Europe. Let me begin with that. It's really idiotic scenario which has no ground.

[Plekhanov, interrupting] It's rank lunacy.

[Bogdanov] It's lunacy, it's [word indistinct] and you Pavel won't ask myself and Sergey to take part in that lunacy. OK, we respect you very much and we take...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] You have already taken part and you have already commented on what you heard, anyway.

[Bogdanov] Number two, number two. You know Mr Perle looks like, you know, an uncle scathing [as heard] bad children behaving in a very bad way. You know in Russian tales there is such a personality. When you want to calm down your children you tell them: I will call this uncle and he will calm you down, you know.

[Plekhanov] Put you in a bag and carry you away or something.

[Bogdanov] Yes, (?I'll) carry you away and things like that. Mr Perle is just playing this role because I, to be frank with you, I don't see any, any common sense to discuss with him numbers; who is superior, who is not superior. If you are a real fair, you know, observer of the correlation of forces between Soviet Union and -- I mean conventional, we're talking about conventional forces -- you will see that is's a rough balance, we call it rough balance. What (?does it, what does it mean)? It means that in some respect we are a bit stronger than they are; in some respects they are a bit stronger than we are. But on the whole there is a rough parity. Of course you can discuss who is superior, who is not. We are not against that. But why Mr Perle, scaring his own citizens and Europeans, does not mention Soviet proposals, how to deal with that maybe legal, you know, (?worry) about the so-called Soviet superiority. We don't deny that. We say we are ready to sit down around the table and we have made a number of very important proposals how to deal with conventional problems.

[Kuzentsov] Prof Bogdanov, thank you for your comment. It was kind of emotional, but I respect your emotions and feelings about what we've just heard. But perhaps we could outline some areas in conventional weapons, where in the West they keep silent on their own advantages, and significant advantages at that.

[Plekhanov] Well, the one area is antitank weapons for instance. All the scenarios of a possible Soviet attack on Western Europe have to do with massive Soviet...

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] Tank assaults.

[Plekhanov] Movements, of tank assaults. Now the numbers of antitank weapons in NATO are really staggering. It's, the, I think it's about 100,000. Now it's estimated that in case they're used in battle at least 90 percent of them would be effective. Now the total number of tanks in the world is much lower than that. So NATO has in Europe more antitank weapons than it needed to eliminate all the tanks in the world. But really, I would like to reaffirm what Dr Bogdanov has been talking about. Discussing war scenarios in Europe lunacy. I wonder if Mr Perle has ever heard of Chernobyl. You know, Europe is filled with nuclear power stations. Any kind, any kind of serious fighting, conventional fighting, even on the level of second world war, would have such tremendous negative consequences in terms of radiation and what have you...

[Unidentified, interrupting] Starting a war in Europe, no matter what kind, conventional, or nuclear or chemical, is a scenario for the death of civilization in Europe, and maybe with consequences for the other continents as well. Now this is just plain realism; that's why we are proposing not only radical cuts in the number of conventional forces, but also changes in the strategies, such changes in strategies which would make offensive -- the possibility of offensive actions by either side, even impossible theoretically not just in practical sense. Also what we are proposing is have nuclear-free zones in the center of Europe, (?disjunctional) forces, such as moving forces back from, from the lines which divide them and deploying them in such a manner that would make a war (?improbable).

[Kuznetsov] Impossible. Well, I'd like to add a few words about what I've heard from Mr Perle and he, he said nothing about, for example, the number of, strength of, division, combat divisions on the western and eastern side, like, say for example, an American division has more men, or a West German division has more men than a Soviet division, for example, so when they manipulate the number of divisions they just omit this fact. Another thing is that they don't count into the equation the Armed Forces of France and Spain. They never mention the fact, which is a very significant fact in my view, that the population of NATO countries is more than what we have in the Warsaw Treaty countries. And then my final argument is that -- ah, both of you know about this current doctrine adopted by NATO which is called Air-Land Battle 2000 and it provides for strikes with conventional and nuclear weapons deep behind enemy lines. So my question is how an inferior side can have such war plans? I don't know...

[Plekhanov, interrupting] That's a good question, that's a good question.

[Kuznetsov] I've yet to hear an explanation from Mr Perle or whoever.

[Bogdanov] And we should. If you like, Pavel, we should invite him to come here and to join us, to have a discussion with him around this table. If he hears, if he hears (?now), that's an invitation for him.

[Kuznetsov] OK, we'll include that invitation in our working schedule for 1987, OK. Now, what I'm interested in and I fully agree with those in the West who say that we, what we terribly lack is trust and confidence. How do we build trust and confidence given this disparity of views?

[Bogdanov] You know, I still believe, you know, that this problem of confidence-building will be major problem for the next year as it was for this.

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Our moratorium, was it the...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] That's what, I was just about to touch that. You know, what we should do. That's my, you know, my opinion, what we should do. It's a tremendous task to build the confidence but we must and we must put into that small bricks, bigger bricks and maybe grand bricks, you know. We have started. Our side have started, has started that process of building trust: Our nuclear disarmament plan. We don't insist on the other side accept it immediately. We give you time to think it over, to criticize it, to have your own views but it's bricks, bricks of trust, you know. Nonnuclear world is the world of trust. Number two: We stopped testing nuclear weapons. It's another brick into that big mountain of trust, you know.

[Kuznetsov] In fact, in fact we are going to prolong it actually beyond the expiration date of 31 December. We're waiting for the first American blast in 1987 before we resume. In other words it's another prolongation of our moratorium, the fifth already. [passage omitted: Plekhanov refers to the successful completion of the Stockholm conference this year; Bogdanov cites joint efforts against terrorism as part of the package. The USSR has genuine desire to build mutual trust and confidence, a major task for 1987, says Bogdanov. Plekhanov hopes wisdom will prevail in 1987 and Bogdanov says let common sense prevail in dealing with all problems.]

[Kuznetsov] Thank you very much. Our time is up. I'm Pavel Kuznetsov signing off. Goodbye till next time on Top Priority a week from now on the same wavelength, and a happy New Year to all of you.

'International Observers Roundtable'

LD282043 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 28 Dec 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio; Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, publicist; and Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov, political observer of Central Television and All-Union Radio]

[Excerpts] [Tsvetov] Hello, comrades. On the eve of the New Year festivities, the world's press usually draws up a list of the 10 most important events of the past year. If we decided to make a list of the most important events, the most significant for the cause of peace and disarmament, there are two that I'm sure would head the list: Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January, and the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik. Before we go into detail about these events, I'll just say a few words about them.

ine statement of 15 January sets out a concrete program for abolishing nuclear and chemical weapons before the year 2000. Comrade Gorbachev's meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik revealed to the world something that, before Reykjavik, a great many people had doubted. In other words, Reykjavik showed that the two sides can come to an agreement and can, consequently, avert a nuclear catastrophe.

[Zorin] You know, colleagues, we live in a time of which a clever man has said with bitter irony that it's a time of an erosion of words and inflation of concepts. I remember that, and yet I would still say with full responsibility, that you, Vladimir Yakovlevich, have named not only important events that have left their mark on the departing year, you have named events that, as I see it, will go down in the history books that will be studied by our children and grandchildren. I am quite definitely and profoundly convinced of that. Both the proposal put forward by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January of this year -- his proposal for full nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 -- and what happened in Reykjavik are on the scale of events that become part of the chronicle of mankind. When Mikhail Sergeyevich put forward that proposal, there were not a few skeptics in the West who said that of course all of that was fine and beautiful -- to dream of a nuclear-free world that could come in a mere 15 years -- but unrealistic. A few months have passed, and what the Western politicians were calling unrealistic has become the concrete agenda of an international conference of the highest importance.

You and I, Vitaliy Ivanovich, were at Reykjavik and saw with our own eyes how far it had proved possible to go in the discussion of problems that only a few months before had seemed no more than a beautiful dream. This is, in itself, sufficient reason to count 1986 a remarkable and important period of time. The time that we have lived through and are living through now is just such a period.

[Kobysh] This year was a year of the initiative of the United Nations. It is of interest that in the United Nations itself, this whole range of problems that we're talking about has found very vivid and very active expression in the course of the work of the General Assembly, that broadest and most important forum of mankind. The session of the General Assembly has been dominated, practically, by precisely these ideas we're speaking of: the ideas of a nuclear-free world; the ideas of creating an inter-connected world that would exclude violence, a world of justice. These are the subjects of the 27th CPSU Congress, and they were present all the time, in one form or another, at the General Assembly. This is a very interesting phenomenon.

[Zorin] What you've said is quite right, Vitaliy Ivanovich. But I wouldn't like our listeners to think that what you've saying is that the UN General Assembly is guided in its activities by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. If we're talking about the themes of the 27th congress, then they are the themes of the desire for peace and international cooperation, for a life without the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. These are themes that are close to the hearts, not only of Soviet communists, not only of Soviet people, but of the peoples of the entire world. That is why the thoughts expressed at the UN General Assembly have turned out to be consistent with the ideas of the 27th CPSU Congress.

[Kobysh] Now, when you were talking about the 10 events that the journalists traditionally line up -- and certainly you mentioned the main and most important ones -- and certainly you mentioned the main and most important ones -- there are a few things that I would, nonetheless, add to these 10. I want to remind you, Valentin Sergeyevich and you, Vladimir Yakovlevich, that today is the 510th day of the Soviet moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. For 10 days, our nuclear test sites have been silent. This, too, Valentin Sergeyevich, will go down in the history books.

[Zorin] I get letters from our listeners and viewers asking whether there was any point in our introducing that moratorium. The Americans are not joining it, so has it all been for nothing? To the people who ask that question, I'd say this: Of course, it has not been for nothing. The moratorium is not just an appeal. It's not a declaration. It's a real action by the Soviet Union, an action that has dealt nothing more nor less than a devastating blow to the myth of the Soviet military threat. Let us speak bluntly. In years gone by, Western propaganda has succeeded in convincing many people in the world that the Soviet Union poses a threat to them. Western propaganda is a powerful machine, and one that operates with a fair degree of efficiency. We know that quite a few people are in thrall to the lying assertions of Western propaganda. So the moratorium, this real action by the Soviet Union, has altered the thinking of very many ordinary people in the world, and a deep crack has appeared in the myth of the Soviet military threat. That by itself is enough to give you an idea of the full significance of the action of the Soviet Union: that the idea of the moratorium has captured the imagination of millions of people throughout the world. This will continue to be a real factor in the year ahead.

[Tsvetov] A feature of the statement of 15 January that I'd like to return to is that in it, possibly for the first time, there is not only a declaration of principles, a declaration of aims, but also a concrete time-scale laid down. In our day, the time factor is beginning to play a very, very important role. I want to say, in this connection, that when the treaty banning nuclear tests in the three environments was signed in 1963, one seemingly minor exception was made: Underground nuclear tests were allowed. What has that led to, in a mere 25 years, minus a year? Now, according to figures from our own press and from the American press, the world has stockpiled about 60,000 nuclear warheads.

To enable listeners to picture this more clearly, I'll try to translate it into terms of bombs of the size used on Hiroshima. It's more than a million such bombs as the one that destroyed Hiroshima. But there aren't enough cities in the world for all those bombs to be used. A second point: In 1977-1984, the U.S. early-warning system issued 2,784 false warnings of a missile attack on the U.S. It was only human intervention that averted a nuclear catastrophe. In other words, more than 20,000 times we've been on the brink of activating those million Hiroshima bombs. Now the picture that emerges is this: the longer agreement on nuclear disarmament is delayed, the more nuclear strike weapons come into existence, and the less man is able -- because of increasingly complex technology -- to control this vast power. I think one can establish the following dependence: that the length of time allotted to mankind is inversely proportionate to the delay in achieving agreement on nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the statement sets a specific time.

[Kobysh] Time is limited, you're absolutely right, Vladimir Yakovlevich. Time is rapidly slipping away. When we say that the moratorium has been in force for 510 days, we're not just indulging in an arithmetical exercise, we're taking note of the fact for 510 days we've been waiting for the Americans to join us. With us, all mankind is waiting. Incidentally, and this is very interesting, the PRC has not carried out a single nuclear test during all those 510 days. In other words, they've displayed full solidarity with us.

[Zorin] That is a very important, relevant and significant fact. But I also want to emphasize once again that when we speak of the importance of the proposals contained in the statement made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January of this year, when we speak of what was achieved in Reykjavik, we're not just talking about the events of the year that's over. We're not just talking about the past.

It is quite obvious that the significance both of the document offering mankind a nuclear-free world and the path to achieving that nuclear-free world, and a concrete time-scale and the concrete means to achieving that aim; and the experience of Reykjavik which has shown that the objective is a realistic one. [sentence as heard]

Marx once said that mankind only sets itself the tasks that it is capable of solving. What Reykjavik has shown is that the task that was set in the statement of 15 January is not a utopian task, but a feasible one. That is a fact of today, and a fact of tomorrow. Human beings are so constituted that, on the eve of the New Year, they want to peer beyond this conventional dividing-line and imagine what the new year will bring. I won't venture any predictions, but there is one thing that I will observe with complete conviction: Politically, the new year will be dominated by these very important Soviet initiatives and actions; by the proposal for a nuclear-free world and abolition of nuclear weapons by the year 2000; by the Soviet moratorium, which has become a real fact of political life.

[Kobysh] Abolition of chemical weapons.

[Zorin] Abolition of chemical weapons.

[Tsvetov] Talking about Reykjavik: There, the two sides practically reached agreement on very many of the questions, if not all. Only one question stopped them from achieving a general agreement. That was the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

[Zorin] We get a lot of letters from listeners asking why it is, if we assert that the Strategic Defense Initiative doesn't worry us or threaten us all that much, that we didn't accept it at Reykjavik.

[Kobysh] Well, it's a reasonable question, an interesting question, and I don't think it's very hard to answer. It's indisputable that we're not afraid of the notorious SDI. The Soviet leaders have said repeatedly that if we're forced to go that way, then we'll find the necessary measures, considerably cheaper and more effective than what has been planned and what they're carried away with at present.

[Tsvetov] Sorry to interrupt. That will be only a small percent of the total cost of SDI, in money, but not in effectiveness.

[Kobysh] But not in effectiveness. Effectiveness will be a hundred percent. But why are we so much against it, and so seriously against it, that this has become a stumbling block in Reykjavik? Because it's not a question of the direct danger of that system, which we can avert; what it's all about in effect, is a new round of the arms race. Atomic weapons came into existence more than 40 years ago. There has been an atomic arms race. All the time the Americans have been avidly striving for superiority. Now a time has come when it's become clear that neither side will succeed in getting a head-start in what can be conventionally termed land-based nuclear weapons. So now they have the idea: Well, we can't overtake the Russians in these types of weapons, so let's impose a race in space weapons on them — a second arms race, if one can call it so. That will either give us military superiority, or strike a blow at the Soviet economy that it won't be able to withstand. In other words, it's a new arms race.

[Zorin] In the United States itself scientists understand this. In the last 2 years about 6,700 physicists from various U.S. educational and scientific centers have signed petitions demanding the renunciation of plans to militarize space. Who are these 6,700 people? They are half of the physicists of the Universities of Harvard, Princeton, and Cornell and of the Universities of Chicago and Illinois, and also...

[Tsvetov, interrupting]...the cream of American scientific...

[Zorin]...and also of the Californian Institute of Technology. This is the best that there is in America. Scientists have called on their colleagues to decline to cooperate in any way with the Pentagon within the framework of the program to militarize space.

[Tsvetov] You know, I'd like to add some more reasons why we have such a harsh attitude toward SDI. As you have said, this will be a new round of the arms race, that is, it will be a round with the creation of completely new types of weapons. Next, taking weapons out into space will in the end lead to uncertainty in the strategic balance and from this, naturally, there will be an increase in mistrust, of which, as it is, there is too much between the Soviet Union and the United States. After that it will be impossible to start cutting down on strategic weapons, because naturally we will respond to SDI with a reinforcement of our strategic weapons. In response, the United States will start reinforcing its strategic weapons and it will no longer be possible to halt this process. Finally, the danger of a war breaking out is greatly strengthened because somebody in the Pentagon will get it into his head that after all there is a nuclear shield and it is possible to attack the Soviet Union with impunity.

Secondly, accidentally -- as I've just been saying, if with today's technology there were more than 20,000 cases of false warning of a missile attack on the United States -- what will happen when all of these computers are in space and man won't be able to even consider what needs to be done, when the computers will have already issued the order for a nuclear attack? It is these reasons that require a most decisive struggle against the Strategic Defense Initiative.

[Zorin] The Star Wars plans are calculated for up to the middle of the next century. That is, for our grandchildren and the grandchildren of our grandchildren, a life has already been programmed under a sky that will consist not of twinkling peaceful stars but of flying weapons of death. Can we really allow this? Therefore, our position here is deeply humanitarian and internationalist. We are thinking not just about ourselves, not just about our own defense and about our own protection. We are thinking about all mankind, about future generations.

[Tsvetov] I would also like to point to another development of the theses of the 15 January statement: the Soviet program for Asian and Pacific Ocean security. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev came out with this program in his speech in Vladivostok. The program consists of five points. I'll recall them for listeners. First of all is regional settlement; second, halting the build-up of nuclear weapons in the region; third, cutting down the activity of naval fleets, particularly submarines; fourth, cutting down armed forces and weapons in Asia to reasonable levels and, finally, the discussion of the measures of trust, beginning with the simplest, the measure on the security of maritime communications in the Pacific Ocean and on averting international terrorism. Asia has the experience of the principles of Pancasila and Bandung. Asia has the experience of the Indo-Pakistani agreement in Tashkent.

The Soviet proposals are based on what has already been — I don't want to say mastered in Asia — but which Asia has already touched on. This is why these proposals have caused such a great response in the world and naturally most of all in Asia and in the Pacific Ocean region.

Apart from this, in Europe, whether proceeding well or badly, the so-called Helsinki process is in operation. It is a system of talks and agreements. There is no such process in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. However, the threat of the militarization of this region is not less serious than in Europe. Therefore, the sooner the peoples of Asia get down to resolving problems of peace and security in their own region, the sooner mutual understanding and a lessening of tension will come to this area.

The Soviet Union has not stopped at just a declaration of principles of Asian and Pacific Ocean security. During his visit to India, Mikhail Sergeyevich proposed a whole series of concrete measures. These are the proposal to hold an international conference implementing the UN declaration on a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the proposal to cut the numbers and activity of naval forces in the Indian Ocean. These are the implementation of measures of trust following the European example where agreement has been reached on notification about major maneuvers and troops movements. These are the establishment of guarantees on air communications and developing an international convention on the fight against terrorism. The crown, the philosophical development of our, I would say, concept of Asian and Pacific Ocean security, and not only of security in that region, but of world security as a whole, was the Delhi declaration.

[Zorin] I would also number the Delhi declaration as being one of the most important events of the year. Our radio listeners must not think that we count only what has to do with our country as among the most outstanding events of the present day. No. What was signed in Delhi has significance for all mankind and for the future of mankind. An absolutely new way of thinking manifested itself in that declaration. It is a new approach to international relations. It is a road, a structure to a new world, and it is difficult to overestimate its significance.

When we talk of the crisis of U.S. foreign policy, I see a symptom of that crisis in the following: The 1974 treaty on limiting underground nuclear weapons testing and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful ends are again to be put to the U.S. Senate for discussion. The Senate...

[Kobysh, interrupting] These treaties have not yet been ratified.

[Zorin] They have not been ratified. For 10 years the Senate has been refusing to ratify them and the Reagan administration is as afraid of these treaties as, if one can so express oneself, the Devil fears incense. If these treaties are again submitted for discussion, and they're being submitted with the aim of ratification, as I understand it, then this again emphasized how deep the U.S. Administration's foreign policy crisis is.

[Kobysh] And how profound the contradictions are between the different sections of the ruling forces in America and just how much the monolithic cohesion of these forces has cracked. This is also the result of the processes that are under way in the international arena and that we've been talking about today.

[Tsvetov] Last year was a very complex one but also significant. I think it was above all significant because the new way of thinking began to elbow its way forward in the most decisive way. After all, never before have people really pondered the meaning of the world survival [vyzhivaniye] so much. Previously, we saw this word in terms of abstracts. Now, though, we've started to see it as a word that concerns us very directly. Sacrificing life for the triumph of humanism, for the sake of those who will remain alive is understandable, but why should life be sacrificed for the sake of emptiness, nonexistence, the universal death that will follow that sacrifice? A sacrifice like that is both senseless and criminal. It was the gradual realization of all this that made last year significant.

Usually, as the year comes to a close, people say, well, we've lived through another 365 days. But you can't measure the past year in time, it is measured in terms of deeds.

Maybe we have not managed to achieve all we wanted in the international arena — after all, it's not easy to break the resistance of aggressive forces, the resistance of a mighty military-industrial complex that is making money out of military preparations. It seems to me, however, that what matters is not where we are now, but the direction in which we're moving. We are moving toward victory of reason over recklessness. Therefore, the world is entering 1987, despite everything, with a sense of optimism. On that note, I take leave of you. All the best.

PRAVDA Review

PM291444 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[Vitaliy Korionov "International Review"]

[Excerpts] Only a few days remain until the New Year begins its march across the planet by the invisible steps of the time zones. The year we are leaving behind was declared International Peace Year by the will of the UN member states. In his New Year address to the Soviet people M.S. Gorbachev said: "We in the Soviet Union want this Peace Year to become a decade of peace and mankind to enter the 21st century in conditions of peace, trust, and cooperation." Throughout the year now drawing to its close, the CPSU and the Soviet state have persistently and purposefully followed this course. Our efforts, supported by the fraternal socialist countries and all the planet's peace-loving forces, were not in vain.

For the Sake of Mankind [subhead]

At the very beginning of the year, on 15 January, the whole planet heard the stirring words of the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in which the concrete program for mankind to enter the 21st century without nuclear weapons was formulated for the first time.

When Lenin's Decree on Peace, the 70th anniversary of which we will be marking next year, was first published, imperialist politicians declared it to be "fantastical" and "utopian." Anti-Sovietists in the West tried to apply the same method to the 15 January statement, but seeing what mighty support the Soviet program for a nuclear-free world received from all sensible people in the world, they were forced to bite their tongues. Even the bourgeois press organs began to acknowledge that it is the boldest, most realistic proposal ever put forward in history.

The struggle for the implementation of the program put forward in the 15 January statement for averting the danger of war became the central avenue of the Soviet Union's foreign policy for the years to come. The whole of 1986 was dominated by the implementation of this principle. We have reason to say: We did not work or struggle in vain.

Of course, the situation on the planet remains alarming and explosive. Nonetheless, we can now look at the situation in the world with greater optimism than at the beginning of 1986. The gulf between the adventurist circles of American imperialism and the rest of mankind is widening.

To bid farewell resolutely and irrevocably to a way of thinking and acting which was based, for centuries, on the acceptability of wars, to raise political thinking to a level which meets the demands of the nuclear missile age — that is what the 27th CPSU Congress called on the states and people to do. This realistic formulation of the question is persistently forging a path in the political life of the modern world.

The process begun in Geneva could not be broken off. Moreover, in the light of Reykjavik the people saw for themselves: There is a real opportunity to move toward fundamentally new relations between states, and above all to deliver ourselves from nuclear catastrophe. But it is this which the military-industrial complex, which has the White House and the entire U.S. Administration firmly in its clutches, seeks to prevent. The finale of the Reykjavik meeting showed that the "Star Wars" program is still an instrument of obstruction in the hands of the Washington ruling clique.

But this outcome of the talks did not discourage the planet's peace-loving forces. On the contrary, it only strengthened the determination of peace-loving states and peoples to fight to thwart the nuclear militarists' plans.

The CPSU and the Soviet state pose the question bluntly: In present-day conditions the time factor is becoming truly critical. In order to bar the path of the nuclear tornado, constructive actions are needed, and not some time in the future, but this very day.

One such practical action was the Soviet moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. Silence has reigned at the Soviet nuclear testing ranges for more than 500 days. This silence is more eloquent than the explosions which thunder out at the American ranges.

Some of the bourgeois propaganda media are trying to interpret the Soviet Government statement published the other day in this way: "The Soviet moratorium has ended." Not true! The USSR has stated that it will resume tests only after the first nuclear explosion in the United States in the new year. This means that the Soviet moratorium has in effect been extended for another period, the fifth. Thus Washington is being given yet another chance to take the opportunity which exists and stop the explosions. The responsibility for the future course of events rests with Washington, and with it alone.

Peace will be neither universal nor lasting unless there is a normalization of the situation in that vast, explosive region, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Here too the USSR's well-known initiatives are aimed at ensuring that nobody has the right to impose his will on other peoples or pierce the body of Asia with foreign military bases or his own nuclear devices. The declaration on a nuclear-free, nonviolent world signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi a month ago, on 27 November 1986, is a major political document of our time.

Breaking the resistance of imperialist reaction, the new way of political thinking — nuclear and space age thinking — is entering the practice of international relations. The fraternal socialist countries and communist and workers' parties are in the front ranks of this battle. The "Delhi Six" make a major contribution to the cause of normalizing the world situation. The voice of the participants in the Eighth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Harare rang out authoritatively in 1986. This year was also marked by another forum which ended successfully, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The American "No" [subhead]

Recent events have exposed with new force the true nature of the Washington administration's foreign policy course. The mask of demagogic rhetoric about the White House's "love of peace" has disintegrated, and the world can clearly see the real state of affairs. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, for instance, notes: American foreign policy "needs a salvage operation," while in the opinion of THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, an influential journal in U.S. scientific circles, "the Reagan administration has begun a frontal assault on the entire arms control process."

The year 1986 was indeed a year of obstruction by Washington to any step aimed at nuclear disarmament, wherever such calls came from. "No" — that is the only thing the peoples of the world hear from the White House. The year began with stubborn efforts by the extreme right in the United States to extinguish the "spirit of Geneva" and ended with the wrecking of the accords all but reached in Reykjavik, which American Senator C. Pell called a "black day for mankind."

All these are links in a single policy based on the senseless attempt to reverse the course of history. Poisoned by ideas of American "license," Washington politicians still entertain illusions that they will be able to carry out the crazy idea of social revenge on a worldwide scale, although the obvious result of this has been described by the American student of international problems L. Wieseltier as "the great American death throes of power." His appeal to "stop this sanctimonious blather about American purity" is perhaps timely. Indeed, the administration, while sanctimoniously declaring its loyalty to Reykjavik, marked the last days of this year with a sharp new buildup in militarist preparations.

The other side of the coin is the U.S. government's obstructionist position toward any UN resolution aimed at strengthening peace and international security. The voting statistics at the 41st UN General Assembly Session are characteristic. A vast and, in some cases, overwhelming majority of states voted at the session in favor of the adoption of resolutions calling for arms limitation and disarmament.

The unvarying American "no" struck a blow to the peoples' hopes. Only the United States voted against the resolution on the need for fruitful political dialogue with a view to improving the international situation. A total of 154 states voted for the resolution on preventing an arms race in outer space, and only the United States abstained. Only the American representative voted against the resolution on turning the South Atlantic into a zone of peace and cooperation and against the resolution on banning the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. In the vote on such an important question of the present day as the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security, only the United States and France voted against.

Summing up the political results of the year, the American magazine NATION writes: "The Reagan administration's foreign policy has demonstrated its complete bankruptcy." There is probably nothing to add to this conclusion.

The Planet Demands [subhead]

International Peace Year showed that the peoples are not only concerned about the development of international events, but filled with determination to turn these events in the direction of achieving a nuclear-free world. The global antinuclear process has entered a new phase.

Both the governments of a growing number of countries and the people's public movements are pooling their efforts to erect barriers in the path of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the end of the year yet another nuclear-free zone was added to those which already exist in the Antarctic and Latin America — in the southern part of the Pacific covering the vast expanses of that region.

The DPRK proposes that the Korean peninsula be declared a zone free from nuclear weapons. The movement for the implementation of the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe is gathering momentum, and the movement to create a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans is hurrying to meet it. Yet another initiative has been put forward, as if to build a bridge between those ideas — that of creating along the borders between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries a corridor free from nuclear weapons, 150 km wide on each side, making a total of 300 km. As is known, this idea originates from the biggest parties in two states of different systems and political orientations — the SED from the GDR and the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] from the FRG. This is further evidence of the multiplying shoots of the new political thinking in the modern world.

The movement to declare nuclear-free cities, prefectures, and settlements is acquiring considerable scope in the United States, Japan, Canada, Britain, and other countries. In Japan, for instance, in the fall of this year more than 1,000 local organs of power, covering territory inhabited by more than one-half of the country's population, had adopted documents proclaiming the renunciation of nuclear weapons and calling for firm compliance with the three nuclear-free principles. In the United States more than 120 zones have declared themselves free from nuclear weapons, among them several major cities.

This year has seen a good "crop" of militant actions by the masses against the threat of nuclear war. Remember the "Great Peace March," in which some 1,000 American patriots marched 3,800 miles through the territory of 15 states of the country over 280 days, under the slogan "Get Rid of Nuclear Weapons!" Remember the 750,000-strong demonstration on the streets of Madrid, protesting Spain's participation in NATO. Remember the "Peace Caravan" on the roads of Greece and the rallies and marches involving many thousands of peace campaigners in Rome, Vancouver, Helsinki, Hasselbach....

The American side's position in Reykjavik made it particularly obvious to sensible people in the world that the path to real arms control is barred by the "Star Wars" program. Hence the intensifying desire, among scientists in various countries, not to take part in developing [razrabotki] space strike arms within the framework of SDI. By this fall more than 7,000 American scientists had signed a pledge never to participate directly or indirectly in work or research connected with the program. This makes a total of 57 percent of all scientific workers at the leading U.S. universities and

institutes, including 15 Nobel Prize winners in physics and chemistry. In Japan more than 70 percent of members of the physics society have declared that they will turn down a proposal to take part in research under the SDI program, while some 10,000 scientists have signed a protest statement against Japan's involvement in the program. All this is a sign of the times.

Unfortunately, International Peace Year was not marked by true peace in every corner of the world. International tension has not become less acute. The arms race, which is exhausting the people, is even intensifying. The senseless war between Iran and Iraq continues. The heat of military conflicts can be felt from other "hot spots." All the same, Peace Year is not fading into oblivion. The forces of peace have done worthy work on its noble soil. They enter 1987 with new confidence: A nuclear-free world can be built, mankind can survive, and will survive!

'Vremya': U.S. 'Missed Opportunities'

LD292039 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 29 Dec 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; commentary by political observer Fedor Burlatskiy]

[Text] Hello comrades! 1986 -- what sort of year was it for relations between East and West? For our country this has been a year of the most energetic actions in the struggle for the triumph of the new mentality.

Reykjavik was the culmination of this process. Thanks to the boldness and innovation of the Soviet leadership, it was possible, as never before, to bring the positions of the USSR and the United States on the fundamental problems of limiting the arms race closer together. The wave of positive changes coming from Moscow has reached such a height that the attempts by Western countries after Reykjavik to roll it back have failed to nullify its results for the future.

Of no less significance, although for the moment, perhaps, not quite so much not seen abroad, are the efforts of the USSR to implement and upturn to a new level of relations between East and West in the economic and humanitarian spheres. This opens up the road to a better use by all countries of the achievements of the contemporary technological revolution and of the advantages of the international division of labor.

For the United States 1986 has been, it can be said, a year of missed opportunities. This is beginning to be understood more and more even in Washington; such is the main impression to come out of my recent conversation in the United States with representatives of the White House, the State Department, and Congress. Yes, they are looking back more and more often to Reykjavik, where the chance of a lifetime was missed because of the administration's uncompromising position on the SDI program. And unexpectedly, as often happens in politics, this rebounded in the bitter reckoning of Irangate.

What 1987 brings depends on many factors, including unpredictable factors. But one thing is obvious: It is dangerous to lose time. The further things go, the more time will work against the process of disarmament. It will be more and more difficult to try and reach agreement as the United States develops the space arms race and draws other countries into it. Many officials in Washington are currently saying that 1987 can provide a unique chance for an agreement on arms limitations. This is the only way, they contend, for the administration to achieve a major success in the final

period of its stay in the White House, and at the same time deflect public opinion in the country from Irangate. Otherwise, effective talks will become possible no earlier than 1990, because the new president will need at least 2 years to enlist the support of Congress and draw up his policies in the world arena.

Regardless of these considerations, it remains an open question as to whether President Reagan will want or be able to embark on the necessary compromises to achieve agreement. In other words, the struggle goes on. The connections of these times become closer and closer, and deeper and deeper. The new mentality is becoming a more and more effective factor in the peoples' movement against the nuclear threat, for a civilized world and universal prosperity.

PRAVDA Editorial

PM311511 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Year of Restructuring, Year of Renewal"]

[Excerpts]

Now, as the last hours of 1986 are ticking away, the question which involuntarily arises is: Have things become calmer for people on our planet? No, the anxieties have not gone away, but nevertheless mankind's hopes are greater. They were born and strengthened first and foremost by the new and fundamentally important peace initiatives advanced by the USSR and the other socialist countries. Back at the beginning of 1986 the Soviet Union advanced a precise program for freeing the world of nuclear weapons in stages by the end of the current century. It met with the support of all the world's people of common sense. The Soviet state not openly urged new political thinking -- it is translating it into concrete decisions and actions. This was shown particularly graphically by the meeting in Reykjavik, where the Soviet side did everything to reach agreements which could switch on the "green light" on the road to a nuclear-free world. And the Washington administration, feeling the "breath" of the military-industrial complex at its back, was solely to blame for the fact that a historic chance was missed. However, Reykjavik not only gives a reminder of unused opportunities. From the vantage point of Reykjavik it can be seen that there are paths opening up prospects for mutual accords capable of diverting the war threat from the entire globe. And the USSR is persistently struggling and will struggle for this. No serious politician in the West can question the sincerity of our peace initiatives. Soviet nuclear test sites have now been silent for more than 500 days. And now, as is clear from the recent statement by our government, how long the Soviet moratorium lasts depends solely on the United States.

TASS: U.S. 'Lost Chances'

LD041849 Moscow TASS in English 1818 GMT 4 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 4 TASS -- Vladimir Bogachev, TASS analyst on military affairs, writes:

Nearly a year has passed since the time the Soviet Union proclaimed an all-embracing and concrete programme for freeing our planet from nuclear weapons even in the current century. About three months ago the historic Soviet-American summit took place, generating hopes in people for real changes for the better in the entire climate of international relations in the world.

The past year of 1986 was not only a time for hopes, meditations, proposals and discussions at official negotiations and unofficial forums on issues of war and peace. It was also a period of possible practical actions by big and small nations in a vitally important sphere for mankind called struggle for peace in the socialist countries and a campaign for arms control in the Western countries.

What have the two great powers (the USSR and the USA) done in this sphere in the past year?

The Sov. Union has been observing for 17 months the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions declared on August 6, 1985. In the same period the United States staged 14 nuclear weapons explosions at the Nevada proving grounds.

Apart from "freezing" the number of its medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR cut them numerically by dismantling, for instance, medium-range missile launchers on the Kola Peninsula and a great number of such launchers on the rest of the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military areas. At the same time the USA increased to 316 the number of its medium-range missiles in Western Europe, continuing their further buildup on the territory of its NATO allies.

Last year the United States equipped with cruise missiles the 131st bomber B-52, brought to combat positions 10 new MX multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, exceeding thereby limits set by the Soviet-American SALT-2 Treaty. The Soviet which strictly observed all provisions of the 1979 treaty, declared that, taking into account the great human importance of the question and the need for preserving the key limit to the strategic arms race, it would refrain for the time being from exceeding the limits of the SALT-1 agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty.

In the six years of its stay in office the Reagan administration has not taken literally a single practical step which could be regarded, even by people with rich imagination, as a gesture of U.S. goodwill in the field of limitation and reduction of armaments.

Under these circumstances it is amazing that some Western experts seek to protect a concept of equal guilt of the Soviet Union and the United States for lost chances in the past year to decrease the nuclear war danger. Some U.S. pressmen, pretending to be deaf and dumb, claim that in 1986 the Soviet Union has not made either "any specific and actual steps which would fully conform to the interests of disarmament."

U.S. President Reagan likes to say that he has covered an extra mile in questions of arms (?control). However if he continues marching in the same direction in this sphere, soon there will be no agreements on limiting armaments, and the world will be on the brink of a nuclear disaster.

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CSO: 5200/1:27

RELATED ISSUES

USSR ACADEMICIAN BYKOV INTERVIEWED ON INF, REYKJAVIK, TEST BAN

AU141958 Vienna VOLKSSTIMME in German 11 Dec 86 p 3

[Text] Peace policy from the position of a Soviet scientist: Professor Dr Oleg N. Boykov, deputy director of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was recently in Vienna to attend the international forum of peace forces in his capacity as a member of the European Peace Council and collaborator of the Committee for European Security. Hubert Schmiedlbauer conducted the following interview with him:

VOLKSSTIMME: What are the present focal points of Soviet peace policy?

Bykov: The main line of Soviet policy was defined at the 27th CPSU Congress. It consists of consolidating international security while, as we have seen recently, efforts are being undertaken to ensure a radical turn in the entire international situation, above all in the nuclear sphere. But we also have in mind a substantial reduction in conventional armaments, and first and foremost in Europe. What is involved is the elimination of the other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical arms. All this is to take place under strict control, verification with all means. Nevertheless, nuclear disarmament is the decisive thing.

VOLKSSTIMME: What is the primary issue in this context?

Bykov: What is involved here is the elimination of the strategic arms of the United States and of the Soviet Union in the near future. A deadline of 10 years was in principle agreed upon in Reykjavik. Then there is the liquidation of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the ban on nuclear tests, and naturally the prevention of an expansion of the arms race into outer space. These four main elements form the so-called package of our proposals. These proposals were drafted in view of the strategic parity and the conditions that have emerged with respect to nuclear and conventional weapons. These proposals in no way endanger the security of either side. Naturally political will is required if one wishes to embark on such a road. The capacity to think in a new way is needed. For the advocates of the arms race, certain forces that need political confrontation, still exist as heretofore.

VOLKSSTIMME: What is your judgment of the development since Reykjavik, particularly in connection with the development of the peace forces throughout the world? Is there reason for pessimism or for optimism?

Bykov: I believe that the situation after Reykjavik is characterized by the fact that the entire process of disarmament is being activated in many respects. Naturally the opponents of disarmament are also getting more active. But the partisans of disarmament are also acting effectively. I have already spoken about the active foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but the other socialist countries are also pursuing an offensive peace policy. I would like to emphasize in particular that what is important is actual disarmament. Things are no longer as they used to be, when disarmament was, so to speak, a political goal, a remote prospect. Disarmament simply is possible today.

One can begin right away with a 50-percent reduction in strategic armaments; one can start right away with the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. These are absolutely realistic steps.

VOLKSSTIMME: In this context, what is the purpose of the campaign for a nuclear arms test ban? Do you think this campaign could help expedite disarmament efforts?

Bykov: This is an important point in the disarmament process. It is quite clear that the tests do not just serve to refine these weapons but to create new types of weapons, particularly those nuclear components that are required for space weapons. The campaign is also important because the Soviet moratorium is still in effect.

VOLKSSTIMME: Under what conditions is another extension of the moratorium possible and conceivable?

Bykov: It is a fact that the moratorium has already been in effect a year and a half. It is evident that it helped to improve tangibly the atmosphere for negotiations. On the other hand, halting the tests over a protracted time is relatively awkward for that side which is halting them. After all, the United States has conducted 23 tests in the past year and a half. This results in certain technical advantages for the United States. But naturally the problem of discontinuing nuclear tests is of enormous political significance. Our leadership constantly emphasizes that we shall not resume our tests if the United States halts its own.

VOLKSSTIMME: What contribution, in your view, can the neutrals and nonaligned countries make? The Austrian peace movement demands that Austria join the initiative of the group of six states. What can such a step bring about?

Bykov: Certainly such a step is effective, particularly if one considers these countries' position in Europe. The neutrals and the social forces in the neutral countries can play a very positive part. We have already seen this role at the Helsinki problems, in the all-European process, in the problems of security and cooperation. This is also perceptible at the Vienna meeting in the Hofburg palace. This is why the neutral countries and their

public can make a particularly important contribution, because today—I would say—such an unstable equilibrium prevails that all sorts of efforts are required to advance the cause of disarmament.

VOLKSSTIMME: One of the arguments that I have heard recently says: A nuclear test ban is a utopia because the nuclear powers as well as other states believe that nobody is keeping treaties anyway. What is your comment on such arguments?

Bykov: Once a first essential decision about reductions is made, the political and strategic situation will simply change. There will be fewer incentives for a continuation of the arms race. As a result the situation will relax and it will then be possible to tackle other objectives which are more far-reaching and more comprehensive. Halting the tests is indispensable for this, of course. The arms race can develop at an accelerated pace at a time filled with tension as long as there are no treaties about putting an end to this race. Regrettably many people have become used to this unstable situation, particularly political personalities in the West.

VOLKSSTIMME: May one say that optimism is justified?

Bykov: As far as the Soviet side is concerned, it will resolutely continue its road; it will not shut the door against negotiations. It will not permit their ending up in a stream of petty quarreling. Naturally a constructive approach, reciprocity, is also necessary on the other side. But as was noted at the party congress, the Soviet Union will not be satisfied with a negative response. After all, both sides need disarmament. It must be achieved. To this end we need as quick and radical progress as possible.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET BOOK ON POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR

Moscow ORESHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNYY ZHURNAL) in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 51-55

[Review by A.L. Samoylov of book "O vozmozhnosti 'sluchaynoy' yadernoy voyny" (On the Possibility of Accidental Nuclear War] by V.S. Yemelyanov, Nauka, Moscow, 1985, 73 pages]

[Text] The book consists of an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion.

In the introduction, it is noted that there have been profound changes in the military area in the period since the end of World War I. Above all there has been an incredible increase in the power of modern-day weapons. Meanwhile, man himself has essentially remained unchanged and still has all of his shortcomings and weaknesses. His thinking has not become faster, even though he is now helped by computers. The control of up-to-date military technology gives rise to an extremely high nervous tension, which can be one of the causes of the beginning of an "accidental" or "unpremeditated" nuclear war (pp 7-8).

The main path to trust, to the prevention of any war, including an "accidental" one, is the cessation of the arms race and a return to calm and correct relations between states, to disarmament.

The first chapter, "Preservation of Peace--the Most Important Problem of Our Time," reflects the idea that, in addition to the military threats arising as a result of the growing arms race, the transfer of tremendous economic and human resources from fruitful economic and social tasks to nonproductive and wasteful weapons is adversely affecting the vital conditions of all peoples in the developing and developed countries (p 22). Humanity cannot undertake a successful resolution of the tremendous economic and other global problems with which it is being confronted if at least part of the tremendous sums now going into military expenditures are not redirected toward their resolution. Increased tension in relations between states with different social systems creates the preconditions for the start of an "accidental" war (p 23). The logic behind the development of our civilization urgently requires the resolution of the problem of disarmament.

The second chapter, "People Must Know the Truth," notes that the time through which humanity is now living is a period of ever-increasing ideological

struggle. The most reactionary forces of our time concentrated in the United States, in trying to maintain their position and influence on international affairs, are undertaking the most desperate measures and are even committing out-and-out crimes (p 29). In response, the Soviet Union is proposing just one path, that of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous international cooperation. A comparison of the military potentials and technical military possibilities of the sides leads specialists to the conclusion that the imperialist forces will not be able to achieve superiority either through the arms race in the stage of preparation for war or through preemptive strikes. There is, however, a probability of a strategic error leading to war. And it is growing with the increasing level of military confrontation and the forward course of technical military progress. The determination of the countries of socialism not to allow a disturbance of the achieved military strategic parity rules out even the very possibility of achieving success through war (p 33).

It is further noted that the anticommunism of the Reagan administration represents a real danger for all humanity, including the American people. Contemporary anticommunism denigrates and distorts not only the ideology of the working class and the experience of real socialism but also opposes the democratic movement as a whole and historical progress as such. Wherever anticommunism is implanted, it goes hand in hand with racism, chauvinism and the infringement of democratic freedoms.

The third chapter, "On the Possibility of an 'Unplanned' Nuclear War," presents excerpts from numerous foreign investigations dedicated to an analysis of the possibilities of an unpremeditated nuclear war. It notes, in particular, five possible causes for this:

1. Breakdowns in defense systems.
2. Insanity of people.
3. Extension of a limited war.
4. A catalytic war (that is, a war induced by catalysts of some sort.)
5. Diplomatic or military miscalculation (p 37).

Serious strategic changes took place in the 1960's, when the missile took the place of the bomber aircraft; an aircraft can be brought back from a mission in the event of the discovery of a mistake but a missile cannot.

The risk of unleashing an "unplanned" nuclear war is especially serious in countries which relatively recently mastered a nuclear potential but are still not able or willing to put resources into more up-to-date security systems (p 40). The greatest dangers are from disinformation from computer systems, as well as from the existence of technological errors, which can produce a chain reaction in the command centers' responses and lead to the initiation of military actions.

The danger facing mankind since the appearance of nuclear weapons and connected with their stockpiling is incomparably greater than which existed before. All previous wars could be stopped at the very beginning of the military conflict. One could agree on a truce and try to resolve disputes through negotiations. Weapons, although powerful for the time, nevertheless could not instantly annihilate the most important centers of even a small

country. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the increase in their power, and the accumulation of gigantic stockpiles, the situation changed radically: the element of time disappeared from all calculations and considerations. Catastrophic events can begin unexpectedly and in a matter of minutes countries can disappear from the map of the world (p 44).

The very conditions of the storage and transport of nuclear weapons instill alarm, for they contribute to the start of an accidental war because of the possibility of mechanical defects in the systems controlling missile launches, or activation of nuclear weapons, or also because of the receipt of incorrect information (p 45).

Although there is no fatal inevitability of nuclear war, an "accidental" nuclear explosion can lead to its "detonation" and put the entire world on the threshold of catastrophe. The risk of such a possibility can be diminished only by reducing the stockpiles of weapons and ending their further production and improvement. These measures alone will lead to a lessening of tension in the relations among countries and will help to reduce the probability of "accidental" and dangerous incidents that can arise among people, especially those in "contact" with nuclear weapons (p 54).

The fourth chapter, "Can a Nuclear Catastrophe Be Avoided?", emphasizes that there is such a possibility but that there are powerful forces that oppose this and continuously create centers of conflict and high tension in the world. These forces, united in the military-industrial complex, have attained particular importance in the United States. Their extremely dangerous activities can be opposed only through the united efforts of nations (p 56). Throughout the entire history of civilization, there were never such powerful popular antimilitary movements covering the entire planet. They have taken on a global character.

It is extremely characteristic of our time that practically any achievements of science and technology can be used not only for good but also to the detriment of humanity, for the purpose not only of improving types of weapons already in existence but also of creating new types. Among the new types of weapons are the so-called space-based weapons that have particularly alarmed specialists.

A special feature of today's antimilitary movement is the participation of scientists, which is more active than any time before: the scope of the Pugwash Movement has expanded significantly since 1957 and now involves about 2,000 scientists from 75 countries, including a large number of Nobel Prize winners. From their very inception in the framework of the Pugwash Movement, more than 30 important international conferences have been convened in different world centers, as have over 30 symposiums and many working groups, where, in overcoming specific difficulties in the international problems of war and peace, academic experts worked out some conclusions and recommendations that were sent to governments, other scientists, and interested public organizations (p 60). Pugwash established an independent informal channel of communication between the West and the East. To some degree, this makes possible the transmission of qualified information to governments and the public and creates the conditions that make nuclear war less probable.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR WELCOMES VIETNAMESE DECISIONS ON ASIAN SECURITY

PRAVDA Editorial

PM231245 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Dec 86 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Renewal Is the Keynote"]

[Excerpts] The Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Congress, recently concluded in Hanoi, proceeded in a businesslike, constructive atmosphere. The entire course of this congress and the decisions it took are distinguished by a spirit of realism and creativity, critical appraisal of what has been done, and quest for a fresh approach to the tasks of ensuring Socialist Vietnam's continued progress. Vietnamese Communists have every reason to call this forum of theirs a congress of restructuring and renewal.

Socialist Vietnam fully supports the peace-loving foreign policy course of the CPSU and the Soviet state, which is aimed at reducing and eliminating by the year 2000 nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, ensuring the nonmilitarization of space, and creating a comprehensive international security system. The proposals put forward by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Vladivostok, which are aimed at turning the Asia-Pacific region into a zone of peace and security, were highly appraised from the congress rostrum. The congress warmly welcomed the Delhi declaration signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi as a document embodying the will and aspirations of all mankind struggling to create a secure, nonviolent world.

The CPV congress proved a convincing demonstration of the internationalist nature of the CPV, which works for the unity and cohesion of the international communist and workers movement, shows indissoluble solidarity with the liberation struggle of oppressed peoples, and contributes to the cause of social progress and the strengthening of peace throughout the world.

In their turn, representatives of communist and worker parties and other progressive organizations and movements who took part in the congress work expressed their solidarity with the CPV as it resolves the tasks facing it. They supported the efforts by Socialist Vietnam -- an active member of the Nonaligned Movement -- to turn Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and good-neighbornliness.

The Sixth CPV Congress is an important landmark in Vietnam's sociopolitical life.

TASS Report

LD292318 Moscow TASS in English 2301 GMT 29 Dec 86

[Text] Hanoi December 29 TASS -- Vietnam wholly supports the message of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the parliaments and peoples of the world of November 19 and declares resolutely for the elimination of nuclear arms, for guaranteeing reliable security to all countries and peoples. This is said in a statement of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam adopted on the final day of the session of the Republic's supreme body of state authority.

The peaceful call of the USSR Supreme Soviet shows the Soviet Union's lofty responsibility for the destiny of humanity, its resolve to be tirelessly waging the struggle for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, the statement says.

The Vietnamese parliamentarians condemn resolutely the United States striving to military supremacy, to the continuation of the arms race and its spread to space. The blocking by Washington of the arrangement about the possibility of the elimination of nuclear weapons, reached in Reykjavik, the abandonment of the SALT-2 treaty mean gross defiance to the cause of peace and international security, the document says.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA: KIM IL-SONG ADDRESS TO ASSEMBLY ON NFZ, ASIAN SECURITY

PM311039 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Important Initiative"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 30 Dec — To prevent nuclear war and uphold peace throughout the world -- this is the most important task of the modern epoch, Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee and president of the DPRK, declared. Addressing the session of the republic's Supreme People's Assembly which ended here today, he said: We resolutely insist on the speediest transformation of the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone. Ensuring peace in this region is of great significance for improving the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and easing international tension as a whole.

The DPRK leader proposed, in particular, the holding of high-level military-political negotiations between the North and South of the country with a view to strengthening trust between the sides and easing tension and a discussion of questions of mutual cooperation and exchange, of reducing armed forces, and of ending the arms race and large-scale military exercises. The success of such negotiations, he declared, would make it possible to open a top-level North-South dialogue on the chief questions of Korea's unification. The speaker recalled other DPRK peace initiatives and pointed to the need to withdraw U.S. troops and their nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The DPRK, Kim Il-song pointed out, will struggle resolutely for the cessation of nuclear tests, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of the militarization of space and will direct its efforts against imperialism's aggressive intrigues and in defense of peace on the Korean Peninsula, in Asia, and throughout the world. The development of relations of friendship and cooperation with socialist countries in the political, economic, and cultural spheres on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is the DPRK's immutable policy.

The easing of tension and the ensuring of lasting peace, the DPRK leader emphasized, is now the priority question in the matter of implementing Korea's independent peaceful unification. He drew attention to the aggressive U.S. preparations in South Korea, whose territory has been turned into the Pentagon's nuclear base, and condemned the false propaganda about "DPRK plans to attack South Korea." We once again state most clearly that we have no intention of attacking the South, Kim Il-song said.

Dwelling on the prospects for socialist building in the DPRK, he emphasized that the achievement of the complete victory of socialism is its chief task. The speediest resolution of this task largely depends on successes in the economy and the creation of the corresponding material and technical base. It must be laid down during the years of the DPRK's Third 7-Year Plan (1987-1993).

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA: VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL ON ASIAN SECURITY

FM311120 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[*"IZVESTIYA Interviews"* with Vo Van Kiet, member of the CPV Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the SRV State Planning Commission; Nguyen Ngoc Truu, SRV minister of agriculture; and Vo Dong Giang, SRV deputy foreign minister, by special correspondents B. Vinogradov and N. Yermolovich in Hanoi: "Vietnam on the Path to Socialism" — date of interviews not stated; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Excerpts] The Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Congress, which ended the other day, drew up a realistic program of action aimed at the all-around stabilization of Vietnam's socioeconomic development and the creation of the preconditions for accelerating socialist industrialization and the country's progress along the path of socialism.

IZVESTIYA's special correspondents B. Vinogradov and N. Yermolovich asked congress delegates Vo Van Kiet, member of the CPV Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the SRV State Planning Commission, Nguyen Ngoc Truu, SRV minister of agriculture, and Vo Dong Giang, SRV deputy foreign minister, to describe in brief the main results of the Vietnamese Communists' forum.

Vo Dong Giang, SRV Deputy Foreign Minister [subhead]

In speaking of SRV foreign policy, it should be stressed that its cornerstone, as was stated once again at the Sixth CPV Congress, is the strengthening of solidarity and all-around ties with the Soviet Union, relations with which are based on the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation signed in November 1978. Practice has already shown repeatedly that the socialist community countries' unity of objectives and actions has become a powerful factor for peace and progress.

Given the complexity of the development of events in the Asia-Pacific region in the light of U.S. intentions of creating a military bloc here directed against socialism and the forces of national liberation, the CPV, the SRV Government, and all our people assess highly and support fully the program to transform this part of the globe into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation, put forward by M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok. We also welcome the Delhi declaration, which graphically embodies these important peace-loving initiatives.

Traditions of the joint struggle for freedom and common goals unite Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia. [paragraph continues]

The countries of Indochina are pursuing an agreed course aimed at turning Southeast Asia into a region of good-neighbornliness and cooperation. This course echoes the officially proclaimed goal of the ASEAN states -- to create a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality here. It would seem that the path to normalizing the situation is open. But positive changes are slow to come. Why?

We cannot, of course, close our eyes to the fact that many unresolved questions exist in the region, inherited from the colonial past, and indeed from the very recent past, when U.S. imperialism tried to stifle the revolution in the countries of Indochina. However, given goodwill the problems can be settled. Vietnam, together with Laos and Cambodia, is always ready to make its contribution for the sake of normalizing relations with the ASEAN members, which would be a good contribution to stabilizing the situation throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

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RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA CONTRASTS DELHI DECLARATION, U.S. TESTING, CW STANCE

PM311128 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 86 Morning Edition pp 4-5

[IZVESTIYA political observer Vikentiy Matveyev article under the rubric "The Delhi Declaration and the Modern World": "Step Back From the Abyss!"]

[Text] History is not made by written or spoken declarations and statements, but, by expressing the spirit of the times and its demands, they grow wings and influence the course of events.

Is it possible today, more than 40 years after the appearance of weapons of mass destruction in the form of the first American atom bombs, when huge arsenals of these weapons have been stockpiled, to set the task of creating a world free from them? The reality of these arsenals is counterposed to the reality of the threat hanging over mankind. [paragraph continues]

Nuclear weapons are capable of destroying not only everything that man has created over the centuries, but man himself, and even life on earth.

We cannot close our eyes to this, or the world will be like the man who, standing at the brink of the abyss, deliberately deprives himself of vision. The comparison to which the author resorts is, I think, the right one. From 1977 to 1984 the U.S. early warning system gave 20,784 false alarms that the country could be threatened by nuclear attack! In particular, fragments of space devices entering the atmosphere were mistakenly taken for Soviet missiles. Such is the danger merely of the accidental unleashing of war.

But it is not enough to see the abyss into which mankind could be drawn in the event of a nuclear conflict. To stand on its brink and do nothing to step back and erect reliable barrier — that is just as reckless as blindness on the part of the man standing above the abyss.

Mankind is worthy of a better fate than to be hostage to nuclear terror and despair.

The Delhi declaration, signed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Indian Prime Minister R. Gandhi on 27 November, formulates the principles of peace which accord with mankind's moral and ethical norms and with his practical needs and demands. The great strength of this document lies in the combination of the lofty, the humanist, and the urgent elements arising from the specific socioeconomic features of world development.

On the one hand, it points to the importance of acknowledging human life as the supreme value, and consequently the impermissibility and immorality of a philosophy and policy based on violence and deterrence, inequality and oppression, and discrimination by race, religion, or color of skin.

On the other, it notes that only disarmament can release the vast additional resources needed to combat economic backwardness and poverty, and that ending the arms race will create better conditions for tackling global problems. The two things are interconnected. The content of the concept of "violence" emerges in the way which modern reality demands, when there are no colonial empires and when the lofty principles and norms of the UN Charter have been proclaimed, yet there is still no end to much that leads to the use of brute force and results in large-scale bloodshed.

For the initiators and apologists of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, strength was and is a means of pressure even without the direct use of weapons. Pressure in order to perpetuate a system which allows a handful of exploiters to live at the expense of the needs and interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It was no accident that the two states which were formerly the main colonial powers tried not to lag behind the United States in the possession of nuclear weapons (although, as is well known, Washington has repeatedly declared that American weapons serve as an "umbrella" for the U.S. allies).

Weapons of mass destruction and violence are close associates. The whole of postwar U.S. policy is clear evidence of this. That is why no less a person than U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger publicly testified the other day that the Delhi declaration is not at all to the liking of him and his Pentagon colleagues. He devoted his speech to Republican women in Washington wholly to this document.

There is no sense in setting forth the content of the speech. It repeats what the Pentagon chief has propounded many times in expressing his intolerance of socialism. That is what Weinberger's speech was based on. But this is a Soviet-Indian document. It is well known that India has a different system from the USSR's. This did not prevent the two countries' leaders from agreeing on a statement of great political significance concerning not only the USSR and India, but the very future of our planet. The furious cries of the Pentagon figure contain not a word about that -- a characteristic silence.

But might Weinberger be getting agitated for nothing? Could the very scale of the goal set in the declaration be such as to make it extremely difficult to attain?

The Delhi declaration does not ignore this question. It states that building a nuclear-free and nonviolent world requires revolutionary restructuring in people's minds and the education of the peoples in a spirit of peace, mutual respect, and tolerance.

During the existence of the United Nations the number of members has trebled -- mainly because of states which have cast off the fetters of colonialism. The voice of many of these countries in favor of peace and disarmament is heard ever more loudly in the international arena. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the "arms lobby" to ignore it.

Two 30-year-old British Government documents which were published a year ago showed, in the spring of 1955, when the Indian Government put forward an initiative on

studying the question of the consequences of nuclear tests, the originators of the course of stepping up nuclear arms started swarming about like ants whose nest has been stirred up. In the first instance official circles in London proposed to respond to this initiative by denying the pernicious nature of these tests for people's health. The British Medical Association -- albeit without publicity -- objected categorically. Whitehall decided to follow this propaganda line: Tests are needed in order to maintain the West's "deterrent."

Some 8 years passed, and in 1963 the partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed between the USSR, the United States, and Britain -- the first postwar accord, which served as a brake, to some extent, on the progress of the unlimited production of nuclear weapons.

The distance which must be traveled in order to rid mankind of these weapons is immeasurably more complex and longer. But it is no mere mirage, no mere utopia.

It is worth remembering how V.I. Lenin linked the success of the cause of disarmament with progress in the anti-imperialist struggle on a wide international scale, that is, with a significant characteristic of our time.

It is monstrous, but true that the U.S. leaders see the continuation and intensification of the arms race as a means by which they wish to weaken economically the socialist countries, first and foremost the USSR, and thereby to lessen our potential for granting material assistance to the young independent states to strengthen their economic autonomy.

At the same time even the richest capitalist power is stumbling beneath the burden of militarization. A year ago THE WASHINGTON POST wrote that the U.S. state debt, which had risen to 2 trillion dollars, "could literally destroy the American way of life." This was stated by Jack Anderson, cochairman of the presidential commission for monitoring the expenditure of government resources.

For the developed capitalist countries too, a curb on the arms race is dictated to an increasing degree by mankind's common interests of self-preservation and by needs and requirements in the financial and economic sphere. "The strengthening of international stability, with a sharp lowering of the level of armaments, has ceased to be an unrealistic proposition." That is how Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti the other day described what the Reykjavik meeting made clear. He did not go on to explain that it is precisely because of this change that circles in the West, especially the United States, which gamble on the arms race have become alarmed. But the fact that there have been fundamental changes in the general situation is beyond dispute.

Until such time as nuclear weapons are eliminated, the USSR and India propose the speedy conclusion of an international convention banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. With some foundation, they see this convention as a major, concrete step on the path to complete nuclear disarmament.

Six concrete, urgent measures are put forward in the Delhi declaration in order to make the slogan of a nuclear-free nonviolent world a reality:

- The total elimination of nuclear arsenals by the end of this century;
- The prevention of the placing of any weapons in space, which is the common property of mankind;
- A total ban on nuclear weapons tests;
- A ban on the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction;

A ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles;
The lowering of the levels of conventional arms and armed forces.

These are the main avenues, which converge at a single point and form an inspiring
ide both for governments aware of their responsibility for the future of the world,
for broad strata of the public. There can be no illusions about easy movement
ong these avenues. An understanding of the necessity for such movement is
portant. From such an awareness there will and must grow the possibility of such
vement toward a better world for all.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S ARBATOV INTERVIEW ON ASIAN SECURITY, POST REYKJAVIK SCENE

Part I

BK211455 Madras THE HINDU in English 28 Nov 86 p 8

[First of two-part interview with Georgiy Arbatov of USSR Academy of Sciences who visited India as part of a panel of experts in various fields to assist the Soviet delegation in its parleys with Indian counterparts, by special correspondent Manoj Joshi in New Delhi--date not given]

[Excerpts]

Q: Do you see the developments as indicative of the cooperation of Pakistan into the world-wide U.S. security system with this AWACS etc.?

A: It (the AWACS) can look here and there. I think there is a lot of technological-militaristic romanticism. They think this can change the facts of life but it hardly will. The Americans tried to do it with Iran but what happened? I'm not sure what they are doing for Pakistan makes it more stable. [paragraph continues] It actually destabilises the region. Of course it may be part of a grand design to weaken India just as they tried to do it to us by the arms race and the Strategic Defense Initiative. Giving more and more sophisticated arms to Pakistan may also destabilise India which was never a country that they trusted. But I don't want to get into this because I don't want to sound as though I am sowing seeds of more distrust between India and the U.S. than already exists. That is not our policy ...

I would say that most Americans would abhor Pakistan becoming a nuclear power. They are afraid. Their leadership, begging your pardon, is tremendously illiterate. Even in the sense of strategy it doesn't understand the viper's nest it is creating there.

Q: The U.S. has been insisting that the regional issues and human rights should form part of the overall arms control package. Why hasn't the USSR insisted that the winding down of American involvement in Afghanistan or the winding down of the Rapid Deployment Force be included in such discussions?

A: We maintain that this is part of an American game. It should have been understood. Here we were in the midst of important negotiations, a treaty to save the very concept of arms control, the ratification of SALT II, to prevent the breakout from all constraints and there was, according to us, a mutual understanding that this had to be settled. The U.S. Government, not because it wanted to stop the arms race, but because it felt pressure since 1982, agreed to negotiations which ran into

stalemate. These negotiations we understood were the number one problem to be discussed. Then they played the usual trick of substituting the real agenda by something artificial by saying that just as important as the main thing were some regional problems and human rights issues and they tried to create an impression that we were against the discussion of such problems. We said we are not against them but on American terms because when they speak about regional problems they mean breaking the neck of Nicaragua, or how to create a deeper impasse in Afghanistan or support Savimbi (the UNITA leader) in Angola. They did not think of South Africa or a political solution in Afghanistan or the West Asia where the most dangerous situation exists or the Iran-Iraq war. N., they helped Iran as we see. Then you cannot discuss everything in 1-1/2 days, you have many difficult problems and obstacles to overcome and then they say that in order to solve this problem we have to solve 10 additional problems. We said we're ready to discuss but let's not shy away from this main problem of survival of the human race.

Q: There is a lot of talk of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific initiative. If I recollect, the ideas proposed at Vladivostok were put in general terms rather than in any specific manner. How do you envision it? Like the Helsinki accord?

A: I can speak on broad terms as to what can resemble Europe and what cannot... We had a situation in Europe where there were an unprecedented number of weapons and some of the biggest armies in peacetime were lined up against each other. This was obviously dangerous. Also we had in Europe, an unprecedented infrastructure of bilateral and multilateral negotiations and relations as well as agreements. Both the sides created a precarious balance. In Asia-Pacific we have much more recently entered a stage of a threatening militarisation. You have the American fleet, sea-based cruise missiles in particular and we have our own response to this. You have other hotbeds of the arms race and tension. West Asia, the Gulf, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Korea, are all flashpoints.

So our thinking was that this is not normal, this can develop into a very dangerous situation. We must at least initiate moves to discuss security in this region as no one else has taken the initiative. Most of the countries in this area are not actually involved in the process of discussing arms control, disarmament, security issues. So we brought forward in Vladivostok this idea but not as an idea to create a mirror image of what has happened in Europe. By the way in Europe the idea came forward in 1965 and the treaty was signed in 1973, so it took quite some time but we brought it forward as an idea because we understand that there are many more conflicts here. Europe is more or less stable. Though you have revanchist forces in Germany and some other countries the Governments at least don't claim territories of other countries.

Here it is different. Everything is in flux, a very volatile situation prevails. We understand that it is much more difficult, there are many more countries, bigger regions, different systems etc. You need many more participants to start the process.

There are many people in the Soviet Union who believe that India can start the process and carry the torch so as to say and generate new ideas, but the decision is India's. We of course will discuss this with many countries and have already held consultations with Japan, People's Republic of China, etc. To once again state the issue, we don't want to impose on Asian nations some grand design of ours. We aren't so naive! No one can claim that we have any blueprint for so complex an arrangement that any Asia-Pacific security arrangement may involve. But we do think that we can't sit and watch the danger arising.

Part II

BK211505 Madras THE HINDU in English 29 Nov 86 p 8

[Second of two-part interview with Georgiy Arbatov of USSR Academy of Sciences by special correspondent Manoj Joshi in New Delhi--date not given]

[Excerpts] Question: How do you assess the post-Reykjavik scenario in the U.S. and Western Europe? Do you see any changes in the position of West European countries away from stated goals of arms control?

Answer: It was a moment of truth, it demanded truth from all. It has shown everyone real intentions. All people tended to speak of the horrors of nuclear war but suddenly we opened the door and people could see it was possible to achieve non-nuclear world then a lot of them shied away under different pretexts. I don't blame them really, they just have to think it over to understand it deeper. Some instance fear that conventional war will then play a greater role and this will war more possible because everyone is afraid of the consequences of a nuclear war they don't have such a fear of a conventional war. Then, the USSR has a conventional weapons superiority. But I will add here that George Shultz (the secretary of state) and then Donald Regan (the White House chief of staff) actually conceded lately that conventional superiority is not such a problem and NATO can face the USSR. And for the first time they stated the truth. The second point is that Gorbachev's proposal (for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000) was not just a matter of doing away with nuclear weapons only and allow the arms race to continue in some new sphere, but a very big step towards a concept of security in which military force will play a much smaller role and then diminish and be eliminated completely.

Nuclear weapons just impersonate all the evils of modern technology. We have the First World War, which scared the hell out of the world. You may recollect the 'generation' and the 'war to end all wars' etc. and that was a modest war by pre-war standards. Then you have the Second World War, and we know better than anyone what it means. You know that any war now will be much worse and the Europeans will just as scared of a conventional war and I think the world in general ought to be well. You now have non-nuclear explosives which in some cases are not distinguishable from the nuclear ones. Then you have the environmental issues, you know Europe has nuclear reactors, there is so much petroleum, gasoline products stored there as well, a lot of chemical factories, etc., you could ruin the environment.

We don't want to merely replace the nuclear danger with some other danger -- chemical or biological or something new -- that may be invented like meteorological warfare, geological warfare or something like that. Gorbachev's proposals were really the great steps required to do something about this militarised world, steps that vitally needed for the well-being of everyone. Therefore, we proposed this summer Budapest deep cuts in conventional forces as well. This was a formal proposal of Warsaw Pact countries and we have not yet received any response from the NATO countries.

Q: Will the USSR be patient after January 1987 when its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing runs out?

A: I hope we can cling to it as long as we can until it doesn't endanger our security. I am not in a position to state as to when this situation will be reached. I hope it has not been reached. But it will not be an easy decision. I think Gorbachev looks at it in the same way. Unless the resumption of nuclear tests are absolutely necessary to ensure security, he will not be eager to start them. How it will be I can't say. There are two sets of people not very happy with the moratorium, one set is those who have plans for peaceful nuclear explosions and the other set is people with some of the military programmes. It is not very easy for us to see the U.S. modernising its arsenals while for the past one-and-a-half years we have not done any testing.

Q: There is some talk that the SDI is somehow linked to the U.S. desire to retain its edge in high-tech industries. What is your view?

A: More than pumping in money it is also linked to pumping away brains from the rest of the world to the U.S. I have talked to many Americans, they are very concerned. In many key industries like computers, optics, lasers, new materials, they buy off all talent from all the countries in the world. These people don't even join companies like the IBM, companies which played such a tremendous role in technological development. Now they go to this futile project from which cannot get any spinoffs because they are such exotic fields, so there can hardly be anything for civilian economy. They have 100 full time people to recruit people in the U.S. Even the U.S. universities are in trouble because the best people are leaving them. They do the same with Japan and with India. It is a thing for which all will have to pay a price and it is unforgivable stupidity.

Q: Do you see a situation where the U.S. will push West Germany and Japan to militarise further? They have been pushing them for the last five years. Nakasone (the Japanese prime minister) for one is interested in bypassing the constitutional limits placed on this in his country with regard to nuclear weapons etc. This could be one way of reducing their own expenditure.

A: I don't rule out a shift. But I don't think they (the Japanese and the West Germans) will fall into this trap. I have spoken to many Japanese and I hear different things. Some of them think that the SDI is as much against the USSR as against Japanese trade and export industries. One has to understand what is meant under SDI, of course there will be some research in super-computers, optics, lasers and other fields but I don't think that the idea of 'astrodome defence' will survive for many years after President Reagan. And while we are against it as Gorbachev has explained it, even if it is in connection with offensive weapons it becomes an obstacle to any cuts in nuclear weapons. And second, if you concentrate so much money on research facilities and military technology, you would have a tremendous new round of the arms race in all fields nuclear and conventional and offensive and defensive and on the land and on sea. Therefore we fight against it and India also supports this position.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

BOOK ON USSR SECURITY CONCEPT--Moscow, 23 Dec TASS--The accelerating rate of the development of military technology necessitates vigorous efforts to create a reliable universal security and law and order system. This idea is pointed out by Dr.Sc. (history) Boris Petrovskiy in his book "SOVIET SECURITY CONCEPT" which has been published here. The book shows the essence of the Soviet security concept rejecting war as a means of resolving differences between capitalism and socialism. The author recalls the USSR's foreign policy initiatives aimed at reversing the dangerous course of events by force of example and common sense. An example of this is the USSR's unilateral suspension of any nuclear blasts since August 6, 1985. Unfortunately, the book notes, the Washington administration has not supported the moratorium. It was believed in the past that military superiority was the best earnest of security. It is getting more and more evident now that even an enormous arms potential cannot guarantee national security, the author of the book concludes. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2056 GMT 23 Dec 86 LD]

REAGAN'S ARMS POLICIES CHALLENGED--Washington January 7 TASS--Democrats challenged the Reagan administration's arms control policies on the very first working day of the 100th Congress, by officially sponsoring three bills in the House, which the ASSOCIATED PRESS said blocked major White House plans to develop new kinds of weapons. One bill provides for denying funds for the U.S. program of nuclear testing involving yields of over one kiloton as long as the Soviet Union keeps observing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Another one calls for a ban on U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons testing against real targets in space in fiscal 1988, while the third one demands compliance with the SALT-2 treaty which the White House has demonstratively renounced in defiance of congressional opinion. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0805 GMT 7 Jan 87 LD]

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